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# Current Trends in International Migration in Europe

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# 1. INTRODUCTION[1]

During the 20th century Europe has experienced three major periods of movement: around the time of the First and Second World Wars and in the last decade or so. Each of these has been associated with wars and the forced dislocation of population. There have been a few smaller but also intense periods of movement, notably the labour migrations of the late-1960s and the refugees flows consequent upon the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968. Individual countries have also had their own crises such as the migration to France of *pieds noirs* in 1962, Ugandan Asians to the UK in 1972 and the return of Portuguese from Africa in the 1960s and 70s. Specific ethnic groups have, at certain times, been highly mobile, including Jews from Central Europe in the 1930s.

It is undoubtedly the case that the period since 1945 has been one of continuous international migration in Europe, ebbing and flowing but always there. Europe is a beehive with an overall net inflow. Put into context there can be no doubt that the 1990s has been the most migratory for the continent since the Second World War. In that sense recent migration has been historically high. It is a period characterised by new migrations, particularly in the Central and Eastern European region and in the CIS. But it is the wars in the Balkans which have dominated movements in the 1990s which have created a series of crises and imposed intolerable burdens on a migration system that was expanding anyway.

As the Communist dominance in much of Central and Eastern Europe began to crumble, large numbers were able to exit borders that had been tightly controlled although the mass emigrations feared by many failed to materialise. The wars in former Yugoslavia brought sudden and massive forced movements on a scale not seen since the Second World War. By the end of December 1993 they had led to an estimated 4.24 million movements, comprising 819,000 refugees, 1.6 million internally displaced persons and 1.79 million assisted war victims. In late 1996 there were 837,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina receiving Temporary Protected status elsewhere in Europe, though the majority of these have now returned. Kosovo was a further perturbation in the spring of 1999 with estimates suggesting over a million people forced to leave their homes, most returning within a few months.

The former Soviet Union has also been a source of large scale forced movement, totalling about 2.28 million, almost all of the movement being contained within its boundaries. By 1998 an estimated 1.556 million people from the CIS and Baltic states were in refugee-like situations and 1.79 million were internally displaced (IOM, 1999). However, for the most part forced migration in this region has not spilled over into Western, Central and Eastern Europe.

These politically-inspired migrations apart, recorded movements in Europe seem to have peaked in 1992-3, since when a number of trends have manifested themselves. Europe remains a zone of immigration, but with generally falling levels of recorded inflows. Three interrelated but distinct migration regions have developed: Western Europe; Central and Eastern Europe excluding the CIS countries; the CIS. Each of these has a significant degree of self-containment, though all of them are clearly enmeshed in a global pattern of migration. In all of them the political-military perturbations referred to above have affected the flow regimes,

[1] The assistance of Charles Pinkerton and James Clarke of the Migration Research Unit at UCL in the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged.

created human rights difficulties and injected major uncertainties into the policy-making process.

While recorded movements have generally declined in the last few years, major questions surround the frequency of unrecorded and irregular migrations. A commonly held view is that such moves have increased, are increasing, and will continue to do so. Unfortunately, evidence to substantiate such views is hard to come by. As a problem is felt, and measures are developed to counteract it, so its statistical presence becomes more open. It is then a short step to it becoming "an increasing problem".

What is clear is that, in Central and Eastern Europe particularly, there has been a growing amount of short-term, short-distance movement across state boundaries. Most of this is for the purposes of gaining a livelihood by the individual, and is associated with the thriving of informal economies, involving petty trading, labour tourism and other novel forms of migration.

There also appears to have been a steady growth in the migration of the highly skilled across Europe as a whole. While the bulk of this movement is still westwards, the continent is now seeing an increasingly complex pattern of "brain exchange", akin to that long existing among the Western market economies. On the horizon, however, are the increasingly rich and varied sources of expertise in the developing world, and a growing exchange of highly skilled between there and Europe can be expected. An international migration market for skills is now a reality, though European countries are generally competing less actively within it than those of the New World, notably Australia, Canada and the USA.

Today, debates about migration policy in Europe have become focused on three propositions. The first proposition is that *replacement migration* will be needed to cope with population ageing and demographic shortfalls. The various scenarios are supply-side based and take no account of skill requirements. The second is that a *global market in migrants* exists where immigration is regarded as an engine of economic growth. Human resource skills are perceived as national economic resources for which countries are in competition. The third is that for various reasons *specific skill shortages* have emerged which are holding back economic growth. The shortages are caused partly by excess demand for new types of skills, partly by such supply side constraints as inadequate training and poor retention, partly by public sector deficiencies.

## 2. MIGRATION AND POPULATION CHANGE IN EUROPE

The world's population looks set to continue its rapid growth, rising to around 9.3 billion by 2050 (Table 1). Europe's share will be increasingly modest, halving between 1995 and 2050, while North America's will also fall. Only a small proportion of the world's population migrates in any one year, mostly within their own countries. There are no reliable statistics on the total numbers of people who move to another country during any given period, but estimates of numbers of people living outside their own country vary from 50-100 million. What is striking about these numbers is not how many people choose (or are able to choose) to live in another country, but how few.

European countries have experienced differing patterns of population change during the 1990s, although average rates of change during the decade have generally been low. For the most recent

period, 1997-99, 13 of the 46 countries for which data are available experienced losses, all of them in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR (Table 2). None of the losses reached one per cent. Growth rates of over one per cent were in small countries (Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, San Marino), the exception being Turkey.

Past Council of Europe reports have indicated that in recent years migration has become a less important arbiter of change compared with the decade as a whole. Table 2 (also see Figure 1) presents the components of population change for the period 1997-99, indicating that migration was the most important component in 33 per cent (15 out of 46) of the countries, whereas in the period 1990-97, it was 45.5 per cent. Of the 33 countries which had an increase in population during the period, 21 had a net gain of people through both natural change and migration. Of the remaining 12 countries with population increase, four (Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Sweden) had a net loss through natural change, offset by a greater gain through migration and eight (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Poland, Turkey) had a rate of natural increase that exceeded net loss through migration.

There were 13 countries which experienced a decrease in population during the 1990s, seven of which (Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine) had a net loss of people through both natural change and migration. Of the remaining six countries with population decrease, five (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia) had a net loss through natural change which exceeded a gain through migration; one (Georgia) had a gain through natural increase offset by a net loss by migration.

The role of migration in European population change has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years as a result of growing concerns about a cocktail of prospective changes to labour supply and demand. Issues raised include demographic ageing, shortages of working age populations, dependency ratios and payment of pensions, and possible shortages of both skilled and less-skilled labour (see, for example, Punch and Pearce, 2000). The United Nations Population Division has suggested that Europe might need replacement migration to cope with these potential problems ranging from around a million to 13 million new migrants per year between 2000 and 2050 (UN, 2000). Others have contested such a scale of migration as being unnecessary or impractical (Feld, 2000; Coleman, 2000).

## 3. MIGRATION AND MIGRATION DATA

### 3.1 The changing nature of migration

When we use the term ‘migration’, it is not immediately clear what is meant. Traditionally it has been associated with some notion of permanent settlement, or at least long term sojourn. In reality, it is a sub-category of a more general concept of ‘movement’, embracing a wide variety of types and forms of human mobility each capable of metamorphosing into something else through a set of processes which are increasingly institutionally driven. What we then define as migration is an arbitrary choice, and may be time specific.

What we mean by *permanent migration,* for example, is no longer clear; where it occurs, for the most part it does so indirectly as a development of previous temporary migrations, mainly through *family reunion* and *family formation*. Indeed, most ‘permanent’ settlement today may be associated with *return migration* to their home countries by former labour migrants and by certain ethnic and

national groups such as German *Ausseidler*, Ingrian Finns, Bulgarian Turks, Pontian Greeks, and Romanian Magyars.

Most voluntary migration in recent decades has featured *temporary labour migrants*, yet this is an enormously diverse group, including au pairs and domestic servants, agriculture, construction and manufacturing workers, hotel, catering, and cleaning staff. Many of them are *seasonal*, others are *frontier workers*, or perhaps they are *highly skilled* corporate secondees. There are numerous other international movers, whose status easily blends into that of migrant: *cross-border commuters*, *labour tourists* and *petty traders*, perhaps engaged in *incomplete migration*, a state of being in which most of their livelihood is derived from frequent short-term visits to other countries. The new migration space in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is replete with such novelties.

Other groups include *asylum seekers*, *refugees*, those in need of *temporary protection*, *students* and *working holidaymakers*.

Finally, the mobility spectrum must take some account of the vast numbers of *tourists* and *business travellers* . Not only may they take on the characteristics of temporary migrants, but in sustaining a global network of travel infrastructure they help reduce the friction of distance which ultimately makes migration for everyone easier.

It is important that these diverse types of migration are not seen as discrete, since one may easily be transposed into another. For example, an overseas student may marry and stay on; an asylum seeker be given leave to remain; or a landed immigrant fail and go home. Indeed, some authors now suggest that the distinction between forced and voluntary movement may have become too blurred to provide a sound basis for dichotomisation.

It does not therefore make sense to think in terms of rigid categories, nor to place 'migration' at some defined point on the mobility continuum. Migration streams, seen as mobility streams, are dynamic and pliant, involve different types of people and motivations, have different roles and methods of insertion into host societies, and are influenced and managed by different agencies and institutions.

### 3.2 Statistical data problems

In the light of the definitional and conceptual complexities indicated above, it is not surprising that the measurement of international migration is fraught with problems which affect the analysis of patterns and trends, identification of causes, and projection of future potential movements. Much of the current debate about actual and potential international migration into Europe, especially from the East and South, has been limited by the patchy availability of up-to-date, unambiguous and consistent data on stocks of foreign population and flows of international migrants.

The provision of international data across Europe has undoubtedly improved in recent years, though large gaps and inconsistencies continue to exist. The annual Council of Europe publication *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe* lists stocks of foreign population by citizenship and summary statistics on flows for those countries that are able to provide them. The annual SOPEMI report of the OECD *Trends in International Migration* contains a set of standard comparative tables on most aspects of international migration, as well as tables specific to individual countries. EUROSTAT produces an annual volume *Demographic Statistics* which contains aggregated data

on stocks and flows on foreign population, and one on *Migration Statistics* which is more detailed. It has also extended its data collection exercise, in partnership with UNECE and the Council of Europe, to Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries of Cyprus and Malta, using the same set of definitions as those used in Western Europe. A major exercise of standardising data formatting for individual countries for entry into its ACUMEN database, accompanied by the creation of metadata has been compiled.

Although these developments mean that statistical data provision has immeasurably improved, the situation remains far from ideal. Even in Western Europe, the existing data still pose a wide range of problems for the user, arising largely from incompatibility of sources, conceptual and definitional problems. In Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS the problems are compounded by inadequate methods of collection and the lack of well-developed statistical systems. Although considerable strides have been made in some countries in the region, the general picture with regard to data availability is extremely patchy.

A growing problem is the complexity of migration. For the most part the concepts of migration used as the basis for collecting statistics do not reflect many of the realities of today's movements, characterised as they are by new forms and dynamics. Particularly difficult to capture are short-term movements and status changes as well as, most obviously, illegal migrations.

The biggest potential source of inaccuracy in the data relates to those living and working illegally. Sometimes they are included in official figures, sometimes not. Numbers of illegal migrants published or circulated are often police estimates which may be based on numbers of deportations or of regularisations. They seriously underestimate total numbers in an illegal situation because of the reluctance of governments in most countries to find, identify and deport those without a right to be there (or even to admit that they exist). Numbers of women in irregular, domestic and service-sector jobs are likely to be under-estimated because they are 'hidden' in private accommodation, and employers do not reveal their presence. Where estimates of the illegal population are made, it is not always possible to discover how they are reached and these figures should be treated with caution. Even data from regularisation programmes (amnesties) underestimate the total illegal stock.

Since 1995, EUROSTAT and the UNECE have used a similar questionnaire to collect statistics from Central and Eastern Europe to that used for EU and EFTA Member States. From 1999 this collaboration was extended to include the Council of Europe. Thus, the process of harmonisation of statistics that had been going on in Western Europe has been extended to the CEE region. The main rationale behind this process is the closer integration of states across the whole of Europe. This is manifest in various association agreements, but the exercise also draws potential new members of the EU and EEA into a more harmonised statistical system. What now happens is a single, annual, multi-national data harvest.

Despite these developments, considerable gaps exist in data availability in the Central and Eastern European countries. The principal reasons are administrative and legal. In some of the countries no collection system exists for some or all of the statistics required. Partly this reflects the inadequacies of the old systems of data collection in the new political environment; but it is also due to conceptual and administrative difficulties in deciding on and implementing new statistical requirements. Further, in some countries the newly emerging legal frameworks for migration are only now being put in place, and no data collection has yet been instituted. The consequence for users is a partial data series at present, but one which should improve in

the next few years. Only slowly, and haltingly, are the associated metadata and documentation being collected and placed alongside the statistics they describe.

The statistics do begin to allow for the first time a monitoring process for international migration within Central and Eastern Europe. The development of migration policies needs a solid statistical foundation which is now being laid. It is hoped that the data can be used to provide a more accurate assessment than has hitherto been possible of the migration realities of the 1990s. Nevertheless, a statistical 'health warning' should be borne in mind when considering the data presented in much of this document.

## 4. STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN EUROPE

When studying the stocks data, it is important to keep in mind the fact that (as detailed below) many of the 'foreigners' are Europeans living in countries other than the one of which they are a citizen, rather than non-European citizens who have migrated into Europe from elsewhere in the world.

It is also important to have in mind the huge differences in total population size of different European countries, which mean that a foreign population of given size may constitute a tiny part of the total in one country but a substantial proportion in another. Those countries which have the largest *numbers* of foreign residents are not the ones which have the largest *proportion* of foreign residents.

The Council of Europe report on recent demographic developments in Europe (2001) lists seven Council of Europe member states with a total population around or over 50 million: the Russian Federation (144.8million), Germany (82.2), Turkey (65.8), United Kingdom (59.9), France (59.0), Italy (57.8) and Ukraine (49.0). Seven states have a total population of less than one million: Andorra, Cyprus, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta and San Marino. The total population of "Europe" is in the region of 810 million. This is the context in which the following data should be considered.

### 4.1 Stocks of foreign population

The total recorded stock of foreign population living in European countries in 1999/2000 (listed in Table 3) stood at around 21.16 million people. The foreign population thus appears to constitute some 2.6 per cent of the aggregate population of Europe. The greater part of this foreign stock was resident in Western Europe. Table 3 sets out data on 26 European states, from which the estimate of total numbers is derived.

There seems little doubt that in Western Europe as a whole, stocks of foreign population have increased considerably in recent years (Figures 2a-2e). Table 3 suggests that in 1999/2000 or thereabouts (using the latest date for which statistics are available, including 1997 for Greece) there were around 20.55 million foreign nationals resident in Western Europe, representing over 5 per cent of the total population of that area. In 1988 (1989 for Ireland and 1990 for France), the figure for foreign nationals was 14.9 million. Hence, between 1988 and the present, total foreign national stocks in Western European countries have increased by 38 per cent. However, this increase was not spread evenly over the period.

By contrast, although most countries in Central and Eastern Europe have also experienced some permanent immigration, much of it return migration, flows have been modest and stocks of foreign population remain relatively small. Table 3 indicates that in 1999/2000 there were some 603,500 foreigners resident in the countries of that region listed, representing a tiny part of a total population of over 242 million. However, information on stocks of foreign population is only slowly becoming available for East European countries and the data in Table 3 are less than comprehensive, derived from a variety of sources, concepts and definitions. In so far as they are based on official sources, they almost certainly underestimate the real total of foreign population currently living in the countries listed. Transit and other temporary migrants, for example, are excluded.

The situation in the Baltic states is anomalous. Data published for 1996 suggest that around 2.4 million ethnic Russians, with old USSR passports, were resident in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (National Statistical Offices of the Baltic Countries, 1996). The status of these people is under review in the three Baltic states and currently they do not appear in the statistics, either as nationals of those countries or as foreigners.

### 4.2 Rate and direction of change in stocks

Overall, recent trends of change in stocks in Central and Eastern Europe differ from those in Western Europe. The latest statistics indicate that *total numbers* of foreign residents are still growing in most Western European countries but that the overall *rate of increase* in numbers has declined significantly since the early 1990s. The pattern in Central and Eastern Europe is somewhat different. Data for the early 1990s are not available for most countries but figures for the last few years suggest not only a decline in rate of increase but in some countries a decrease in the foreign resident population has occurred.

However, it is essential to scrutinise the experience of individual countries to appreciate that there have been and continue to be marked differences between countries which cannot be detected from the overall picture (Figures 2a-2e). For example, Germany recorded an exceptionally high rate of increase in foreign nationals between 1990 and 1992 which greatly inflated the overall rate of change in Western Europe at that time. By contrast, Spain recorded a drop in stocks of foreign nationals between 1990 and 1991 and, since then, has experienced its highest rate of increase between 1997 and 1998.

Focusing on Western Europe first and including only those countries for which data were available at or around 1981, 1988 and 1999 (the major omissions being France and the UK), rates of increase of foreign national stocks have been computed. During the period 1981-88 the annual increase averaged 122,700 (1.4 per cent), but rose to 789,400 (8.3 per cent) per annum 1988-93, then fell to 210,650 (1.5 per cent) per annum 1993-99. Some 477,800 per annum of the 1988-93 increase occurred in Germany, compared with only 77,580 per annum during 1993-99.

Though rates of change at different points in time differed, most of the countries with year-on-year data shown in Table 3 saw an annual increase in their stock of foreign residents in most years between 1980 and 1993 (every year in the case of Denmark and Finland). Only Sweden recorded as many as five years where numbers declined (1981-5) and only in 1983 did as many as five countries record a decline simultaneously.

In 1994, the situation appeared to start changing. Five countries recorded a drop in numbers of foreign residents and this increased to six in 1995 (Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Norway,

Portugal and Sweden). By 2000 Belgium, Greece (1997), Netherlands (1999) and Sweden had lower stocks than in 1994. In other countries numbers fluctuated: for example, those of the UK fell in 1995 and 1996 then rose strongly. In Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal there were consistent rises; in Germany and Switzerland 1999 saw falls after rises throughout the period as a whole. The evidence overall does not suggest that we are seeing the beginning of a trend of decline in foreign population stocks overall; if anything there is still a strong upward trend. What is apparent, however, is that trends and fluctuations do vary from country to country: Western European states are exerting some individuality in this regard.

The Federal Republic of Germany has experienced the largest absolute increase listed, with a foreign population of 7.34 million in 1999 (including the former GDR) compared with 4.45 million (for the old FDR) in 1980, an increase approaching 3 million. Effectively, this increase in Germany has occurred since 1988. Prior to political events from 1989, numbers of foreign nationals in West Germany had fluctuated around the 4.5 million mark. Other large increases since the beginning of the 1980s include, for the latest data available, Italy (953,000), Austria (478,700), UK (607,000), Switzerland (475,900), Spain (713,700) and the Netherlands (130,600). Hence, those countries with already large stocks of foreign population have recorded substantial increases in absolute numbers.

France is the exception to this generalisation, where the downward trend indicated in the early 1990s has continued. The high rate of naturalisation has reduced the number of those with foreign citizenship in France.

Focusing now on Central and Eastern Europe, the data indicate a general rise in the officially-recognised foreign population in the 1990s (Table 3). The largest numbers are in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Russia. In the Czech Republic, there has been an increase every year from 1990 to 1999, reaching a peak of 228,900 before declining to 201,000. In Hungary, the numbers rose and then levelled out after 1994 at around 140,000, increasing in 1999 to 153,100 before decreasing in 2000 to 110,000, although the data refer only to temporary residence permit holders. Russia recorded 138,300 permanently resident foreigners in 1997, although the trend of change here has been downwards since 1995.

In the remaining countries where data are shown in Table 3, Bulgaria experienced a steady upward trend in its relatively small stocks of foreign population from 1990 to 1998 before a small decline in 1999, the changes here have been in smaller increments than the Czech Republic. Poland's recorded foreign stocks changed little between 1993 and 1996 and then rose to 42,800 in 1999. Slovenia recorded a doubling of its stocks between 1994 and 1995, fell to 33,500 in 1998 before rising again to 42,300 in 2000. Latvia has seen its small foreign population quadruple since 1995. Romania, on the other hand, has seen its tiny numbers of permanent foreign residents decline steadily, halving between 1992 and 1996 (although nearly 81,000 were recorded as temporary residents in 1996) remaining steady in 1997 and 1998, and declining over 1999 and 2000.

### 4.3 Foreign stocks as proportion of total population

The importance of foreigners in the total population varies considerably from country to country, although proportions have been rising generally (Table 4 and Figures 3a-3d). In 2000 (or the latest available date) the largest proportions of foreigners, relative to the total population, were in Luxembourg (36.1 per cent of the total population) and Switzerland (19.1 per cent). In three countries - Austria, Belgium and Germany - the proportion was around nine per cent. In another

group of countries - Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom - it ranged between 3.3 per cent and 5.6 per cent. In all other countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe listed in Table 4, foreign citizens constituted less than 3 per cent and, in all but three cases (Slovenia and the Czech Republic), less than 2 per cent of the total population.

In a few countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Slovenia) the percentage has fallen or remained stable during the latest period for which data are available. Changes in the proportion of foreigners may have occurred for a number of reasons, including rates of acquisition of citizenship by foreigners and updating of statistics.

### 4.4 Nationalities of the foreign population in Europe

There are broad differences between the foreign populations of Western Europe and of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as individual differences between countries. The following analysis therefore looks first at the situation in Western Europe and then separately at that in Central and Eastern Europe.

The composition of the foreign population in Western Europe is a reflection of successive waves of post-war migration associated first with labour shortage and more recently (especially since the mid-1970s) with family reunion and formation, as well as the flight of refugees from war-torn areas both within and outside Europe. The dominant foreign groups within each country reflect the sources from which labour has been recruited since the war; particular historical links and bilateral relations with former colonies; and ease of access (in terms of geography or policy) for refugees and asylum seekers from different places. Despite their recent status as immigration countries, the largest foreign national groups continue to be from the traditional labour recruitment countries of Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece), plus Turkey and former Yugoslavia, and more recently North Africa.

The best available comparative statistics on the national composition of the foreign population are those compiled by EUROSTAT from national sources. Data are available for 2000 for some but not all countries (dates indicated on Table 5), but the pace of change of composition is slow enough for them to give a reasonable picture of the current situation. Of particular significance is the number of fellow EU and EEA nationals in member states, since these groups have rights of free movement and are not subject to the same immigration and residence controls as non-EU/EEA citizens.

Within the EU and EFTA as a whole, there were 20.29 million foreigners of whom 13.04 million (64 per cent) were Europeans. Africans numbered 3.15 million (15.6 per cent) and Asians 2 million (11.1 per cent). There were 18.69 million foreign nationals resident in EU states at the beginning of 2000 (Table 5). About 5.7 million of these (30.5 per cent) were nationals of other member states. It would appear that the relative importance of other EU foreigners in EU states is fairly static, the comparative numbers for the two previous years being 5.6 and 5.7 million (31.9 and 31.7 per cent). The inclusion of the EEA states plus Switzerland (i.e. EU and EFTA) brings this total to 5.67 million, 30.5per cent of all foreigners in the EU.

The data in Table 5 illustrate the considerable diversity of foreign migrant origins that exists in Western Europe. In Luxembourg, Ireland, and Belgium, over half of the foreign population is from other EU countries; for Spain, UK, France and Sweden between a third and a half. Around 60 per

cent of Switzerland's (not an EEA country) foreign nationals are EU citizens. For most countries, however, the bulk of their foreign national population comes from outside the EEA.

The statistics in Table 5 reflect a complex set of geographical locations and migration histories. In the case of the UK, Ireland and Spain, proximity to a fellow EU member, together with a long history of population interchange, is clearly important (although this is not the case for Portugal as a destination). The situation in Belgium and Luxembourg reflects their geographical location, surrounded as they are by larger EU neighbours with open borders.

The significance of other regions as sources of foreign migrants varies with destination country. Africa is a particularly important source for France and Portugal reflecting earlier colonial ventures, and for Italy and Belgium to a lesser extent. America is important for Portugal and Spain (mainly South America), and also for Greece and Italy. Asia is a major source for the UK, Greece and Italy, though for different reasons and with emphases on different parts of that large and diverse continent. The UK receives Asian immigrants mainly from the Indian sub-continent, largely for settlement purposes; Italy's Asian contingent is mainly from South East Asia (particularly Filipinos); Greece's comes from proximate countries in the Middle East region.

The dominance of Germany as a destination for foreign nationals from non-EU European countries is also clear: it received over a quarter of EEA (plus Switzerland) foreigners, over half of those from Central and Eastern Europe and three-quarters from Other Europe (which includes Turkey). Germany's Asian numbers are enhanced by Vietnamese recruited to the former GDR. However, African nationals in Germany are comparatively few. Despite the links between Spain and Portugal and the Americas, the UK receives the largest proportion of foreign nationals from that continent (mainly the US) and, not surprisingly, about three-quarters of those from Australasia and Oceania.

Analysis of the data in Table 5 with earlier years demonstrates, not unexpectedly, a stable distribution pattern that changes only slowly, as a result of net migration flows. It serves to emphasise that Western European countries may well have sharply divergent perspectives on migration, derived from their different foreign stocks.

Data availability on the nationalities of the foreign population in Central and Eastern Europe varies from country to country. The major part appears to comprise nationals from other Central and East European states, though the picture is clearly not static and is complicated by changes in numbers which result from changes in citizenship.

Hungary exemplifies the complexities of change in some countries. Around three quarters of the foreign population of Hungary in 1997 were from Central and East European countries, particularly those with common boundaries. Some 43 per cent of the total (62,000) were from Romania, with citizens of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union also in significant numbers. At the same time, the numbers of foreign residents from virtually all EU and EFTA countries had increased since 1995 (with Germans forming the largest group), as had the totals from other parts of the world, whereas the numbers from some parts of Eastern Europe, including Romania, had fallen. However, other sources (Juhasz, 1998) explain that more than half the foreign residents in 1997 were ethnic Hungarians, two thirds coming from Romania, and that between 1990 and 1997, a total of 56,000 people were granted Hungarian citizenship, a majority from the territory of Romania. In 1998, 77,400 foreign citizens lived in Hungary as permanent residents. In view of the largely unchanged in- and outflows, Juhasz (1999) suggests that a fall in naturalisation might be a cause of the growth of the permanent foreign population.

In the Czech Republic, another country with relatively large foreign population stocks compared to others in Central and Eastern Europe, nationals of Slovakia (40,400) and Ukraine (65,900) constituted 46.4 per cent of foreign nationals with long-term residence permits in 1999, down from 48.6 per cent in 1996. The other larger groups were Vietnamese (24,800), whose numbers had risen significantly since 1994 (9,600), and Polish nationals (18,300) whose numbers have fallen in recent years. Citizens of Russia (16,900), Germany (6,100), Bulgaria (5,000) and China (4,300) were the other main groups. The stocks of long-term residents from Western countries have been slightly decreasing in recent years (Maresova, 2000).

The third country in Table 3 with foreign population stocks exceeding 100,000 is Russia. There appear to be no available data on Russia's foreign population comparable to that given for other countries above. The complexity of population movements in the former Soviet Union are summarised in Section 5 and something about the foreign stock may be inferred from this.

Overall, the political changes which have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe over the last ten years and the various kinds of turbulence which have resulted have generated a complex pattern of movement *within* that area, as well as *into* that area, by people whose origins lie there. This fact seems to account for much of the change in foreign population stocks during the 1990s and their nationalities. On the evidence available, stocks of foreign residents from other parts of Europe and other parts of the world remain a small proportion of the total but there are significant differences between countries both in the dominant minority national groups and in the way they are changing. At the same time, there are substantial numbers of temporary and transit migrants from outside Central and Eastern Europe whose presence is described further in other sections.

## 5. FLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION

The data problems discussed above apply *a fortiori* to migration flows. Statistics on emigration are particularly problematical; many countries do not collect them, and those that do tend towards underestimation (Salt, Singleton and Hogarth, 1994; Salt *et al*., 2000). Even in countries with well developed data collection systems, more often than not there are substantial differences between the estimates of a particular flow made by its origin and destination countries respectively. It is still surprisingly difficult to monitor migration flows involving the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The recording systems developed during Communist times were designed to record only certain types of flows, mainly those regarded as "permanent", and have proved grossly inadequate for assessing most of the flows that have occurred in the region since 1989. Indeed, many of the categories of movement seen there defy most collection systems regarded as "normal".

### 5.1 Flows of migrants into and within Western Europe

Around 1985 a clear change in the trend of inflows into Western Europe occurred (Table 6, Figures 4a-4g). Outflows have fluctuated, varying from country to country (Table 7, Figures 5a-5f). The countries where data were available for the period 1980-99 (Table 8, Figures 6a-6d) saw a net aggregate gain of 8.48 million by migration.

Net gains would appear to have fluctuated. In the first half of the 1980s, inflows of foreign population declined, with even net losses indicated for Germany (1982-84), Luxembourg (1982)

and Switzerland (1983). From the mid-1980s the data suggest that there have been net gains for most countries (with the exception of Iceland). Since 1994 net gains have, on the whole, tended to fall in those countries for which data are available, with Germany recording net emigration in 1997 and 1998, resulting from the return of Bosnians with temporary protection. In 1999 Germany reverted to a substantial net increase.

In 1999 (Italy, 1998), the aggregate net gain in Western Europe for the countries listed was 608,100, the main gains being in the UK and Germany. This compares with 1993 when the net gain was 592,000, around half of which was accounted for by Germany. In 1980 Germany had 52.1 per cent of the gain (in the eight countries for which data are available for the years 1980, -88, -92 and –99), rising to a peak of 68.4 in 1992 and then falling again to 37 per cent in 1996, after which Germany had a deficit because of the return of temporarily protected Bosnians. The Netherlands share fell from 11.9 per cent in 1980 to 6.9 per cent in both 1988 and 1992, then rose to 9.5 per cent in 1999. The UK's share of the net gain rose from 5.9 per cent in 1980 to 6.2 in 1988 declining sharply to 2.6 per cent in 1992, increasing rapidly in recent years to 12.0 per cent in 1994, 21.2 per cent in 1996 and 31.2 per cent in 1999. These three countries' shares of foreign population gain in the EU and EFTA have differed throughout the period 1980-99, reflecting both changes in net gains in these countries and in the other countries for any given year. For 1999, trends vary. Germany experienced a greater net gain; Denmark and Italy (since 1996) had falling net gains, Finland had little change.

It should nonetheless be noted that these data probably underestimate total net inflows, since for the most part they exclude asylum seekers and some categories of temporary immigrants, many of whom it is known stay illegally.

## 5.2 Flows of migrants involving Central and Eastern Europe

### 5.2.1 Numbers

It is clear that the lifting of the Iron Curtain heralded increases in migration flows both within and from the region. One estimate is that in the early 1990s the annual average number of officially recorded net migrations from Central and Eastern European countries to western countries was around 850,000 (Garson, Redor and Lemaitre, 1997), compared with less than half this in the three preceding decades (Frejka, 1996; Okolski, 1998). Most emigration during the Communist period was ethnically based, mainly Jews and Germans. Permanent emigration flows are summarised in Table 7.

Most flow data on foreign immigration in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe refer to permanent immigrants; thus they considerably under-record total flows. Numbers are modest and generally not rising (Table 6). Many of those recorded are former citizens who left during the communist period, many becoming naturalised in their new countries. Peak flows were in 1991 or 1992, two or three years after the return to democracy, a pattern consistent with the idea that the relatively small numbers of those who wished to return waited until they were confident that political change was irreversible. In 1999 Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland andRomania recorded net outflows. Russia continued to have the largest net inflow though much reduced, almost entirely from parts of the former USSR, with a level much below that in 1994.

### 5.2.2 Types of migration

During the 1990s Central and Eastern Europe as a whole has been characterised by several major types of migration which have been widespread and numerically very important. These

are ethnically based migrations; transit migration by people from within and beyond the region, most of whom seek to move to Western Europe; migration by those seeking protection; and the substantial movements that have occurred between the successor states of the USSR.

Within this overall typology, a set of geographically more selective flows has been identified by Okolski (1998):

- temporary labour migration westwards involving, for example, Albanians going to work in Italy and Greece, Estonians and Russians to Finland, Romanians to Israel, Czechs, Bulgarians, Poles and Hungarians to Austria and Germany;

- intra-regional flows of workers, notably Ukrainians, Belarussians, Romanians and Russians to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland;

- inflows of workers from some developing countries, such as Chinese and Vietnamese to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

- inflows of mainly highly skilled workers from Western Europe, especially to the Czech republic, Hungary and Poland;

- return migration, for example, to Poland, Bulgaria and Romania;

- ethnic migrations from Poland, Romania and the former USSR, especially to Germany, Israel and the former USSR.

Superimposed on these patterns of migration is a complex mosaic of relatively short-term movements based on "labour tourism" and petty trading, and comprising a highly intensive shuttling back and forth across international borders in order to make a living. Traditionally not regarded as migration, such movements have forced themselves into the migration lexicon simply as a result of their volume, economic importance and novelty. Okolski (1997) has categorised many of these moves as "incomplete migration", the term describing a situation in which those involved make frequent, short-duration trips abroad to earn a living while maintaining a home in the origin country. "Incomplete migrants" are characterised by a 'loose' social status and/or flexible occupational position in the country of origin; irregularity of stay or work in the country of destination; while maintaining a steady residence and household links in the country of origin. Often distance of move is short, perhaps only cross-border. Although individual stays abroad may be measured in days rather than weeks, during the course of a year the majority of the migrant's time will be spent away from home in a foreign country.

These movements are closely related to the growing informalisation of the economies of the CEE countries associated with their political and economic transformation. The quickest employment growth in these countries has been in the informal sector where there are many seasonal and temporary jobs but which do not provide a stable source of income and which are regarded by many workers as a supplement to what can be earned abroad. A dual livelihood has been created consisting of labour emigration, predominantly in the informal sector in the destination country, and work in the informal sector at home.

### 5.3 The migration of the former Soviet Union

Migration in the former Soviet Union is currently characterised by internal circulation, with some international spillover. The causes of this movement are multiple, and include falling living standards, socio-political instability and a series of armed conflicts. The result is a complex typology of movement, some elements of which may be characterised as 'normal' (such as labour migrations), others as the products of a series of emergencies. The data in Table 6 record annual inflows to the Russian Federation, most of them coming from elsewhere in the former Soviet Union (the 'near abroad'): numbers have clearly fluctuated, but since the peak of 1994 there has been a marked downward trend.

The migratory trends and patterns of the CIS states during the 1990s and particularly during 1997-8 have been analysed in a report of the IOM Technical Co-operation Centre for Europe and Central Asia (IOM, 1999). The situation is summarised in Table 9. The Russian Federation remains the principal migration partner of all the CIS countries, absolutely and relatively. The overall decrease in migratory movements in the region during the period 1989-97 can be attributed mainly to the fall in Russian outmigration. There has also been a fall in the relative significance of ethnic movements in recent years, the pattern of flows in recent years bearing a closer resemblance to that in the Soviet period.

The depressingly long list of emergency migrations includes those stemming from conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Chechnya. It is estimated that around 2.4 million persons have been refugees or in refugee-like situations since 1989. A further 2.9 million have been internally displaced, including Armenians (72,000), Azerbaijanis (600,000), Georgians (274,000), Russians (194,000) and Chechnyans (153,000) (IOM, 1999).Since the mid-1980s around three quarters of a million migrants have been forced to resettle owing to environmental degradation (IOM, 1999), the bulk of them stemming from the disaster at Chernobyl (it has been estimated that up to 3 million more are still living in contaminated areas (Omelyanets and Torbin, 1991; quoted in Shamshur, 1995). Other displacements are in the Aral Sea basin and around the Semipalatinsk nuclear test area in Kazakhstan.

Other large scale migrants include repatriates within the former Soviet Union, most of them Russians returning to Russia. Causes of these movements are complex, although push factors seem to be dominant. Amongst the earliest repatriates have been those ethnic groups deported by Stalin away from their traditional areas of settlement (such as the Crimean Tatars, about a quarter of a million of whom are estimated to have returned to the Crimea by mid-1995 (Shamshur, 1995)). Overall, an estimated 4.7 million people may be regarded as repatriants, though not all of these are recent: Russian speakers particularly have been repatriating from elsewhere in the CIS since the 1970s. This trend accelerated in the 1980s, and involved increasing numbers of other ethnic groups, particularly those of Central Asia: for example, between 1991 and 1996 an estimated 155,000 Kazaks repatriated from the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Mongolia and Iran (IOM, 1997b), the number in 1997 being 11,600.

A related trend to repatriates is the return of ethnic groups who were forcibly deported from their historic homelands. Around a million of these have moved since the mid-1980s, including Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians (IOM, 1997b), with 150,000 "returning" in 1997 alone.

The number of 'normal' migrants within and from the former Soviet Union is not easy to calculate because of poor statistics. It seems that most labour migrants go to Russia, numbers are high, and

most movement is short-term. It was estimated in the mid-1990s that Russia hosted about 100,000 migrant workers engaged in compliance with intergovernmental agreements, but this may well be a big underestimate (International Herald Tribune, 1994; Shamshur, 1995). Recently, numbers of labour migrants within the CIS have been rising again as a result of changing socio-economic conditions. In 1997 241,000 labour immigrants were hired, 186,000 of them from the CIS. Ukraine (32 per cent) is the main source, followed by Turkey (14 per cent) and China (9 per cent). Over half the documented labour migrants are in construction, 10 per cent each in agriculture and manufacturing (IOM, 1999). So far these migrations have been largely contained within the CIS rather than spilling over into the rest of Europe. There is evidence of large scale illegal migration: the Federal Migration Service of Russia reported in 1994 that there were about half a million immigrants from Asia, Africa and the Middle East who had entered in violation of passport and visa procedures (IOM, 1994). Belarus reported between one and four hundred thousand illegal entrantsover a two year period (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995).

Data on migration exchanges with non-CIS countries are variable in quantity and quality. Emigration from Russia to non-CIS countries is estimated at 83,500 in 1997, down from the peak of 113,900 in 1993, but well above the 47,600 of 1989. The vast majority of emigrants went to Germany (58 per cent), though the proportion has been falling, Israel (15 per cent) and the USA (11 per cent), although in 1997 the number going elsewhere doubled (Table 10). These numbers refer only to those moving for permanent residence: the number going abroad temporarily is unknown but likely to be high. Emigration from Ukraine totalled 190,000 in 1997; about 52,000 went to non-CIS countries, mainly Israel, USA and Germany. For Belarus permanent emigration to CIS countries was 9,700 in 1997 while that to non-CIS countries was running at 8,900; about the same as 1995 and well below the peak of 34,000 in 1990. Again, Israel, USA and Germany were the main destinations.

### 5.4 Europe's migration fields

What has been the outcome for the European migration system as a whole of the trends in migration flows and the processes creating them indicated above? Table 11 is an attempt to measure the degree of self containment within Europe of the migration fields of individual countries, based on the proportion of immigration and emigration flows to and from the regions listed, and using the latest available data for those countries for which appropriate statistics exist. For both flow directions there are considerable differences between countries.

With regard to immigration, countries fall into several groups. For those in Central and Eastern Europe for which we have data (notably the Baltic states and Slovenia) the vast majority of immigrants come from elsewhere in Europe, mainly from other CEE countries, and with only small proportions from EU and EFTA states. Scandinavian countries also display a relatively high degree of 'Euro self-containment', mainly from EU and EFTA states, and from 'Other Europe' (largely Turkey and former Yugoslavia) with only small proportions of flows from Central and Eastern Europe. Germany's immigration field is strongly European, and along with Austria and Finland receives a high proportion of its immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast, almost a third of the UK's immigrants come from outside Europe. The Mediterranean countries also tend to look beyond Europe, as does the Netherlands.

Emigration data project a stronger picture of regional self-containment (the data for Spain are anomalous, including only Spaniards known to be moving abroad). Most of those leaving the

Central and Eastern countries go elsewhere in the region and only Germany and Austria in the west send a substantial proportion eastwards. Romanian and Slovenian data suggest a strong tendency for movement to EU and EFTA states, though in the case of the former there is some dispersion further afield, especially to North America.

It is difficult to generalise from Table 11 because of data interpretation problems for some countries, and the absence of statistics for many others. Nevertheless, three major conclusions may be drawn. First, there is some evidence of regional self-containment, especially for Central and Eastern European countries, in that the majority of exchanges are with elsewhere in Europe as a whole or its constituent parts. Second, there are marked differences in the migration fields of individual countries, reflecting a range of historical (such as post-colonial links) and geographical (especially proximity) processes. Finally, the patterns depicted reinforce the diversity of migration experience across Europe.

## 6. LABOUR MIGRATION

### 6.1 Stocks of foreign labour in Western Europe

It is more difficult to obtain accurate and comparable data across Europe for stocks of labour than for the foreign population as a whole. There are problems of knowing who is included, and which sources might be used. In addition, unrecorded workers are almost certainly proportionately more important in the labour market than are unrecorded residents in the total population.

The evidence from Table 12 suggests that in Western Europe around 1999/2000 (using the latest data for each country) there were about 7.88 million recorded foreign workers. This represents an increase of about 32.2 per cent on the 1988 figure (5.96 million) but only 6.5 per cent on that for 1994 (7.4 million). Indeed, it would appear that over the last few years stocks of recorded foreign labour have changed little. This is in contrast to the situation earlier in the 1990s when Western Europe increased its foreign labour force as the economy went into recession. A longer term perspective may be had by comparing the situation in 1980, 1988 and 1999 for those eight countries in Table 12 for which data are available throughout. In 1980 these countries had 4.63 million foreign workers, but by 1988 this total had fallen slightly to 4.45 million (-3.9 per cent); in 1999 the number had risen to 5.23 million, an increase in eleven years of 780,000 (17.5 per cent). For these countries, therefore, all of the increase in the foreign labour force since 1980 occurred after 1988.

The period since 1988 has, however, been one of fluctuation. For all countries listed (except Turkey) a comparison of the situation in 1988, 1992 and 1999 (or latest data available) has been made. In 1988 total numbers of recorded foreign workers were 5.9 million; by 1992 these had risen by 23.1 per cent to 7.3 million but rose 7.7 per cent to 7.86 million in 1999. It would appear therefore that increases in Western Europe's recorded foreign workers occurred almost entirely in the late 1980s and early 1990s and that since then the numbers have hardly changed.

Despite the general increases in the stocks of foreign population between 1980 and 1999 (Figures 7a-7e), changes in the stocks of foreign labour have varied between the traditional countries of immigration. In 1998 the recorded stock of foreign labour in Germany (1.99 million) was 1.4 per cent lower than in 1980, despite an increase of 64.4 per cent in the foreign population. These figures do not include ethnic Germans 'returning' from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet

Union. From 1980 to 1999, Austria's foreign labour stock increased by 91 per cent (158,900), compared with a 165 per cent increase in foreign population. In Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, for example, stocks of foreign workers fell during the early 1980s, reflecting the general economic downturn, reached a low point in 1984 or 1985, and then recovered to levels well in excess of those at the start of the decade. Increases in the late 1980s and early 1990s thus augmented an already rising trend.

In the last few years trends in foreign labour stocks have varied between countries. Germany, Ireland and Switzerland recorded falls in numbers, though for the last the situation stabilised in 1999; in contrast, Austria, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain had relatively large gains although in the latest years these gains have levelled off. Numbers in the UK have risen, especially in 1997-98. Partly these differences reflect responses to the economic cycle, but they also reflect the statistical capture of foreign workers. In most countries the real numbers of foreign worker stocks are higher because of the presence of illegal workers.

The majority of foreign workers in Europe in 1999 - like the majority of the foreign population - were concentrated in the Federal Republic of Germany and France, with a total of over 3.56 million workers. The UK also had over a million. The foreign labour stocks of each country reflect their respective foreign nationality population. The largest groups of foreign workers in Germany are Turks, Yugoslavs and Italians; in France, Portuguese, Algerians and Moroccans; in the UK, Irish. Turks are the largest single foreign worker group in Germany, the Netherlands, and the second largest group in Austria; Yugoslavs are the largest group in Austria, the second largest in Sweden and Switzerland; whilst Italians are the most prominent group in both Switzerland and Belgium. In addition to their numerical importance in France, Moroccans are the second largest group in both Belgium and the Netherlands.

The available statistics on the numbers of foreign workers in Eastern Europe are limited. Those in Table 12 are from official sources, and thus omit the large number of transient and illegal workers. The numbers recorded are low, certainly in comparison with those for Western Europe, and in recent years have fluctuated. Outside Russia, the Czech Republic has been the main destination, numbers there doubling since 1994, although in 1997 and 1998 there was a downward trend.

### 6.2 Flows of labour

The mid-1980s turning point in total population flows in Western Europe was echoed by inflows of labour, with steady increases in all the countries listed in Table 13 (see also Figures 8a-8d) until the early 1990s, since when there has been a general downturn in labour inflows for those countries for which data are available. In the last couple of years there is evidence of an upward trend in several countries, notably Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Spain, the UK and Germany in 1998 and 1999. To some extent the upturn is a response to economic growth, with skilled labour being especially drawn in. However, the statistics underestimate total flows, those for Germany, for example, excluding ethnic Germans. Unfortunately reliable data on outflows of workers are not available, making it impossible to produce net labour flows.

Temporary rather than permanent migration, mainly for work purposes, was typical of Eastern Europe and the USSR during the communist period. Principal origins were 'fraternal' regimes such as Vietnam, Cuba and Nicaragua. Since then new inflows of workers have occurred, polarised between the highly skilled (mainly from the West) and those finding niches at the bottom end of the labour market (mainly from Romania, Bulgaria and the CIS, and from the Third World).

While permanent emigration from Eastern Europe has been lower than many expected, substantial temporary labour emigration from the region to Western Europe has occurred. The reasons seem to be general: freedom to leave; rising unemployment and declining standard of living for some groups; the existence of better paid jobs (some illegal) abroad. The results of this emigration are twofold. In some regions remittances and savings bring in income to local economies; elsewhere shortages of labour occur which are increasingly being filled by foreign labour.

The total number of people from Central and Eastern Europe working outside their own country is unknown, although EUROSTAT data on total numbers of foreign citizens for the EEA countries and Switzerland provide some guide (Table 14). Data on inflows of foreign labour in Central and Eastern Europe are at best only indicative, and there is little evidence of a strong trend though 1997 data for Hungary and Poland suggest increases (Table 13).

### 6.3 Characteristics of foreign employment

Foreign workers enter the complete spectrum of occupations in immigration countries, but are increasingly to be found in tertiary and quaternary sectors rather than manufacturing. Much of the immigrant flow is into highly skilled jobs, and the work permit systems of most countries now select in those with high levels of expertise. However, there is increasing evidence of polarisation, with large numbers of jobs being filled at relatively low skill levels, especially in labour intensive occupations such as catering and cleaning. Many workers finding their way into these jobs are in an irregular situation.

The sectoral distribution of foreign workers has been analysed in successive reports of the SOPEMI committee (OECD, 1995, 1997). Results show that foreign employment continues to be concentrated in certain sectors, for example mining and quarrying and manufacturing in Germany, construction in France and Luxembourg and selected service industries in the UK. However, in most Western European countries, foreigners are to be found in all sectors, with a fairly consistent trend being towards greater presence in services as a whole. There is some evidence for recent years to suggest that in a number of countries foreigners are over-represented in industries where employment is declining faster than the average. This may partly explain the generally higher unemployment levels of foreign workers when compared with indigenous ones.

In Central and Eastern Europe many foreign workers are in highly skilled occupations, frequently corporate expatriates. There are some echoes, however, of the guestworker phase of Western European immigration in the 1960s: Ukrainian workers in Poland are found in substantial numbers in agriculture and construction (Stola, 1997). The bulk of labour immigration in the region seems to be in low-skilled employment, often in the informal sector, and involving marginal activities such as petty trading and short-term manual work. In the Czech Republic, for example, most Ukrainians are in manual jobs, mainly in construction, manufacturing and agriculture; their working conditions are poor and they are paid less than Czechs doing equivalent work (Maresova, 1999).

### 6.4 Migration by the highly skilled

Migration by the highly skilled has come into prominence only recently, for the most part from the mid-1980s onwards. In many respects it is a child of economic globalisation and the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs). It is now widely accepted that its economic importance far outweighs the relatively small numbers involved, although it must be said that detailed statistical

information is severely limited (Salt, 1997). Scrutiny of the work permit systems of most European states indicates clearly that professional, managerial and technical workers more often than not constitute the bulk of those accepted: in the UK, for example, they have consistently accounted for around 80 per cent of all work permit issues. Within Western Europe as a whole a complex series of "brain exchanges" has developed, superimposed upon the free movement system inherent in the operation of the European Economic Area (EEA). To this has now been added a new set of movements, part of the integration process in the European economy as a whole.

In the last year or so, several countries in Western Europe have taken steps to increase their immigration of skilled workers. Germany has introduced a 'Green Card' system to attract 20,000 IT workers to fill shortages, although so far it has had difficulty in finding enough potential migrants with the necessary skills. The UK government has also adopted a more positive attitude towards skilled labour migration, making changes to the work permit system which are designed to increase the inflow of a range of skilled occupations, including IT and medical personnel.

Much of the discussion of the migration of the highly skilled has focused on the potential for a "brain drain" from east to west (see, for example, Studi Emigrazione, 1995). This growing interest has taken place within a vacuum of systematic data. Most of the information is derived from statistics showing: the decline in employment in the scientific sector for several countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; the arrival of scientific personnel from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in countries of Western Europe; and surveys conducted amongst scientific personnel still in the East concerning their future intentions regarding international migration.

These data do not indicate the massive actual and potential brain drain from East to West, with negative impacts upon sending countries, that is sometimes suggested. After the collapse of Communist regimes in the Eastern bloc, their science sectors were relatively overstaffed yet underfinanced. The subsequent reduction of staff in these sectors occurred very quickly. It would appear that the majority of personnel who left the science sector remained within their country but sought employment in alternative work in the private sector. Only in the former Soviet Union does it seem that the collapse and subsequent decline in employment and investment in the scientific sector resulted in increased brain migration.

This information should not be used to suggest that the movement of more skilled people from East to West has been inconsequential. For example, the level of education of migrants to and from Russia is noticeably higher than that of Russia's population (IOM, 1997a). The share of persons with professional qualifications is 1.5 times higher among migrants than in the general population. Ukraine's experience was similar, with 18 per cent of emigrants having higher education in 1996, and an estimated net migration loss of such educated people totalling 11,000 for the year. Georgia has also experienced a considerable brain drain in recent years at a time when it needs to capitalise on its intelligentsia to rebuild its economy (IOM, 1997a).

The migration of highly skilled staff has not been one way. As the economies of the region have become more internationalised, so there has been a substantial west-east flow of corporate staff, consultants, educationists and others (Hillmann, 1997). This process seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

Movements of highly skilled staff between Western and Central Eastern Europe have been subsumed within larger studies recently of the likely migration impacts of enlargement of the EU eastwards. The estimates by Bauer and Zimmerman (1999), Fassmann and Hintermann (1997)

and Salt *et al.*, 1999) suggest an influx of between 1.16–1.96 million immigrants from the first wave countries over a period of roughly 15 years. This is equivalent to 1.89–3.2 per cent of the population of these countries.

## 7. ASYLUM

### 7.1 Trends in numbers of asylum applications

Much of the discussion about the scale of migration into and within Europe separates out asylum seekers from 'normal' (predominantly labour and family reunion) migration flows. There are sound reasons for this. Not only are the motivations of the two sets of moves different, but the data are also collected and presented differently. However, the distinction between the two has become increasingly blurred. Many asylum seekers are not in need of protection and are attempting to migrate for economic and/or family reasons, while the statistical distinction is no longer clear.

Most of the literature on asylum has focused on policy, legislation and procedures. Analyses of how and why asylum seekers choose particular destinations are scarce, though some recent research has shown the importance of traffickers in this regard (Koser, 1998; Morrison, 1998). One study, mainly carried out in the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK, but with reference to the North American literature as well, found that most asylum seekers are not well informed with regard to possible destination countries: indeed, the influence of rumour is strong (Böcker and Havinga, 1998). In the majority of cases the choice of country for asylum is not a conscious, rational choice by the asylum seeker and certainly not based on a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of various options. The main exceptions relate to a preference among some asylum seekers for Canada and the US. The study identified three interconnected factors which appear to be very important for explaining the patterns of destination for asylum seekers: existing communities of compatriots, colonial bonds and knowledge of the language. Chain migration effects seem important, especially in terms of friendship and kinship networks. Asylum policy and reception vary in importance between countries, but overall, visa policy tends to be more significant.

#### 7.1.1 The destination perspective in Western Europe

Inflows of asylum seekers to Western Europe have fluctuated in total and between destination countries since the mid-1980s (Table 15 and Figures 9a-9f). The states listed received a total of 169,710 asylum seekers in 1985, reached a peak of 695,580 in 1992, falling to 247,500 in 1996 before rising to 392,200 in 2000. Table 16 shows the proportion of the total accounted for by individual destination countries at selected dates and gives some measure of "asylum pressure" through the number of application per 10,000 of the home population.

A major feature of Table 16 is the changing situation in Germany. In 1985 it accounted for 43.5 per cent of inflows, almost two-thirds in 1992 but fell to 18.9 per cent in 2000. France experienced a sharp reduction in its proportion between 1985 and 1992 before rising again in 2000, although to nowhere near its mid-80s level. The UK's situation changed radically, from only 3.7 per cent of the total in 1985 to 16.7 per cent in 1999 and 23.4 per cent in 2000 when it was the most important destination. Other countries with major increases in their proportions are Belgium and Netherlands. In contrast, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland moved in the opposite direction.

There have also been significant changes in asylum pressure. The following countries had greater pressure in 2000 than in 1992: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Norway. Never the less, significant differences remain. Sweden and Denmark had the most applications per 10,000 of their populations in 1985 but their situations were relatively modest in 2000. Germany rose from 9.5 in 1985 to 54.59 in 1992, falling back to 9.6 in 2000. The UK experienced a strong upward pressure, from a very low figure in 1985 to 16.3 in 2000, although this was still less than eight of the other countries listed. By 2000 Belgium, with 41.6 applications per 10,000 of its population was the country undergoing the greatest pressure. The lowest pressures were experienced by the Mediterranean countries.. What is not clear, however, is how far these numbers are affected by registration of asylum flows.

### 7.1.2 The origin perspective with respect to Western Europe

After 1991-92 Yugoslavs came to head the list of origin countries, with Romanians, Turks, Sri Lankans, Somalis, Iranians, Zairians, Iraqis, Bulgarians, Albanians, Nigerians, Lebanese and Chinese also prominent. Many of those fleeing former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Kosovo, do not appear in the asylum statistics, but are given some form of temporary protected status. In recent years Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Sri Lanka have become the major sending countries, all of them having sources of conflict likely to create populations in need of protection. The evidence from recent year indicates that larger proportions of asylum seekers are qualifying for protection.

Table 17 is an attempt to define Europe's migration field for asylum seekers in 1988 and 1997 (the latest year for which such a breakdown is currently possible) for the 11 countries for which data are available. The top ten national origins are listed. In 1988 these countries received 93 per cent of all EU/EFTA asylum applications, 95 per cent in 1997. The ten origin nationalities listed accounted for 70.3 per cent of all applications to the 11 destinations in 1988 and 66.4 per cent in 1997.

Six origin countries are listed at both dates, Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Iran, Sri Lanka, Romania and Zaire (DR Congo). Thus during a period of large scale perturbation in asylum seeking, the broad geography of movement had some similarity. Trends in numbers from these have varied. Those from former Yugoslavia rose considerably while Turkish numbers fell; numbers of Iranians more than halved, Sri Lankans and Zairians fell. Lebanon, Hungary and Ghana had fallen out of the top ten by 1997, to be replaced by Iraq (rising to second place), former Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

That the proportions of total applications accounted for by these selected groups vary considerably is an indication of the diverse range of origins for individual destinations. The listed origins were responsible for 83.6 (1988) and 72.1 (1997) per cent respectively in Germany, 71.3 and 50.4 per cent in Spain, 46.9 and 53.6 per cent in France and only 29.9 and 43.8 per cent in the UK. Nevertheless, it is clear that certain origin nationalities account for high proportions of asylum seekers in some destinations: for example, Poles 46.2 per cent in Spain and Ghanaians 25.4 per cent in Belgium in 1988; former Yugoslavs 37.8 per cent in Switzerland, Iraqis 31. 6 per cent in Sweden, Somalis 22.8 per cent in Denmark in 1997.

### 7.1.3 Asylum applications in Central and Eastern Europe

Data on asylum seeking in Eastern Europe are still very partial, and for the most part the numbers recorded are low. Applications in Hungary fell in the mid 1990's but have subsequently increased. Indications for other countries are for fluctuations in numbers of asylum seekers (Table 15), although it is thought that many claimants are really transit migrants wishing eventually to enter Western Europe. There is some recent evidence that asylum seekers are now targeting Central and Eastern European countries for settlement because of their political freedom and economic growth.

## 7.2 Trends in asylum decisions

Statistics on asylum decisions are difficult to interpret because of the time lag between an application being made and a decision being reached. A further complication is the appeals procedure which may mean several "decisions" on a single case. How these are recorded in the statistics affects the recognition rate. Table 18, based on UNHCR data, shows the number of asylum decisions for selected countries, together with the proportion that were granted 1951 Convention status.

During the period 1990-2000 (1999 if no later data) there were 4.04 million decisions. Germany has tended to dominate the statistics on number of decisions and in some years has made more than half of all decisions in the countries cited. However, the trend in numbers has been steadily downward in Germany since 1993, whereas this is not the case for all countries. In 2000 the number of decisions in the UK and Italy was the highest of the decade, reflecting both the increased number of applications in recent years and measures taken by governments to speed up the process and reduce the backlog of cases.

These figures simply represent decisions taken on applications, both positive and negative. Table 18 also shows the percentage of decisions granting full refugee status under the 1951 Geneva Convention. The percentage is generally low. For those countries with data for 2000 here only Belgium had a recognition rate above a quarter. What is striking, however, is the wide variation from country to country in the proportion deemed to qualify for full asylum status.

At the same time, some refugees and people with 'temporary protection' have been returning to their country of origin following cessation of hostilities. It was calculated in 1997 that some 75,000 Bosnians had already been assisted to return to Bosnia from the EU under organised schemes, with further returns planned. Germany, with nearly 60 per cent of the estimated Bosnian population in the EU, accounted for about 70,000 of these returnees. (Black, Koser and Walsh 1997). Most of the estimated one million or so Kosovars who left their homes in 1999 have now returned in what was one of the largest single moves since the Second World War.

# 8. IRREGULAR MIGRATION

## 8.1 Overall patterns

There are enormous difficulties in assessing the scale of irregular/illegal immigration. According to International Labour Office estimates, in 1991 there were an estimated 2.6 million non-nationals in Europe in an irregular or undocumented situation, the figure including seasonal workers and those asylum seekers whose applications have been turned down but have not left. In the last few years many countries have recorded increases in illegal immigration and working. Using data from border

control authorities on apprehensions, illegal trespassing, detentions etc., the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) estimated that in 1993 illegal inflows in Western Europe totalled around 350,000 (Widgren, 1994). This still remains the most widely quoted estimate.

The concept of illegality is difficult to apply in Eastern European countries because of the absence of legislation controlling entry and settlement. There is growing evidence that large numbers of foreigners are entering the labour market without appropriate permissions, and whose situation may be deemed irregular in some way. Evidence of increasing illegal migration is to be found on the streets of most cities in Eastern Europe, in the form of informal job markets and clandestine employment. In Prague, for example, in addition to the estimated 53,000 foreigners residing legally in 1995 there were thought to be 20,000 Chinese, 20,000 Ukrainians and about 10,000 transit migrants illegally in the city, with a further 25-40,000 North Americans and West Europeans working in predominantly skilled occupations but not registered (ICMPD, 1997; UNECE, 1996). In 1999, 32,325 persons were apprehended trying to enter the Czech Republic illegally, a decline of 28 per cent on the year before. The most numerous groups were Romanians, Afghans, Sri Lankans and Bulgarians. In Slovakia 7,800 illegal migrants were detected at borders (Lubyova, 2000).

In Romania, most foreigners work illegally. In 1998, only 1,335 foreign citizens were working in Romania with a work permit, coming mainly from Turkey, Lebanon and various Western European countries (Gheorgiu, 1999). In 1999 7,300 foreigners staying illegally in Romania were identified (Gheorgiu, 2000). Bulgarian sources suggested rising numbers of illegal immigrants in the early 1990s: in 1993 there were an estimated 15,000 illegal stayers, a substantial proportion of whom undertook work of some sort (Bobeva, 1994). More recent estimates vary: ICMPD (1997) has suggested 30-50,000, but Bobeva (1999) claims that there are less than 10,000 illegally resident foreigners. These do not include the large numbers who have crossed the Bulgarian border illegally, mainly from the Balkans and Middle East. Irregular workers are reckoned to be plentiful in Poland, one estimate suggesting that each year some 200,000 migrant workers take up employment in the country's shadow economy (Lentowicz, 1999, quoted by Okolski, 1999).

Although there is no way of confirming these numbers, the trend seems to be upward. For most countries of Central and Eastern Europe it is likely that 'irregular' immigration is characteristic, and that most foreign workers are in some way illegal.

### 8.1.1 Regularisations

One way of assessing the size of the illegal population in a country is through the number of regularisations accepted as a consequence of amnesty programmes. These have been a fairly common feature in Mediterranean countries during the last two decades (Table 19).

Three main waves of regularisation have occurred, in the 1980s, in the early 1990s and since 1996. Over the period as a whole around 1.45 million regularisations have occurred, but it is the third wave that has been the largest, with 1.12 million since 1996.

Regularisation has affected diverse groups of migrants. Clearly the numbers cannot be equated with the total numbers of people living irregularly at any one time. Nor can it be assumed that the countries which have had such programmes are those with the largest numbers of in an irregular situation.

## 8.2 Trafficking: its importance, size and scale

There is a strong feeling that increasing amounts of irregular migration are associated with the growth of trafficking and human smuggling, although hard evidence one way or the other is difficult to find. Recently, some new information on the nature and scale of trafficking and smuggling has become available (IOM, 2000), although one study of the situation across Europe found a serious lack of hard evidence with regard to numbers and characteristics, such that much of the discussion is based on anecdotal and event-related data (Salt and Hogarth, 2000).

The illegal trafficking and smuggling of migrants is widely recognised to be a major international problem. In addition to security issues the problem of trafficking is also one of human rights. Migrants who are trafficked may be exploited by: being charged extortionate prices for their journey; having their money and belongings stolen; having their identities stolen (passports and other travel documents, identity cards etc.); and being trapped into debt bondage. They may also be subject to inhuman conditions and to physical abuse, sometimes resulting in death. Over the last year or so the literature has begun to distinguish two separate but related concepts: "trafficking" involves placing a person in some kind of disadvantageous employment situation after providing (often illegal) migration assistance; "human smuggling" denotes the process of helping a person cross a national border illegally.

It is uncertain how large a business trafficking and human smuggling is, how much money it generates, and how many people it employs. Nevertheless it is on its way to becoming an established branch of well organised international gangster syndicates, according to one estimate bringing in an annual income of about US$5 to US$7 billion, and perhaps as profitable as drug-smuggling (Widgren, 1994). To individual migrants the costs of trafficking vary enormously depending on their nationality, ethnicity, and on the means of transport employed and the distances involved. The total annual business of trafficking Chinese to the US in the early 1990s was estimated to be worth some US$3 billion to the traffickers (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 April 1993, as cited in Skeldon, 1994).

There are almost insuperable difficulties in assessing how many migrants are trafficked and smuggled, though the usual starting point is the incidence of irregular and undocumented migration. Police evidence in practically all Western European States suggests a growth in stocks of illegal aliens working and residing in these countries (Expert Group of the Budapest Group, 1996). Statistics on border apprehensions seem to confirm the trend, although they may reflect increased vigilance rather than more transgressions. Despite attempts such as the Budapest process, which aims to manage flows of irregular migrants, and suggestions that some forms of irregular migration are now better controlled (for example, asylum seekers) it is anticipated that unless efficient counter-measures are established there will be a continued increase in inflows into Europe outside of legal channels (Ibid.).

There is evidence to suggest that traffickers and smugglers are behind a substantial proportion of irregular migration, though how much can at best only be guessed. Where estimates of the extent of illegal border crossings organised by traffickers have been made, it is likely that they have undercounted the problem because of a reliance on statistics of border apprehensions. One of the few attempts to estimate the scale of trafficking in Europe is that of Widgren (1994). He suggested that approximately 15-30 per cent of those managing to reach their destinations in Western European countries in 1993 used the services of traffickers during some part of their journey, the proportion being slightly higher for asylum seekers (20- 40 per cent), resulting in a trafficked total of 100,000 to 220,000 people (Ibid.). Evidence from

Central and Eastern European states, in replies to anti-trafficking surveys, suggests similar proportions (Expert Group of the Budapest Group, 1995).

Similar techniques have been used more recently to estimate numbers trafficked between the CEE countries and Western Europe (IOM/ICMPD, 1999). Based on border apprehensions and the assumption that at most one in three migrants who attempt to cross CEE borders illegally is ever caught, an estimate of 100-300,000 migrants entering Western Europe illegally from CEE countries was arrived at; of these perhaps 25-75,000 were estimated to have been smuggled by traffickers.

Almost all estimates of the scale of trafficking are based on statistics relating to the numbers of illegal migrants apprehended while being trafficked across borders, although the data remain limited (IOM, 1998). From these statistics it is sometimes possible to deduce whether or not migrants are arriving in organised groups (Morawska, 1999). A major problem is in distinguishing trafficked and non-trafficked illegal migrants and also accounting for the fact that one individual may attempt a border crossing several times, resulting in multiple counting. Where data are collected, presentation of the results may only be partial in that only selected nationalities (perhaps the ten largest) are recorded (Lederer, 1997). Furthermore, there are few data which allow trends in numbers to be identified.

The limited trend evidence presents mixed results on whether trafficking and human smuggling are growing. Even where the source used is identical, revisions from year to year in the data may make for differences in trends. Federal border data for Germany for the period 1990-96 suggest that trends in apprehensions for illegal migrants as a whole, those engaged in trafficking, and numbers of individual migrants trafficked show some differences. Apprehensions of illegal immigrants peaked in 1993 then fell in each succeeding year. In contrast numbers of cases of trafficking which were relatively low in the early 1990s, peaked in 1993, fell back in 1994 but rose in 1995 and 1996. However, the numbers apprehended as traffickers, which also peaked in 1993, fell in 1994, rose in 1995, but fell in 1996, suggesting that latterly the number of traffickers per case was falling and therefore that one trafficker per case was becoming more common (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 1997). It appears then that in 1996 an individual trafficker was responsible for more migrants. Numbers of trafficked migrants also peaked in 1993, fell in 1994, and have risen in every year since. Thus in 1995 and 1996 numbers of illegal migrants recorded were falling, numbers of cases of trafficking were rising, numbers of traffickers apprehended fell in 1996 while numbers of trafficked individual migrants rose throughout. In 1997 the situation may have changed. The number of illegal migrants in the first six month of 1997 rose by 30 percent compared with the previous year. In contrast, cases of trafficking during the same period fell by 6 percent while the number of migrants trafficked who were apprehended rose by 17 percent (Severin 1997). These statistics would appear to suggest that the number of migrants per trafficking operation was continuing to rise, and that the trafficking business was expanding.

One interpretation of these figures is that trafficking and smuggling migrants was becoming relatively more important and the process more efficient, although the poor quality of many of the data and the effort expended by the authorities in apprehending and charging illegal entrants mean that such a conclusion must be approached with caution. Some support for this interpretation, however, comes from US enforcement data: trends in numbers of “smugglers of aliens located” fell from 21,901 in 1990 to 13,458 in 1996, but at the same time numbers of “aliens located who were smuggled into the US” rose from 71,049 to 122,233 (INS, 1997).

### 8.2.1 Estimates of numbers trafficked and smuggled migrants

A review of the estimates of numbers of smuggled and trafficked migrants globally and in Europe reveals two main features. First, there is a preference for nice round numbers. Second, estimates are frequently rehearsed and recycled and take on a momentum of their own.

Table 20 is an attempt to bring together the various estimates made of the scale of smuggling and trafficking at the global and European level. Globally numbers are put at 4 million annually, including up to 2 million women and children. Estimates for the EU as far apart as 1993 and 1999 give the same range of 50-400,000 for both sexes. Numbers of women smuggled and trafficked annually into the EU and Central and Eastern Europe has been put at 300,000. Still regarded as the most authoritative estimate – because the assumptions upon which it was based are available, is Widgren's 100-220,000 in 1994.

Rarely is it clear how the estimates have been derived, though in general they rely on assumptions about the ratio between those apprehended at borders and those who succeed in getting through undetected. Thus, Heckmann *et al*. (2000) derive their estimate of the number trafficked and smuggled into the EU (400,000 in 1999) from apprehension statistics. For every one person caught entering the EU illegally (260,000), it is assumed two pass unhindered.

Many references can be found to the sums of money paid to traffickers. Most of the information is "event related", i.e. it refers to individual cases. It is difficult to come up with anything approaching a set tariff since the sums paid vary according to the level of service provided. As might be expected the costs are positively related to distance (Table 21). Hence trafficking to the US costs more than to Europe. For similar destinations however there may be sharp differences in amounts paid: one study found a range from $ 3000 to $ 30000 (Smith 1997). In some cases prices are known for individual services including fraudulent documentation, transport, guided border crossing and job brokering. Examples include $ 4000 transport to Lithuania (IOM, 1997), fraudulent documentation and other initial expenditures, $ 600 to $ 1500 for migrants trafficked from the Dominican Republic (IOM 1996), and $ 1500 for obtaining a US visa (News 04/14/97).

Although resort to trafficking varies for different national and ethnic groups, by gender and by sector of employment, studies consistently show trafficking's increasing importance in flows of irregular migrants. Around 40 per cent of transit migrants interviewed in Turkey were without a valid document and almost all of them arrived with the aid of traffickers. One-third of them, mainly Iranians, ethnic Turks from Iraq, and Africans, were planning to use traffickers to help them reach their final destinations (IOM, 1995a). Findings of the German Border Police suggest that more than 60 per cent of the foreigners who illegally entered Germany in 1995, most of them from and via Central and Eastern Europe, were guided by trafficking organisations (Ternes, 1996). An estimated 2,000 of the 19,000 - 25,000 foreigners currently working as prostitutes in Italy had used the services of traffickers (IOM, 1996b). A similar story applies to the case of Chinese irregular migration into Central and Eastern Europe (IOM, 1995b).

While it would appear that trafficking is organised, often highly so, there is less evidence that 'organised crime' *per se* is heavily involved. For the most part it appears that the main operators are more likely to be conventional criminal groups than internationally organised crime syndicates. It appears that trafficking is a business with relatively low entry costs and

one that can be carried out by small scale entrepreneurs. The primary motivation is that of high profits and low risks (Lederer and Nickel 1997). The major exception would seem to be the Chinese Triads (IOM 1995), Italian Mafia (Global Survival Network 1997), and, perhaps, Vietnamese in Germany diversifying from their main activity of cigarette smuggling (Spiegel 1995).

### 8.3 Trafficking, smuggling and the new geography of migration

Trafficking may also be creating a new geography of international migration. Evidence suggests that traffickers increasingly determine the choice of migrants' destination countries and the routes taken (see for example, Koser 1998 and IOM, 1997b). The effect of channelling migrants also reflects the principles by which this process is achieved: traffickers use of local knowledge, of key locations, and their wider intelligence of international weaknesses in regimes of migration control.

Knowledge of trafficking routes is sporadic, largely anecdotal and often highly sensitive. The available information shows a high level of diversity in the flows, many of which are highly organised. Within Europe, Germany is easily the most popular destination, but it would appear that to some extent fashion dictates flows, with certain countries becoming more popular depending upon current rumour about ease of entry or reception policies. The origins of trafficked migrants have expanded to include parts of Eastern Europe (notably former Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria), most of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and much of Africa and Asia (including China and the Indian sub-continent (ISC)). Given the wide range of origins, it is not surprising that complex networks of flows have developed.

Information on the geographical pattern of routeways, much of it derived from studies of transit migrants, suggests five main trajectories. Three of these are "land" routes from the East. The most northerly goes through Russia, the Baltic and Poland. To the south is a route through Ukraine, the Balkans and the Czech and Slovak Republics. The third route goes through Bulgaria, Romania and the Balkans. A fourth route transits the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The final path crosses the Mediterranean from North Africa, mainly into Italy and the Iberian peninsula. All of these routes may be fed by any of a diverse set of sources, located mainly in Europe and Asia. Along them are some countries, towns and cities through which migrants are routinely trafficked.

Although most studies say something about them, knowledge of trafficking routes remains desultory and largely anecdotal. Given the wide range of origins and the large number of destinations it is not surprising that complex networks of flows have developed. For example, one study of the routes used to traffic women for prostitution from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union shows a network which links that region with the rest of Europe, North America, North and South Africa the Asia-Pacific Rim and Australia (Global Survival Network 1997).

Other studies have demonstrated the importance of particular places in route networks. Most attention has been paid to selected major cities, mainly on the eastern and southern fringes of Europe, which function as gathering points for migrants either coming in groups or individually. Among the most commonly mentioned are Moscow and Kiev, followed by Prague, regarded as an important transit point for migrants from the Middle and Far East (ICMPD, 1999). Survey evidence suggests, for example, that a main route from China is via

Moscow and Prague (IOM, 1995a). A study by officials of several US government departments and agencies claimed that Moscow hosted an estimated 200,000 illegally resident aliens at any one time, including 60,000 Chinese and 40,000 South Asians (quoted in Branigin, 1995).

Although there is plenty of anecdotal information about specific routes, few studies have attempted to produce a synthesis. An exception was a study by the Council of Europe in 1993 of illegal entry routes for trafficked migrants into Europe which suggested an eighty per cent dispersion via Eastern Europe and the Balkans, a two per cent dispersion from the Maghreb and an eight per cent dispersion via the North Sea.

## 9. MANAGING MIGRATION

### 9.1 The need for a new migration policy approach

The increasingly apparent need for a new European policy on migration stems from a combination of the deficiencies of the policies evolving since the 1970s, and the changing nature of migration and attitudes to it. The existing policy model is based on two major lines of action: the closing of borders to new influxes of immigrant labour, and measures to promote the social integration of the immigrant populations in place. This model has proved inadequate in dealing with existing stocks and flows, and there is little likelihood that it is flexible enough to deal with the new situation. The implication is that new models now need to be considered. Not only are the migration problems confronting the wider Europe of the 1990s different from those faced by Western Europe in the 1970s, but the new democracies will also wish to avoid the mistakes made historically by their western neighbours.

A possible way forward was been outlined by a Reflection Group of the Council of Europe (1998) which suggested how a new migration management strategy for Europe as a whole may be developed and implemented. The strategy received a broad welcome when presented at a meeting of officials of member states in October 1998. A rolling programme of revision of the strategy has now been instituted by the Council of Europe.

Closing borders to foreign workers emerged as the main response to a new economic situation in the 1980s marked by the end of growth and by recession. However, in a world increasingly characterised by global networks for producing and exchanging goods, services and information, and where states have forfeited much of their control over capital movements and the organisation of production, excessive reliance on policies to control labour flows is unlikely to succeed. It is clear, too, that large numbers of new unskilled jobs continue to be created, many of them in the 'informal' sector, filled by immigrants willing to work at wage levels unacceptable to indigenous workers. Given the existence of such jobs, and the willingness of immigrants to take them, it is difficult for governments to control entry to them. Furthermore, during a period when the prevailing economic ethos has been for flexibility and deregulation in labour markets, with a negative effect on wage rates and conditions of work, tightening immigration control appears to have been a contradictory strategy.

The evidence presented earlier in this document suggests that entry controls have had some success in Western Europe, though it is clear that their effects have not been uniform across countries. Migration policies are still generally reactive rather than proactive, and characterised by crisis management, not consistency. The circumstances of the 1990s have led to the evolution of a series of migration-related policies pursued in parallel rather than in an integrated fashion. As a result, labour and family reunion policies are generally not integrated, while asylum policy has grown up separately from them. The situation now is that a new strand of policy, dealing with trafficking, is being added to the warp. Thus European migration policies currently address a series of issues separately: labour; family reunion and formation; asylum; trafficking and illegal flows; integration. Cutting across these are broader management issues such as those of regularisation and return, and prevention: only a comprehensive strategic approach will deal with these.

### 9.2 A new Migration Management Strategy

Underlying such a strategy is the conviction that a comprehensive approach should satisfy certain basic criteria. First, policy makers and their social partners should be well informed, using information that is as accurate and up-to-date as possible. Second, migration policy making should be open and transparent, for all interests. Third, the rules, regulations and procedures formulated by policy makers and their agents should be as clear and unambiguous as possible. Fourth, any strategy should be manageable in terms of in terms of the resources available, including those of finance, information and time. Finally, and most importantly, policy must have clear aims and objectives, ideally pursued in a consistent manner.

With these things in mind a management strategy was designed by the Reflection Group to apply at the pan-European scale and based on four principles:

- orderliness

To develop a set of measures able to manage migration in an orderly manner, so as to maximise opportunities and benefits to individual migrants and to host societies and to minimise trafficking and illegal movement.

- protection

To provide an appropriate capability for protection and for dealing with disorderly or sudden movements.

- integration

To provide an environment conducive to integration.

- co-operation

To engage in dialogue and co-operation with sending countries in order to link foreign policy and migration policy objectives.

An integrated management strategy is now required to bring these together. To establish such a strategy requires a number of conditions to be met by individual governments, bearing in mind that not all countries will have the same policy entry points. First, all countries should develop a comprehensive migration policy, beginning with a review of existing aims and measures which is designed to identify gaps and introduce greater coherence. Currently, most European governments have policies to deal with some aspects of migration, but few of them can claim to range across the whole spectrum of migration types and issues. Second, that policy should be internally co-ordinated between all government departments with responsibilities for migration and integration matters in order to ensure coherence in both initiatives and response. Third, a strategic approach to management of migration matters requires the input of all actors in the migration field, including a wide range of NGOs. Fourth, migration policy should be transparent, so that the rationale is clear and all actors feel that they have a positive role, with initiatives and decisions being openly communicated. Finally, national policies should be internationally co-ordinated to ensure the greatest possible degree of agreement and harmonisation.

The strategy proposed by the Council of Europe Reflection Group accepts the reality that Europe is a region of immigration, the management of which has to be organised on a comprehensive basis. It adopts a flexible approach and is co-ordinated both between and within countries. It assumes roles for all of the various actors in the migration process and is to be transparently negotiated and

communicated.

The strategy emphasises that the protection of individual human rights is the basis of management. It strongly supports measures to integrate foreign populations, while accepting that integration is a two-way process. Integration policy is not simply a central government concern but has to be pushed downwards to local community levels. The strategy suggests that entry of non-European migrants is best controlled by pushing its nexus away from European borders, through the use of preventative measures designed to discourage potential migrants who are not eligible for entry under established policies, combined with attempts to tackle the root causes of emigration. It is also acknowledged that there will be some emigration pressures from within Europe and the CIS, to which the package of measures suggested here may also apply. In involving all actors in the migration process it spreads the burden of control, while accepting that government is the ultimate arbiter.

At the heart of the strategy is the conviction that many of the migration problems now confronting governments have resulted from a piecemeal approach to specific problems, such as the economy, asylum, illegality or return. This approach is no longer sustainable. A management strategy should be regarded as a comprehensive whole, to be applied over the long term. Measures have to be applied as a complete package: failure to do so will only replicate the mistakes of the past where action in one direction has served only to create new problems from another. Whether countries are able to develop their own integrated policies and to harmonise them with others are questions that can no longer be ducked. Reticence will mean the continued application of old, tried, tested and, ultimately, failed solutions.

Support for such a management approach has come also from the European Commission in its proposals for EU immigration policy over the next 20-30 years. With four essentials for a common EU immigration policy (European Commission, 2000).

- The need to control migration movements through measures which promote legal immigration and combat illegal entry
- Co-operation with the countries of origin of immigrants within the framework of policies of development aid designed to minimise migration push factors
- Definition of a policy of integration which establishes the rights and obligations of immigrants
- The elaboration of a legislative framework common to all Member States aimed at imposing penal sanctions on traffickers and smugglers, as well as providing support for the victims of trafficking

## 10. FINAL COMMENTS

In view of the large number of countries discussed at various stages in this paper, and the range of detail provided, no attempt will be made here to summarise its findings. Instead, a few general points that seem particularly apposite will be proposed.

First, a set of international migration systems has developed in Europe. These systems have many interdependencies, but may also be perceived to be geographically discrete. Indeed, there are ground for arguing that three interlinked but separate sub-systems have evolved within Europe, characterised by different types and scales of movement: one in Western Europe, one in the CIS, and another between these two.

Second, at the level of individual countries there remain enormous variations in migration experience, the product of historical evolution as well as contemporary events. There is a highly diverse geography of migration within Europe. Generalisation is attractive but may be deceptive.

Third, following the peaks of 1992-3, trends in recorded flows have generally shown declines or broad stability. After some years when the main indicators of migration were strongly upwards, there is at least a pause in the graphs. What is unclear is the degree to which unrecorded movements have stepped into the breach. Partly these are in the form of undocumented or illegal migrations; partly also they reflect the increasing incidence of types of movement which defy the normal definitions of migration and so do not appear in any statistics. On balance, there is no hard evidence that illegal and unrecorded migration is strongly on the increase.

Fourth, international migration patterns and trends are highly influenced by economic globalisation processes. The European systems, acting largely independently, at least in geographical terms, are nevertheless part of a multi-dimensional global matrix of movement involving people, capital, goods, services and ideas. The prognosis for their future evolution will depend to a considerable extent on how this matrix evolves. For example, transnational capital is already driving the migration of the highly skilled within and beyond the region.

Fifth, in recent years the political and practical agendas for dealing with migration have been influenced predominantly by asylum. Limited attention has been paid to family reunion and even less to labour market requirements. In contrast to Australia, Canada and the US, for example, there has been little debate about the role that immigrant labour might play in enhancing the competitiveness of European national and regional economies. There are signs, however, that this attitude may be changing.

Sixth, countries are increasingly seeking to recruit high-level skills. Several Western European countries have introduced special schemes to this end, or have modified their existing work permit systems. Methods used include relaxation of regulations to allow fast-track recruitment, taxation changes, changes of the rules on employment of foreign students and schemes directed at specific skills. Three broad categories of highly skilled workers are sought: IT specialists, health professionals and specialist managers and professionals.

Finally, there are grounds for suggesting a rethink of the concept of international migration. An alternative view is that it is a diverse international business, wielding a vast budget, providing hundreds of thousands of jobs world-wide, and managed by a set of individuals, agencies and institutions each of which has an interest in promoting the business. To explain why, where and how people move in the late 1990s needs an understanding of those interests. By extension, policy measures to deal with their consequences must focus more on agencies and institutions and less on migrants.

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# TABLES

TABLE 1
ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED POPULATION OF THE WORLD AND MAJOR AREAS, 1950, 2000 AND 2050

| REGION | *Millions and Per Cent* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1950 | | 2000 | | 2050 | |
| | Nos. | % | Nos. | % | Nos. | % |
| WORLD TOTAL | 2519 | 100.0 | 6057 | 100.0 | 9322 | 100.0 |
| Africa | 221 | 8.8 | 794 | 13.1 | 2000 | 21.5 |
| Asia | 1399 | 55.5 | 3672 | 60.6 | 5428 | 58.2 |
| Europe | 548 | 21.8 | 727 | 12.0 | 603 | 6.5 |
| Latin America and the Caribbean | 167 | 6.6 | 519 | 8.6 | 806 | 8.6 |
| North America | 172 | 6.8 | 314 | 5.2 | 438 | 4.7 |
| Oceania | 13 | 0.5 | 31 | 0.5 | 47 | 0.5 |

Source: United Nations Population Division,World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision, Volume 1: Comprehensive Tables (United Nations, New York 2001)

Notes:

The 2050 data are based upon medium fertility variants

TABLE 2
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE IN EUROPE, 1997-99

| Country | *annual average per cent* Growth Rate | Natural Increase | Net Migration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Albania [1] | 0.90 | 1 30 | -0.40 |
| Andorra | 0.76 | 0.87 | -0 11 |
| Armenia | 0.20 | 0 43 | -0 23 |
| Austria | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0 11 |
| Azerbaijan | 0.91 | 0.99 | -0 07 |
| Belarus | -0.71 | -0.46 | -0 25 |
| Belgium | 0.22 | 0.10 | 0 12 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina [1] | 0 11 | 0.56 | -0.45 |
| Bulgaria | -0.61 | -0.61 | 0.00 |
| Croatia [2] | -0.07 | -0.02 | -0.05 |
| Cyprus | 0.62 | 0.55 | 0 06 |
| Czech Republic | -0.10 | -0.20 | 0 10 |
| Denmark | 0.35 | 0.14 | 0.20 |
| Estonia | -0.53 | -0.44 | -0.09 |
| Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [1] | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0 00 |
| Finland | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.08 |
| France | 0.42 | 0.34 | 0 08 |
| FYR Macedonia | 0.35 | 0.42 | -0 07 |
| Georgia | -0.15 | 0.10 | -0.26 |
| Germany | 0.06 | -0 08 | 0 14 |
| Greece | 0.19 | 0.00 | 0 19 |
| Hungary | -0.43 | -0.43 | 0.00 |
| Iceland | 1.09 | 0.83 | 0.28 |
| Ireland | 1.12 | 0.58 | 0 54 |
| Italy | 0.13 | -0.08 | 0 20 |
| Latvia | -0.76 | -0.60 | -0 16 |
| Liechtenstein [3] | 2.20 | 0.68 | 1 52 |
| Lithuania | -0.08 | -0.10 | 0.02 |
| Luxembourg | 1.36 | 0.38 | 0 98 |
| Malta [2] | 0.61 | 0.45 | 0 16 |
| Moldova | -0.30 | -0.05 | -0 25 |
| Netherlands | 0.63 | 0.38 | 0.25 |
| Norway | 0.64 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Poland | 0.01 | 0.05 | -0.03 |
| Portugal | 0.21 | 0.08 | 0.14 |
| Romania | -0.19 | -0.16 | -0.03 |
| Russian Federation [2] | -0.28 | -0.50 | 0 22 |
| San Marino | 1.42 | 0.40 | 1.03 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0 03 |
| Slovenia | 0.01 | -0.06 | 0 07 |
| Spain | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0 09 |
| Sweden | 0.06 | -0.05 | 0 12 |
| Switzerland | 0.39 | 0.23 | 0.16 |
| Turkey [2] | 1.32 | 1.51 | -0.23 |
| Ukraine [2] | -0.78 | -0.61 | -0.17 |
| United Kingdom | 0.40 | 0.14 | 0 26 |

Source Council of Europe

Notes:
1 1997 only.
2 1997-98 average
3 1998 only

TABLE 3
STOCK OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000 (thousands)

(A) WESTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 282 7 | 299 2 | 302 9 | 296 7 | 297 8 | 304 4 | 314 9 | 326 2 | 344 0 | 387 2 | 456 1 | 532 7 | 623 0 | 689 0 | 713 5 | 723 0 | 728 0 | 732 7 | 737 3 | 748 2 | 761 4 |
| BELGIUM (1) | | 885 7 | 891 2 | 890 9 | 897 6 | 846 5 | 853 2 | 862 5 | 868 8 | 880 8 | 904 5 | 922 5 | 909 3 | 920 6 | 922 3 | 909 7 | 911 9 | 903 1 | 892 0 | 897 1 | 861 7 |
| DENMARK | 101 6 | 101 9 | 103 1 | 104 1 | 107 7 | 117 0 | 128 3 | 136 2 | 142 0 | 150 6 | 160 6 | 169 5 | 180 1 | 189 0 | 196 7 | 222 7 | 237 7 | 237 7 | 256 3 | 259 4 | 258 6 |
| FINLAND | 12 8 | 13 7 | 14 3 | 15 7 | 16 8 | 17 0 | 17 3 | 17 7 | 18 7 | 21 2 | 26 3 | 37 6 | 46 3 | 55 6 | 62 0 | 68 6 | 73 8 | 81 0 | 85 1 | 87 7 | 90 2 |
| FRANCE (2) | - | - | 3714 2 | - | | 3752 2 | - | - | - | - | 3607 6 | 3596 6 | - | | - | - | - | - | - | 3263 2 | - |
| GERMANY (3) | 4453 3 | 4629 8 | 4666 9 | 4534 9 | 4363 7 | 4378 9 | 4512 7 | 4630 2 | 4489 1 | 4845 9 | 5241 8 | 5882 3 | 6495 8 | 6878 1 | 6990 5 | 7173 9 | 7314 0 | 7365 8 | 7319 6 | 7343 6 | - |
| GREECE | 213 0 | 223 0 | 229 7 | 232 0 | 234 1 | 233 2 | 220 1 | 217 8 | 222 6 | 226 1 | 229 1 | 253 3 | 262 3 | 265 0 | 244 0 | 153 0 | 155 0 | 165 4 | - | - | - |
| IRELAND | | | - | 82 8 | - | - | - | - | | 79 3 | 80 8 | 87 7 | 94 9 | 89 9 | 91 1 | 96 1 | 117 8 | 114 4 | 111 0 | 117 8 | 126 5 |
| ITALY (4) | 298 7 | 331 7 | 358 9 | 381 3 | 403 9 | 423 0 | 450 2 | 572 1 | 645 4 | 490 4 | 781 1 | 859 6 | 925 2 | 987 4 | 922 7 | 991 4 | 1095 6 | 1240 7 | 1250 2 | 1252 0 | - |
| LUXEMBOURG | 94 3 | 95 4 | 95 6 | 96 2 | 96 9 | 98 0 | 96 8 | 98 6 | 100 9 | 104 0 | 110 0 | 114 7 | 119 7 | 124 5 | 130 0 | 132 5 | 138 1 | 142 8 | 147 7 | 152 9 | 159 4 |
| NETHERLANDS | 520 9 | 537 6 | 546 5 | 552 4 | 558 7 | 552 5 | 568 0 | 591 8 | 623 7 | 641 9 | 692 4 | 732 9 | 757 4 | 779 8 | 757 1 | 725 4 | 679 9 | 678 1 | 662 4 | 651 5 | - |
| NORWAY (5) | 82 6 | 86 5 | 90 6 | 94 7 | 97 8 | 101 5 | 109 3 | 123 7 | 135 9 | 140 3 | 143 3 | 147 8 | 154 0 | 162 3 | 164 0 | 160 8 | 157 5 | 158 0 | 165 1 | 178 7 | 184 3 |
| PORTUGAL (6) | 49 3 | 53 6 | 57 7 | 65 9 | 72 6 | 80 0 | 87 0 | 89 8 | 94 7 | 101 0 | 107 8 | 114 0 | 121 5 | 170 8 | 157 1 | 157 0 | 168 3 | 175 3 | 178 1 | 191 0 | - |
| SPAIN | 182 0 | 197 9 | 200 9 | 210 4 | 226 5 | 241 9 | 293 2 | 334 9 | 360 0 | 398 1 | 407 7 | 360 7 | 393 1 | 430 4 | 461 0 | 499 8 | 539 0 | 609 8 | 719 6 | 801 3 | 895 7 |
| SWEDEN (7) | 421 7 | 414 0 | 405 5 | 397 1 | 390 6 | 388 6 | 390 8 | 401 0 | 421 0 | 456 0 | 483 7 | 493 8 | 499 1 | 507 5 | 537 4 | 531 8 | 526 6 | 522 0 | 499 9 | 487 1 | 477 3 |
| SWITZERLAND (8) | 892 8 | 909 9 | 925 8 | 925 6 | 932 4 | 939 7 | 956 0 | 978 7 | 1006 5 | 1040 3 | 1100 3 | 1163 2 | 1213 5 | 1260 3 | 1300 1 | 1363 6 | 1370 6 | 1372 7 | 1347 9 | 1368 7 | - |
| TURKEY | - | - | - | - | - | - | 24 9 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 68 1 | 135 9 | 162 2 | - | - |
| UNITED KINGDOM | - | - | - | - | 1601 0 | 1731 0 | 1820 0 | 1839 0 | 1821 0 | 1949 0 | 1875 0 | 1791 0 | 1985 0 | 2001 0 | 2032 0 | 1948 0 | 1934 0 | 2066 0 | 2207 0 | 2208 0 | 2342 0 |

(B) CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BULGARIA (9) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 24 1 | 23 4 | 27 8 | 29 4 | 31 4 | 34 8 | 37 6 | 38 8 | 40 6 | 41 1 | 38 7 | - |
| CZECH REPUBLIC (10) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 34 6 | 34 9 | 35 2 | 34 9 | 37 7 | 49 6 | 77 6 | 103 7 | 158 7 | 198 6 | 209 8 | 219 8 | 228 9 | 201 0 |
| HUNGARY (11) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 73 9 | 88 2 | - | 138 1 | 140 0 | 138 0 | 143 0 | 150 2 | 153 1 | 110 0 |
| POLAND(12) | - | - | - | | - | - | - | - | - | - | | - | - | 30 0 | - | - | 29 9 | 32 5 | - | 42 8 | - |
| ROMANIA (13) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | - | 3 2 | 2 7 | 1 9 | 1 9 | 1 7 | 1 4 | 1 4 | 1 3 | 1 2 |
| SLOVENIA | - | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 24 8 | 48 0 | 43 0 | 41 7 | 33 5 | 42 5 | 42 3 |
| RUSSIA (14) | - | - | - | - | - | - | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 171 6 | 158 5 | 138 3 | - | | |
| LATVIA (15) | - | - | - | - | - | - | | - | - | - | - | - | - | | - | 7 1 | 12 1 | 17 4 | 23 7 | 25 7 | 29 2 |

Sources Eurostat, Council of Europe OECD SOPEMI Correspondents National Statistical Offices

NOTES

1 In 1985 as a consequence of a modification of the nationality code some persons who formerly would have been counted as foreigners were included as nationals This led to a marked decrease in the foreign population
2 Population censuses on 4/3/82 and 6/3/90 The figure for the census of 20/2/75 is 3442 4
3 Data as of 30/10 up to 1984 and in 1990 and as of 31/12 for all other years Except for 1991 & 1992 refers to western Germany FSO
4 Data are adjusted to take account of the regularisations which occurred in 1987 88 and 1990 The fall in numbers for 1989 results from a review of the foreigners register (removing duplicate registrations accounting for returns) Source Ministry of the Interior elaborated by CENSIS
5 From 1987 asylum seekers whose requests are being processed are included Numbers for earlier years were fairly small
6 1993 figure includes estimated 39 200 from special regularisation
7 Some foreigners permits of short duration are not counted (mainly citizens of other Nordic countries)
8 Numbers of foreigners with annual residence permits (including up to 31/12/82 holders of permits of durations below 12 months) and holders of settlement permits (permanent permits) Seasonal and frontier workers are excluded 1993 data from Sopemi 1994 figure taken in April
9 Permanently resident foreigners Ministry of Interior 1990 figure from Council of Europe (Nov 1994)
10 Data derived from Ministries of Labour and Interior and include only those holding permanent and long term residence permits
11 Temporary residence permit holders only
12 1993 figure from IOM (April 1994) Foreign nationals with permanent residence permits 1996 figure estimate by Okolski
13 Foreign citizens with permanent residence permits (granted before 1990) 80 900 had temporary residence in 1996
14 Only permanent resident foreigners Ministry of Interior 1998
15 Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 1998

TABLE 4
STOCK OF FOREIGN POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000, (per cent)

(A) WESTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 5.1 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 7.9 | 8.6 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 9.4 |
| BELGIUM (1) | - | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 8.6 | 8.6 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.9 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.4 |
| DENMARK | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.8 |
| FINLAND | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| FRANCE (2) | - | - | 6.8 | - | - | 6.8 | - | - | - | - | 6.3 | 6.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5.6 | - |
| GERMANY (3) | 7.2 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 7.4 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 8.2 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 8.9 | - |
| GREECE | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | - | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0.0 | - |
| IRELAND | - | - | - | 2.4 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.3 |
| ITALY (4) | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 0.0 |
| LUXEMBOURG | 25.8 | 26.1 | 26.2 | 26.3 | 26.5 | 26.7 | 26.2 | 26.5 | 26.8 | 27.4 | 28.6 | 29.4 | 30.3 | 31.1 | 32.0 | 32.6 | 33.4 | 34.1 | 34.9 | 35.1 | 36.1 |
| NETHERLANDS | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.1 | - |
| NORWAY (5) | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.1 |
| PORTUGAL (6) | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | - |
| SPAIN | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| SWEDEN (7) | 5.1 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 5.4 |
| SWITZERLAND (8) | 14.1 | 14.3 | 14.4 | 14.4 | 14.4 | 14.5 | 14.7 | 14.9 | 15.2 | 15.6 | 16.3 | 17.0 | 17.6 | 18.1 | 18.6 | 19.3 | 19.6 | 19.4 | 19.0 | 19.1 | - |
| TURKEY | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.04 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | - | - |
| UNITED KINGDOM | - | - | - | - | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.9 |

(B) CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BULGARIA (9) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | - | 0.6 | 0.5 | - |
| CZECH REPUBLIC (10) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 |
| HUNGARY (11) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | 0.9 | - | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.1 |
| POLAND(12) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.2 | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | - |
| ROMANIA (13) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| SLOVENIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| RUSSIA (14) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | - | 0.0 | - |
| LATVIA (15) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.2 |

Sources: Eurostat, Council of Europe, OECD SOPEMI Correspondents, National Statistical Offices

NOTES

1. In 1985, as a consequence of a modification of the nationality code, some persons who formerly would have been counted as foreigners were included as nationals. This led to a marked decrease in the foreign population.
2. Population censuses on 4/3/82 and 6/3/90. The figure for the census of 20/2/75 is 3442.4.
3. Data as of 30/10 up to 1984 and in 1990 and as of 31/12 for all other years. Except for 1991 & 1992, refers to western Germany. FSO.
4. Data are adjusted to take account of the regularisations which occurred in 1987-88 and 1990. The fall in numbers for 1989 results from a review of the foreigners' register (removing duplicate registrations, accounting for returns). Source: Ministry of the Interior, elaborated by CENSIS.
5. From 1987, asylum seekers whose requests are being processed are included. Numbers for earlier years were fairly small.
6. 1993 figure includes estimated 39,200 from special regularisation.
7. Some foreigners permits of short duration are not counted (mainly citizens of other Nordic countries).
8. Numbers of foreigners with annual residence permits (including, up to 31/12/82, holders of permits of durations below 12 months) and holders of settlement permits (permanent permits). Seasonal and frontier workers are excluded. 1993 data from Sopemi. 1994 figure taken in April.
9. Permanently resident foreigners, Ministry of Interior. 1990 figure from Council of Europe (Nov 1994).
10. Data derived from Ministries of Labour and Interior, and include only those holding permanent and long-term residence permits.
11. Temporary residence permit holders only.
12. 1993 figure from IOM (April 1994) - Foreign nationals with permanent residence permits. 1996 figure estimate by Okolski.
13. Foreign citizens with permanent residence permits (granted before 1990). 80,900 had temporary residence in 1996.
14. Only permanent resident foreigners, Ministry of Interior, 1998.
15. Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 1998.

TABLE 5
FOREIGN POPULATION IN EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES, AS OF 1 JANUARY 2000 (OR LATEST YEAR AVAILABLE)

Absolute figures

| | B | DK | D | EL | E | F | IRL | I | L | NL | A | P | FIN | S | UK | IS | LI | N | CH | EU 15 | EFTA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Year* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *1997* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *2000* | *1998* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *1997* | *2000* | *2000* | *(2)* | *(2)* |
| Total | 853369 | 256276 | 7343591 | 161148 | 801329 | 3263186 | 126533 | 1270553 | 147700 | 651532 | 753528 | 190898 | 87680 | 487175 | 2297947 | 7271 | 11714 | 178686 | 1406630 | 18692445 | 1592587 |
| Europe | 661258 | 157203 | 5930311 | 97432 | 352974 | 1555679 | 92209 | 498170 | - | 333380 | 474728 | 56712 | 60171 | 330763 | 1057261 | 5094 | 11414 | 118354 | 1254001 | 11658251 | 1377449 |
| EU 15 & EFTA | 570531 | 72473 | 1905432 | 46789 | 326388 | 1225755 | - | 161024 | - | 200087 | - | 54253 | 17333 | 214757 | 874272 | 2941 | 9629 | 83355 | 810512 | 5669094 | 896808 |
| EU 15 | 563556 | 53195 | 1858672 | 45020 | 312203 | 1195498 | 92209 | 148506 | 131410 | 195886 | - | 52429 | 16328 | 177430 | 859138 | 2617 | 5012 | 78482 | 807332 | 5701480 | 888431 |
| EFTA | 6975 | 19278 | 46760 | 1769 | 14185 | 30257 | - | 12518 | - | 4201 | - | 1824 | 1005 | 37327 | 15134 | 324 | 4617 | 4873 | 3180 | 191233 | 8377 |
| Central and Eastern | 21544 | 46626 | 1969760 | 47264 | 25733 | 119849 | - | 328144 | - | 32468 | 340499 | 2361 | 41066 | 99424 | 118395 | 2142 | 985 | 31467 | 362624 | 3193133 | 396233 |
| Other Europe | 69183 | 38104 | 2055119 | 3379 | 853 | 210075 | - | 9002 | - | 100825 | - | 98 | 1772 | 16582 | 64594 | 11 | 800 | 3532 | 80865 | 2569586 | 84408 |
| Africa | 153356 | 23871 | 300611 | 13237 | 213012 | 1419758 | - | 411492 | - | 149764 | - | 89518 | 7791 | 27726 | 291388 | 184 | 18 | 11567 | 35446 | 3101524 | 47197 |
| Americas | 18744 | 9808 | 205373 | 19996 | 166709 | 81293 | 8044 | 120898 | - | 36484 | - | 35987 | 3649 | 31814 | 249669 | 828 | 178 | 14318 | 46955 | 988468 | 62101 |
| Asia | 19047 | 55524 | 823092 | 27884 | 66922 | 203432 | - | 236369 | - | 62368 | - | 7890 | 13813 | 84140 | 559042 | 1104 | 99 | 33274 | 67386 | 2159523 | 101764 |
| Oceania | 648 | 1110 | 10033 | 1242 | 1013 | 3024 | - | 3154 | - | 3168 | - | 516 | 495 | 2171 | 98669 | 56 | 5 | 761 | 2568 | 125243 | 3385 |
| Other (3) | 316 | 8760 | 74171 | - | 699 | - | - | 470 | - | 66368 | 278800 | 275 | 1761 | 10561 | 23846 | 5 | 34 | 412 | 274 | 466027 | 691 |

Proportion of total foreign population of reporting country (per cent)

| | B | DK | D | EL | E | F | IRL | I | L | NL | A | P | FIN | S | UK | IS | LI | N | CH | EU 15 | EFTA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Year* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *1997* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *2000* | *1998* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *1997* | *2000* | *2000* | *(2)* | *(2)* |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Europe | 77.5 | 61.3 | 80.8 | 60.5 | 44.0 | 47.7 | 72.9 | 39.2 | - | 51.2 | 63.0 | 29.7 | 68.6 | 67.9 | 46.0 | 70.1 | 97.4 | 66.2 | 89.1 | 62.4 | 86.5 |
| EU 15 & EFTA | 66.9 | 28.3 | 25.9 | 29.0 | 40.7 | 37.6 | - | 12.7 | - | 30.7 | - | 28.4 | 19.8 | 44.1 | 38.0 | 40.4 | 82.2 | 46.6 | 57.6 | 30.3 | 56.3 |
| EU 15 | 66.0 | 20.8 | 25.3 | 27.9 | 39.0 | 36.6 | 72.9 | 11.7 | 89.0 | 30.1 | - | 27.5 | 18.6 | 36.4 | 37.4 | 36.0 | 42.8 | 43.9 | 57.4 | 30.5 | 55.8 |
| EFTA | 0.8 | 7.5 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.8 | 0.9 | - | 1.0 | - | 0.6 | - | 1.0 | 1.1 | 7.7 | 0.7 | 4.5 | 39.4 | 2.7 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.5 |
| Central and Eastern | 2.5 | 18.2 | 26.8 | 29.3 | 3.2 | 3.7 | - | 25.8 | - | 5.0 | 45.2 | 1.2 | 46.8 | 20.4 | 5.2 | 29.5 | 8.4 | 17.6 | 25.8 | 17.1 | 24.9 |
| Other Europe | 8.1 | 14.9 | 28.0 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 6.4 | - | 0.7 | - | 15.5 | - | 0.1 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 0.2 | 6.8 | 2.0 | 5.7 | 13.7 | 5.3 |
| Africa | 18.0 | 9.3 | 4.1 | 8.2 | 26.6 | 43.5 | - | 32.4 | - | 23.0 | - | 46.9 | 8.9 | 5.7 | 12.7 | 2.5 | 0.2 | 6.5 | 2.5 | 16.6 | 3.0 |
| Americas | 2.2 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 12.4 | 20.8 | 2.5 | 6.4 | 9.5 | - | 5.6 | - | 18.9 | 4.2 | 6.5 | 10.9 | 11.4 | 1.5 | 8.0 | 3.3 | 5.3 | 3.9 |
| Asia | 2.2 | 21.7 | 11.2 | 17.3 | 8.4 | 6.2 | - | 18.6 | - | 9.6 | - | 4.1 | 15.8 | 17.3 | 24.3 | 15.2 | 0.8 | 18.6 | 4.8 | 11.6 | 6.4 |
| Oceania | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 0.1 | - | 0.2 | - | 0.5 | - | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 4.3 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.2 |
| Other (3) | 0.0 | 3.4 | 1.0 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.0 | - | 10.2 | 37.0 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 |

*Proportion of total foreign citizenship in EU and EFTA countries (per cent)*

| | B | DK | D | EL | E | F | IRL | I | L | NL | A | P | FIN | S | UK | IS | LI | N | CH | EU 15 | EFTA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Year* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *1997* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *2000* | *1998* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *2000* | *1999* | *2000* | *1997* | *2000* | *2000* | *(2)* | *(2)* |
| Total | 4.2 | 1.3 | 36.2 | 0.8 | 4.0 | 16.1 | 0.6 | 6.3 | 0.7 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 11.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 6.9 | 92.1 | 7.9 |
| Europe | 5.1 | 1.2 | 45.5 | 0.7 | 2.7 | 11.9 | 0.7 | 3.8 | - | 2.6 | 3.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 8.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 9.6 | 89.4 | 10.6 |
| EU 15 & EFTA | 8.7 | 1.1 | 29.0 | 0.7 | 5.0 | 18.7 | - | 2.5 | - | 3.0 | - | 0.8 | 0.3 | 3.3 | 13.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 12.3 | 86.3 | 13.7 |
| EU 15 | 8.6 | 0.8 | 28.2 | 0.7 | 4.7 | 18.1 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 3.0 | - | 0.8 | 0.2 | 2.7 | 13.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 12.3 | 86.5 | 13.5 |
| EFTA | 3.5 | 9.7 | 23.4 | 0.9 | 7.1 | 15.2 | - | 6.3 | - | 2.1 | - | 0.9 | 0.5 | 18.7 | 7.6 | 0.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 95.8 | 4.2 |
| Central and Eastern | 0.6 | 1.3 | 54.9 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 3.3 | - | 9.1 | - | 0.9 | 9.5 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 10.1 | 89.0 | 11.0 |
| Other Europe | 2.6 | 1.4 | 77.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 7.9 | - | 0.3 | - | 3.8 | - | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 3.0 | 96.8 | 3.2 |
| Africa | 4.9 | 0.8 | 9.5 | 0.4 | 6.8 | 45.1 | - | 13.1 | - | 4.8 | - | 2.8 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 9.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 98.5 | 1.5 |
| Americas | 1.8 | 0.9 | 19.5 | 1.9 | 15.9 | 7.7 | 0.8 | 11.5 | - | 3.5 | - | 3.4 | 0.3 | 3.0 | 23.8 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 1.4 | 4.5 | 94.1 | 5.9 |
| Asia | 0.8 | 2.5 | 36.4 | 1.2 | 3.0 | 9.0 | - | 10.5 | - | 2.8 | - | 0.3 | 0.6 | 3.7 | 24.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 3.0 | 95.5 | 4.5 |
| Oceania | 0.5 | 0.9 | 7.8 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 2.4 | - | 2.5 | - | 2.5 | - | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1.7 | 76.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 2.0 | 97.4 | 2.6 |
| Other (3) | 0.1 | 1.9 | 15.9 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.1 | - | 14.2 | 59.7 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 5.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 99.9 | 0.1 |

Source: Eurostat

Notes:
1. "-" refers to data which are unavailable.
3. These sub-totals have been constructed by summing relevant figures where available in the preceeding columns. Therefore, owing to unavailable figures and data from different years, some of these figures are (under-)estimates.
5. Includes those not included in other categories, stateless and unknown.

Notes:
1. "-" refers to data which are unavailable.
2. For UK C&E Europe includes F. Soviet Union and Other Europe does not.
3. These sub-totals have been constructed by summing relevant figures where available in the preceeding columns. Therefore, owing to unavailable figures and data from different years, some of these figures are (under-)estimates.
4. Includes Former USSR and Former Yugoslavia.
5. Includes those not included in other categories, stateless and unknown.

TABLE 6
INFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-1999 (1) (thousands)

(A) WESTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BELGIUM | 46.8 | 41.3 | 36.2 | 34.3 | 37.2 | 37.5 | 39.3 | 40.1 | 38.2 | 43.5 | 50 4 | 54.1 | 55.1 | 53.0 | 56.0 | 53.1 | 51.9 | 49.2 | 50.9 | 57.8 |
| DENMARK | - | - | - | - | 8.9 | 15.6 | 17.6 | 15.2 | 13.8 | 15.1 | 15.1 | 17.5 | 16.9 | 15.4 | 15.6 | 33.0 | 24.7 | 20.4 | 21.3 | 27.9 |
| FINLAND | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 4.2 | 6.5 | 13.2 | 10.4 | 10.9 | 7.6 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 7.9 |
| FRANCE (2) | 59.4 | 75.0 | 144.4 | 64.2 | 51.4 | 43.4 | 38.3 | 39.0 | 44.0 | 53.2 | 63.1 | 65.3 | - | 116.0 | 82.8 | 77.0 | 75.0 | 103.0 | 136.0 | 104.4 |
| GERMANY | 632.3 | 502.0 | 322.4 | 276.4 | 333.3 | 400.0 | 479.5 | 473.3 | 648.6 | 770.8 | 842.4 | 920.5 | 1208.0 | 989.8 | 773.9 | 792.7 | 707.9 | 615.3 | 605.5 | 673.9 |
| GREECE | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 25.0 | 13.4 | - | 16.3 | 17.4 | 20.2 | 22.2 | 22.1 | - | - |
| ICELAND | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.0 |
| IRELAND | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6.2 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 11.8 | 10.7 | 15.2 | 14.7 | 13.3 | 13.6 | 21.5 | 23.4 | 20.8 | 21.6 |
| ITALY (3) | 88.3 | 91.5 | 100.1 | 98.3 | 86.9 | 82.2 | 75.7 | 104.5 | 85.8 | 81.2 | 96.7 | 70.9 | 72.3 | - | - | 68.2 | 143.2 | - | 111.0 | 268.0 |
| LUXEMBOURG | 7.4 | 6.9 | 6.4 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 6.6 | 7.4 | 8.3 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 10.3 | 10.9 | 10.7 | 10.1 | 10.1 | 10.3 | 10.0 | 10.4 | 11.6 | 12.8 |
| NETHERLANDS | 79.8 | 50.4 | 40.9 | 36.4 | 37.3 | 46.2 | 52.8 | 60.9 | 58.3 | 65.4 | 81.3 | 84.3 | 83.0 | 87.6 | 68.4 | 67.0 | 77.0 | 76.7 | 81.7 | 78.4 |
| NORWAY (4) | 11.8 | 13.1 | 14.0 | 13.1 | 12.8 | 14.9 | 16.5 | 23.8 | 23.0 | 18.4 | 15.7 | 16.1 | 17.2 | 22.3 | 17.9 | 16.5 | 17.2 | 22.0 | 26.7 | 32.2 |
| PORTUGAL | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 13.7 | 9.9 | - | - | 3.6 | 3.3 | - | 10.6 |
| SPAIN | 3.0 | 11.3 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 6.2 | 4.3 | 5.3 | 9.7 | 14.4 | 13.7 | 10.6 | 18.2 | 15.4 | 18.6 | 19.5 | 16.7 | 35.6 | - | - |
| SWEDEN (5) | 34.4 | 27.4 | 25.1 | 22.3 | 26.1 | 27.9 | 34.0 | 37.1 | 44.5 | 58.9 | 53.2 | 43.9 | 39.5 | 54.8 | 74.7 | 36.1 | 29.3 | 33.0 | 35.7 | 34.6 |
| SWITZERLAND (6) | 70.5 | 80.3 | 74.7 | 58.3 | 58.6 | 59.4 | 66.8 | 71.5 | 76.1 | 80.4 | 101.4 | 109.8 | 112.1 | 104.0 | 91.7 | 87.9 | 74.4 | 69.6 | 74.9 | 85.8 |
| TURKEY | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| UNITED KINGDOM (7) | 107.0 | 93.0 | 104.0 | 108.0 | 106.0 | 122.0 | 130.0 | 113.0 | 127.0 | 146.0 | 161.0 | 150.0 | 116.4 | 120.0 | 133.0 | 154.0 | 168.0 | 188.0 | 221.0 | 331.8 |

(B) CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CZECH REPUBLIC (8) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | 12.4 | 14.1 | 19.1 | 12.9 | 10.2 | 10.5 | 10.9 | 12.9 | 10.7 | 9.9 |
| HUNGARY (9) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 33.7 | 37.1 | 22 8 | 14.8 | 15.9 | 12.8 | 13.2 | 12.5 | 14.3 | 16.6 | 18.2 |
| POLAND (10) | 1.5 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 6 9 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 7.5 |
| ESTONIA (11) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 12.5 | 8.4 | 5.2 | 3.5 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 |
| LATVIA (11) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 40.3 | 32.3 | 14.7 | 6.2 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 1.8 |
| LITHUANIA (11) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 47.4 | 38.6 | 14.2 | 6.7 | 2.9 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| ROMANIA (12) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 4.5 | 2.1 | 6.6 | 11.9 | 10.1 |
| SLOVAK REPUBLIC | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| FYR MACEDONIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.6 | - | - |
| RUSSIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 989.7 | 1036.3 | 806.0 | 1011.3 | 979.3 | 1191.4 | 866.3 | 647.0 | 597.7 | 513.6 | 379.7 |
| CROATIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10.1 | 48.3 | 57.7 | 33.4 | 42.0 | 44.6 | - | - | 32.9 |

Sources: Eurostat, Council of Europe, OECD SOPEMI Correspondents, National Statistical Offices

NOTES

1 Asylum seekers are excluded
2. Entries of new foreign workers, including holders of provisional work permits (APT) and foreigners admitted on family reunification grounds.
Does not include residents of EU countries (workers and family members) who have not been processed via the International Migration Office (OMI).
1993 figure rounded to the nearest '000
3. 1980-1991 - new entries in the population register.
4 Entries of foreigners intending to stay longer than six months in Norway.
5. Some short duration entries are not counted (mainly citizens of other Nordic countries)
6 Entries of foreigners with annual residence permits, and those with settlement permits (permanent permits) who return to Switzerland after a temporary stay abroad Includes up to 31 December 1982, holders of permits of durations below 12 months Seasonal and frontier workers (including seasonal workers who obtain permanent permits) are excluded Transformations are excluded
7. Source International Passenger Survey OPCS
8 Immigrants are persons who have been granted a permanent residence permit Includes those from Slovak Republic (1990 onwards)
9 1997 figure - Source HCSO Data refer to foreigners with long-term resident permits or immigration permits, except for foreigners with labour permits.
10 Immigrants are persons granted a permanent residence permit.
Numbers may be underestimates since not all children accompanying immigrants are registered.
11. Recorded as "external' migration flows referring to non-Baltic countries.
12. Persons granted a permanent residence permit

TABLE 7

OUTFLOWS POPULATION FROM SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-1999 (thousands)

(A) OUTFLOWS OF OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM WESTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BELGIUM | 23.1 | 23.8 | 22.4 | 19.5 | 18.4 | 16.7 | 16.3 | 16.2 | 18.7 | 17.4 | 16.6 | 15.8 | 20.5 | 21.8 | 22.6 | 33.1 | 22.0 | 23.5 | 32.5 | 24.4 |
| DENMARK | - | - | - | - | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 6.7 | 7.7 | 16.2 |
| FINLAND | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 3.0 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| GERMANY (1) | 385.8 | 415.5 | 433.3 | 424.9 | 545.1 | 366.7 | 347.8 | 334.0 | 359.1 | 438.3 | 466.4 | 497.5 | 614.7 | 710.0 | 621.4 | 567.4 | 559.1 | 637.1 | 639.0 | 555.6 |
| ICELAND | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
| ITALY | - | - | - | - | - | 8.5 | 7.1 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 7.1 | 6.3 | 6.8 | - | - | 8.4 | 8.5 | - | - | - |
| LUXEMBOURG | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 7.8 | 8.0 |
| NETHERLANDS | 23.6 | 25.0 | 28.1 | 28.0 | 27.0 | 24.2 | 23.6 | 20.9 | 21.4 | 21.5 | 20.6 | 21.3 | 22.7 | 22.2 | 22.7 | 21.7 | 22.4 | 21.9 | 21.3 | 20.7 |
| NORWAY | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 8.4 | 8.6 | 9.3 | 10.6 | 9.9 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 10.5 | 9.6 | 9.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 13.0 |
| PORTUGAL | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.1 | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | 0.4 |
| SWEDEN (2) | 20.8 | 20.8 | 19.9 | 17.4 | 14.6 | 14.0 | 15.4 | 11.6 | 11.8 | 13.1 | 16.2 | 15.0 | 13.2 | 14.8 | 15.7 | 15.4 | 14.5 | 15.1 | 14.5 | 13.6 |
| SWITZERLAND (3) | 63.7 | 64.0 | 62.6 | 61.7 | 55.6 | 54.3 | 52.8 | 53.8 | 55.8 | 57.5 | 59.6 | 66.4 | 80.4 | 71.2 | 64.2 | 67.5 | 67.7 | 67.9 | 59.0 | 58.1 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 79.0 | 69.0 | 72.0 | 63.0 | 61.0 | 66.0 | 81.0 | 80.0 | 94.0 | 83.0 | 96.0 | 102.0 | 94.0 | 88.0 | 82.0 | 74.0 | 77.0 | 94.0 | 88.0 | 141.9 |

(B) PERMANENT EMIGRATION FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BULGARIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 218.0 | 87.9 | 40.3 | 68.0 | 66.4 | 64.6 | 55.0 | 62.0 | - | - | - |
| CZECH REPUBLIC (4) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.0 | 11.8 | 11.2 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.1 |
| POLAND (5) | 22.7 | 23.8 | 32.1 | 26.2 | 17.4 | 20.5 | 29.0 | 36.4 | 36.3 | 26.6 | 18.4 | 21.0 | 18.1 | 21.3 | 25.9 | 26.3 | 21.3 | 20.2 | 22.2 | 21.5 |
| ROMANIA (6) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 41.4 | 96.9 | 44.2 | 31.2 | 18.4 | 17.1 | 25.7 | 21.5 | 19.9 | 17.5 | 12.6 |
| YUGOSLAVIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 26.4 | 69.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ESTONIA | - | - | - | - | - | 24.3 | - | - | - | 19.6 | 12.4 | 13.2 | 37.4 | 16.2 | 9.2 | 9.8 | 7.2 | 4.5 | 3.0 | - |
| LATVIA | - | - | - | - | - | 42.0 | - | - | - | 39.1 | 32.8 | 25.5 | 53.1 | 32.0 | 21.9 | 13.3 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 6.3 | 3.7 |
| LITHUANIA | - | - | - | - | - | 41.0 | - | - | - | 36.1 | 23.8 | 20.7 | 28.9 | 16.0 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 1.4 |
| HUNGARY (7) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 24.9 | - | - | - | - | - | 23.4 | 19.5 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| SLOVAK REPUBLIC (8) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| UKRAINE (9) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 266.6 | 307.0 | 345.7 | - | - | - | - | - |
| RUSSIA (10) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 739.0 | 729.0 | 675.0 | 673.0 | 483.0 | 337.0 | 340.0 | 388.0 | 233.0 | 213.4 | 215.0 |
| BELARUS (11) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 140.0 | 84.0 | 61.0 | 54.0 | 55.0 | 35.0 | - | - | - | 13.2 |
| FYR MACEDONIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | - | - |
| CROATIA (12) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8.6 | 8.9 | 9.2 | 10.2 | 15.4 | 10.0 | - | - | - |

Sources: Eurostat, Council of Europe, OECD SOPEMI Correspondents, National Statistical Offices

NOTES:

1. Data includes registered exits of asylum seekers. From 1991 includes former East Germany.
2. Some foreign citizens (in particular from other Nordic countries) are not included.
3. Exits of foreigners with annual residence permits (including, up to 31 December 1982, some holders of permits of durations below 12 months) and holders of settlement permits (permanent permits).
4. Includes only emigrants who report their departure.
   Include flows between the Czech and Slovak Republics from 1990 onwards.
5. Only persons who register their intention to establish a permanent residence abroad with the authorities are included in statistics.
6. Persons who already settled their permanent residence abroad (documented).
7. 1997 figure - Source: HCSO. Data refer to foreigners with long-term resident permits or immigration permits, except for foreigners with labour permits.
8. Includes the flow from the Slovak to the Czech Republic and thus the notable difference between the 1993 and 1994 figures reflects the vast decline in emigration to the Czech Republic.
9. Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Statistics, in IOM, 1997 and ICMPD 1997.
10. State Commitee on Statistics and Ministry of Interior, in IOM, 1997.
11. Ministry of Statistics and Analysis, Ministry of Interior, in IOM, 1997.
12. Includes only emigrants who report their departure.

TABLE 8
NET POPULATION FLOWS OF SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

(A) NET FLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO/FROM WESTERN EUROPE, 1980-99 (thousands)

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | Net Total (Dates shown) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BELGIUM | 23.7 | 17.5 | 13.8 | 14.8 | 18.8 | 20.8 | 23.0 | 23.9 | 19.5 | 26.1 | 33.8 | 38.3 | 34.6 | 31.2 | 33.4 | 20.0 | 29.9 | 14.7 | 18.5 | 21.3 | 477.6 |
| DENMARK | 2.6 | 3.4 | 5.0 | 6.8 | 4.0 | 10.0 | 11.5 | 7.1 | 2.8 | 4.4 | 8.2 | 11.5 | 11.7 | 11.2 | 11.2 | 27.9 | 17.4 | 11.9 | 11.0 | 11.6 | 191.2 |
| FINLAND | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 5.6 | 11.2 | 8.9 | 9.4 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 4.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 5.9 | 88.1 |
| GERMANY | 246.5 | 86.5 | -110.9 | -148.5 | -211.8 | 33.3 | 131.7 | 139.3 | 289.5 | 332.5 | 376.0 | 423.0 | 593.3 | 279.8 | 152.5 | 225.3 | 148.2 | -21.8 | -33.5 | 118.2 | 3049.1 |
| ICELAND | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.7 | -0.4 | 0.0 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 6.0 |
| ITALY | 88.3 | 91.5 | 100.1 | 98.3 | 86.9 | 73.7 | 68.6 | 99.1 | 80.6 | 75.4 | 89.6 | 64.6 | 65.5 | - | - | 59.8 | 134.7 | 125.2 | 119.2 | | 1521.1 |
| LUXEMBOURG | 1.4 | 0.4 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 54.5 |
| NETHERLANDS | 56.2 | 25.4 | 12.8 | 8.4 | 10.3 | 22.0 | 29.2 | 40.0 | 36.9 | 43.9 | 60.7 | 63.0 | 60.3 | 65.4 | 45.7 | 45.3 | 54.6 | 54.8 | 60.4 | 57.7 | 853.0 |
| NORWAY | 4.5 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 15.2 | 13.7 | 7.8 | 5.9 | 7.7 | 9.1 | 11.8 | 8.3 | 7.5 | 7.2 | 12.0 | 14.7 | 19.5 | 183.4 |
| PORTUGAL | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8.8 | - | - | 3.4 | - | - | 10.4 | 22.6 |
| SWEDEN | 13.6 | 6.6 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 11.5 | 13.9 | 18.6 | 25.5 | 32.7 | 45.8 | 37.0 | 28.9 | 26.3 | 40.0 | 59.0 | 20.7 | 14.8 | 17.9 | 21.5 | 21.0 | 465.4 |
| SWITZERLAND | 6.8 | 16.3 | 12.1 | -3.4 | 3.0 | 5.1 | 14.0 | 17.7 | 20.3 | 22.9 | 41.8 | 43.4 | 31.7 | 32.8 | 27.5 | 20.4 | 6.6 | 1.7 | 15.9 | 27.7 | 364.3 |
| UK | 28.0 | 24.0 | 32.0 | 45.0 | 45.0 | 56.0 | 49.0 | 33.0 | 33.0 | 63.0 | 65.0 | 48.0 | 22.4 | 32.0 | 51.0 | 80.0 | 85.0 | 94.0 | 133.0 | 189.9 | 1208.3 |

(B) TOTAL NET FLOWS OF POPULATION TO/FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1990-99

| | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BELARUS | - | - | - | - | -0.5 | 3.9 | 12.9 | 14.7 | 19.9 | 17.6 |
| CROATIA | - | - | - | - | 23.3 | 26.6 | 34.6 | 33.8 | 44.2 | 18.6 |
| CZECH REPUBLIC | - | - | - | - | 9.9 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 12.0 | 9.5 | 8.8 * |
| ESTONIA | -4.0 | -8.0 | -33.8 | -13.8 | -7.6 | -8.2 | -5.7 | -2.5 | -1.5 | -0.6 * |
| FYR MACEDONIA | - | - | - | - | 3.0 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| HUNGARY | - | - | - | - | 9.1 | 10.2 | 7.0 | 12.5 | 15.4 | 16.8 |
| LATVIA | -0.5 | -10.8 | -46.9 | -27.9 | -18.8 | -10.5 | -7.3 | -6.8 | -3.2 | -1.8 |
| LITHUANIA | -8.8 | -8.9 | -22.2 | -13.1 | -2.6 | -1.8 | -0.9 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.3 |
| MOLDOVA | - | - | - | - | -5.0 | -4.0 | -16.5 | -15.4 | -3.2 | -4.8 |
| POLAND | - | - | -11.3 | -15.5 | -19.0 | -18.2 | -13.1 | -11.8 | -13.3 | -14.0 |
| ROMANIA | - | - | - | - | -16.3 | -21.2 | -19.5 | -13.3 | -5.6 | -2.5 |
| RUSSIA | - | - | - | - | 809.6 | 502.5 | 343.5 | 349.0 | 300.2 | 165.0 |
| SLOVAK REPUBLIC | - | - | - | - | 4.8 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| SLOVENIA | - | - | - | - | 0.9 | 2.5 | 6.5 | 2.4 | -2.1 | 2.3 |
| UKRAINE | - | - | - | - | -143.2 | -94.8 | - | - | - | - |

Sources: Eurostat, Council of Europe, OECD SOPEMI Correspondents, National Statistical Offices

Notes:
See Table 6 and 7.

TABLE 9
POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE CIS COUNTRIES IN 1989-1997 (1)

| | Thousands |
|---|---|
| CIS refugees and persons in refugee-like situations | 2426 |
| Non-CIS refugees and asylum seekers | 156 |
| Internally displaced persons | 2890 |
| Repatriants | 4689 |
| Formerly deported peoples | 1208 |
| Ecological migrants (2) | 739 |

Source: IOM, 1999

Note
1. These figures are approximations owing to the existence of significant differences in definition and registration systems between CIS countries.
2. 1989-96 only.

TABLE 10
EMIGRATION FROM RUSSIA, 1989-1997

| | THOUSANDS | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COUNTRY | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
| CIS & BALTIC STATES TOTAL | 691.7 | 625.8 | 587.2 | 570.0 | 369.1 | 231.8 | 229.3 | 291.6 | 149.5 |
| NON CIS / BALTIC STATES TOTAL | 47.6 | 103.6 | 88.3 | 102.9 | 113.9 | 105.4 | 110.3 | 96.7 | 83.5 |
| GERMANY | 20.6 | 33.8 | 33.9 | 62.7 | 73.0 | 69.5 | 79.6 | 64.4 | 48.4 |
| GREECE | 1.8 | 4.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | - | - | - | - | - |
| ISRAEL | 22.0 | 61.0 | 38.8 | 22.0 | 20.4 | 17.0 | 15.2 | 14.3 | 12.9 |
| USA | 0.7 | 2.3 | 11.0 | 13.2 | 14.9 | 13.8 | 10.7 | 12.3 | 9.1 |
| OTHERS | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 5.6 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 5.7 | 10.6 |

Source: Population and Society. Information Bulletin for the Centre of Demography and Population Ecology (Oct 1994) and State Committee on Statistics and Ministry of the Interior in IOM, 1997.

TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMMIGRATION/EMIGRATION BY PREVIOUS/NEXT RESIDENCE (1)

| | Immigration | | | | Emigration | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | EU & EFTA | C&E Europe | Europe | Rest of World | EU & EFTA | C&E Europe | Europe | Rest of World |
| Albania [2] | - | - | - | - | 83.0 | - | 92.5 | 7.5 |
| Austria | 28.0 | 43.3 | 81.0 | 19.0 | 29.9 | 45.4 | 82.4 | 17.6 |
| Belgium [3] | 8.5 | 0.1 | 8.6 | 91.4 | 19.2 | 0.4 | 19.8 | 80.2 |
| Cyprus [4] | 50.5 | - | 65.7 | 34.3 | - | - | - | - |
| Denmark | 43.7 | 10.1 | 59.0 | 41.0 | 49.7 | 6.2 | 61.0 | 39.0 |
| Estonia [5] | 8.8 | 87.5 | 96.3 | 3.7 | 13.3 | 84.2 | 97.5 | 2.5 |
| Finland | 44.1 | 27.7 | 74.6 | 25.4 | 77.7 | 5.9 | 84.5 | 15.5 |
| Germany | 22.5 | 36.2 | 65.9 | 34.1 | 28.0 | 41.5 | 76.2 | 23.8 |
| Greece | 25.5 | 14.6 | 70.8 | 29.2 | - | - | - | - |
| Iceland | 72.3 | 10.6 | 83.4 | 16.6 | 83.6 | 1.9 | 86.1 | 13.9 |
| Ireland | - | - | 54.5 | 45.5 | - | - | 66.9 | 33.1 |
| Italy [6] | 15.4 | 27.2 | 43.0 | 57.0 | 62.2 | 5.6 | 69.4 | 30.6 |
| Latvia [7] | 4.9 | 87.5 | 92.4 | 7.6 | 5.2 | 87.0 | 92.2 | 7.8 |
| Lithuania [8] | 2.0 | 93.1 | 95.2 | 4.8 | 6.8 | 78.1 | 84.9 | 15.1 |
| Netherlands | 32.1 | 6.0 | 44.5 | 55.5 | 50.0 | 3.3 | 56.6 | 43.4 |
| Norway | 54.5 | 7.7 | 63.9 | 36.1 | 56.1 | 5.7 | 62.6 | 37.4 |
| Portugal | 60.2 | 3.0 | 63.5 | 36.5 | 95.0 | 1.1 | 96.1 | 3.9 |
| Romania [7] | - | - | - | - | 67.8 | 10.9 | 79.5 | 20.5 |
| Slovenia [9] | 16.7 | 0.6 | 93.7 | 6.3 | 58.2 | 0.2 | 89.3 | 10.7 |
| Spain | 46.1 | 2.4 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 1.8 | 0.3 | 2.1 | 97.9 |
| Sweden | 35.1 | 19.3 | 57.2 | 42.8 | 60.8 | 5.8 | 67.5 | 32.5 |
| United Kingdom | 33.7 | 2.1 | 37.9 | 62.1 | 34.2 | 3.1 | 38.7 | 61.3 |

Source: Eurostat

Notes:
1. All figures refer to 1997 unless otherwise stated.

4. 1992.
5. 1994.
6. 1996.
7. 1995.
8. Immigration 1994, emigration 1995.
9. Immigration 1995, emigration 1994.

TABLE 12
STOCKS OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000 (thousands)

(A) WESTERN EUROPE (1)

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA (2) | 174.7 | 171.8 | 156.0 | 145.3 | 138.7 | 140.2 | 146.0 | 147.4 | 150.9 | 167.4 | 217.6 | 266.5 | 273.9 | 277.5 | 291.0 | 316.8 | 319.7 | 318.9 | 324.8 | 333.6 | - |
| BELGIUM (3) | - | - | - | 190.6 | 182.5 | 179.7 | 179.2 | 176.6 | 179.4 | 196.4 | - | 290.4 | 337.3 | - | - | 328.8 | 343.8 | - | - | - | - |
| DENMARK (4) | - | - | - | 51.9 | 53.6 | 56.5 | 60.1 | 62.7 | 65.1 | 66.9 | 68.8 | 71.2 | 74.0 | 77.7 | 80.3 | 83.8 | 87.9 | 106.4 | 116.6 | - | - |
| FINLAND (5) | 4.5 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 6.4 | 7.2 | 8.0 | 10.0 | 13.0 | 14.0 | 14.7 | 15.2 | 22.6 | 25.5 | 29.7 | 32.5 | 36.0 | 37.2 | - |
| FRANCE (6) | 1458.2 | 1427.1 | 1503.0 | 1574.8 | 1658.2 | 1649.2 | 1555.7 | 1524.9 | 1557.0 | 1593.8 | 1549.5 | 1506.0 | 1517.8 | 1541.5 | 1593.9 | 1573.3 | 1604.7 | 1569.8 | - | - | - |
| GERMANY (7) | 2015.6 | 1917.2 | 1785.5 | 1709.1 | 1608.1 | 1586.6 | 1600.2 | 1610.8 | 1656.0 | 1730.8 | 1837.7 | 1972.9 | 2103.9 | 2183.6 | 2140.5 | 2128.7 | 2067.7 | 2001.8 | 1987.5 | - | - |
| GREECE (8) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 24.9 | 23.9 | 21.6 | 23.2 | 24.2 | 33.1 | 29.0 | 26.2 | 27.4 | 28.7 | 29.4 | - | - | - |
| IRELAND (9) | - | - | - | - | - | 34.0 | 33.0 | 33.0 | 35.0 | 33.0 | 34.0 | 39.3 | 40.4 | 37.3 | 34.5 | 42.1 | 43.4 | - | - | - | 59.9 |
| ITALY | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 187.8 | 153.4 | 380.9 | 464.6 | 507.5 | 525.5 | 474.6 | 332.2 | 580.6 | 539.8 | 614.0 | 747.6 | - |
| LUXEMBOURG (10) | 51.9 | 52.2 | 52.3 | 53.8 | 53.0 | 55.0 | 58.7 | 63.7 | 69.4 | 76.2 | 84.7 | 92.6 | 98.2 | 101.0 | 106.3 | 111.8 | 117.8 | 124.8 | 134.6 | 145.7 | 150.2 |
| NETHERLANDS (11) | 188.1 | 192.7 | 185.2 | 173.7 | 168.8 | 165.8 | 169.0 | 175.7 | 176.0 | 192.0 | 197.0 | 214.0 | 229.0 | 219.0 | 216.0 | 221.0 | 218.0 | 208.0 | 235.0 | - | - |
| NORWAY (12) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 49.5 | 47.7 | 46.3 | 46.3 | 46.6 | 47.9 | 50.3 | 51.9 | - | - | - | - | - |
| PORTUGAL (8) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 33.4 | 35.2 | - | 36.9 | 39.9 | 59.2 | 63.1 | 77.6 | 84.3 | 86.8 | 87.9 | - | 91.6 | - |
| SPAIN (13) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 58.2 | 69.9 | 85.4 | 171.0 | 139.4 | 115.4 | 121.8 | 138.7 | 161.9 | 176.0 | 190.5 | 172.8 | - |
| SWEDEN (14) | 234.1 | 233.5 | 227.7 | 221.6 | 219.2 | 216.1 | 214.9 | 214.9 | 220.2 | 237.0 | 246.0 | 241.0 | 233.0 | 221.0 | 213.0 | 220.0 | 218.0 | 220.0 | 219.0 | - | - |
| SWITZERLAND (15) | 501.2 | 515.1 | 526.2 | 529.8 | 539.3 | 549.3 | 566.9 | 587.7 | 607.8 | 631.8 | 669.8 | 702.4 | 716.7 | 725.8 | 740.3 | 728.7 | 709.1 | 692.8 | 691.1 | 701.2 | - |
| TURKEY | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 16.3 | 21.0 | 23.4 | - | - |
| UNITED KINGDOM (16) | - | - | - | - | 744.0 | 808.0 | 815.0 | 815.0 | 871.0 | 914.0 | 882.0 | 828.0 | 902.0 | 862.0 | 864.0 | 862.0 | 865.0 | 949.0 | 1039.0 | 1005 | - |

(B) CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ALBANIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | 0.7 | - | - | - |
| BULGARIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| CZECH REPUBLIC(17) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 95.5 | 29.8 | 14.5 | 51.6 | 72.1 | 111.9 | 143.2 | 130.7 | 111.2 | - | - |
| HUNGARY (18) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 30.9 | 28.9 | 31.2 | 15.7 | 17.9 | 20.1 | 21.0 | 19.2 | 14.0 | 21.4 | - | - |
| ROMANIA (19) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 4.7 | - | - | - |
| SLOVAK REPUBLIC (20) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.8 | - | - | - | - |
| RUSSIA (21) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 292.2 | 241.5 | - | - | - |

Sources: OECD SOPEMI Correspondents, National Statistical Offices

NOTES:

1. Includes the unemployed, except in Benelux and the U.K. Frontier and seasonal workers are excluded unless otherwise stated.
2. Annual average. Work permits delivered plus permits still valid. Figures may be over-estimated because some persons hold more than one permit. Self-employed are excluded. Data for 1990 and 1991 have been adjusted to correct for a temporary over-issue of work permits relative to the number of jobs held by foreigners, between August 1990 and June 1991.
3. Excludes the unemployed and self-employed.
4. Data from population registers and give the count as of the end of November each year except December (end of December).
5. Estimate, assuming activity rates of the 1980s (slightly under 50%).
6. Data as of March each year derived from the labour force survey.
7. Data as of 30 September each year. Includes frontier workers but not the self-employed. Refers to Western Germany.
8. Excludes the unemployed.
9. 1991 data excludes the unemployed.
10. Data as of 1 October each year. Foreigners in employment, including apprentices, trainees and frontier workers. Excludes the unemployed.
11. Estimates as of 31 March, including frontier workers, but excluding the self-employed and their family members as well as the unemployed.
12. Excludes unemployed. Data are for the second quarter.
13. Data derived from the annual labour force survey.
14. 1990-92 data corrected.
15. Data as of 31 December each year. Numbers of foreigners with annual residence permits (including up to 31December 1982, holders of permits of durations below 12 months) and holders of settlement permits (permanent permits) who engage in gainful activity.
16. Excludes the unemployed.
17. Former CSFR until 1992. Data refer to stock on 31/12 except for 1992 and 1996 (30/6). Source Federal Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in OECD, 1997. Includes those from the Slovak Republic (1993 onwards). 1997 data as of 30/6.
18. 1996 figure for first half of year. Valid work permits.
19. Total work permit holders.
20. Total work permit holders. Ministry of Labour and Slovak Employment Service in OECD, 1997.
21. Source: Federal Migration Service, 1998.

TABLE 13
INFLOWS OF FOREIGN LABOUR INTO SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1981-1999 (thousands)

| (A) WESTERN EUROPE | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | (8) 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA (1) | - | - | 31.4 | 32.4 | 34.0 | 18.0 | 15.3 | 17.4 | 37.2 | 103.4 | 62.6 | 57.9 | 37.7 | 27.1 | 15.4 | 16.3 | 15.1 | 15.4 | 18.3 |
| BELGIUM | 3.5 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 3.7 | - | 5.1 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.5 | - | - |
| DENMARK (2) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 | - |
| FRANCE | 33.4 | 97.0 | 17.3 | 10.8 | 9.7 | 9.9 | 10.7 | 12.7 | 15.6 | 22.4 | 25.6 | 42.3 | 24.4 | 18.3 | 13.1 | 11.5 | - | - | - |
| GERMANY | 43.9 | 25.9 | 24.4 | 27.5 | 33.4 | 37.2 | 48.1 | 60.4 | 84.8 | 138.6 | 241.8 | 408.9 | 325.6 | 221.2 | 270.8 | 262.5 | 285.3 | 275.5 | 433.7 |
| IRELAND (3) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.5 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 5.6 | 6.3 |
| LUXEMBOURG (4) | - | - | 3.9 | 4.1 | 6.9 | 8.4 | 10.5 | 12.6 | 14.7 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 15.9 | 15.5 | 16.2 | 16.5 | 18.3 | 18.6 | 22.0 | |
| SPAIN (5) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 52.3 | 45.5 | 47.9 | 51.2 | 126.1 | 95.0 | 92.7 | 88.6 | 100.3 | 126.4 | 86.8 | 85.5 | 91.6 |
| SWITZERLAND (6) | 35.3 | 33.1 | 24.2 | 25.0 | 25.4 | 29.4 | 33.6 | 34.7 | 37.1 | 46.7 | 46.3 | 39.7 | 31.5 | 28.6 | 27.1 | 24.5 | - | 26.4 | 31.5 |
| UK (7) | - | - | - | - | - | 35.0 | 40.3 | 45.5 | 53.4 | 55.0 | 50.5 | 35.4 | 37.1 | 45.0 | 51.0 | 50.0 | 59.0 | 68.0 | 127.0 |

| (B) CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BULGARIA (9) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | - 0.2 |
| CZECH REPUBLIC (10) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 47.5 | - | - | - |
| HUNGARY (11) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 30.9 | 28.9 | 31.2 | 15.5 | 19.5 | 18.6 | 18.4 | 14.5 | 18.0 | 22.6 | - |
| POLAND (12) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.3 | 12.0 | 9.6 | 11.0 | 10.5 | 13.7 | 17.5 | - | - |
| ROMANIA (13) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| SLOVAK REPUBLIC (14) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.5 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 2.5 |

Sources: OECD SOPEMI Correspondents, National Statistical Offices

NOTES:

1. Data for all years covers initial work permits for both direct inflow from abroad and for fist participation in the Austrian labour market of foreigners already in the country. Owing to a change in administrative practice, data from 1986 onwards are not comparable to the previous years. There is a break in the series from 1994 as a result of Austria's entry into the EEA. From 1994 onwards, only citizens of non-EU countries need a work permit.
2. Residence permits issued for employment. Nordic citizens are not included.
3. Work permits issued and renewed for non-EU nationals.
4. Data cover both arrivals of foreign workers and residents admitted for the first time to the labour market.
5. Work permits granted. 1999 provisional
6. Seasonal and frontier workers are not taken included.
7. Data from the Labour Force Survey.
8. As from 1st January 1994, citizens of EEA countries such as Austria, Iceland, Sweden, Norway and Finland no longer require work permits to work in EU countries.
9. Work permits, new and extensions.
10. Valid labour permits issued for foreigners.
11. 1994 figure shows data for the period 1/1/92 to 30/6/94, from Council of Europe, Nov 1994. Work permits are issued for a maximum of one year. 1997 figure source - Hungarian National Labour Centre.
12. Numbers of Individual work permits.
13. New work permits issued to foreign citizens.
14. Work permits granted. Czech nationals do not need work permits in Slovakia.

TABLE 14
FOREIGN POPULATION FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES

| | Total | Former USSR | Poland | Hungary | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 13636 | 2863 | 6034 | 966 | 3773 |
| Denmark | 11513 | 4355 | 5457 | 366 | 1335 |
| Germany | 729802 | 253957 | 283312 | 52029 | 140504 |
| Greece [2] | 41333 | 19814 | 5027 | 573 | 15919 |
| Spain | 14078 | 3549 | 5496 | 298 | 4735 |
| France [3] | 63039 | 4661 | 47127 | 2736 | 8515 |
| Italy | 106387 | 7404 | 16614 | 2374 | 79995 |
| Netherlands | 15115 | 6280 | 5680 | 1275 | 1880 |
| Austria [4] | 65281 | 2112 | 18321 | 10556 | 34292 |
| Portugal | 1598 | 775 | 186 | 91 | 546 |
| Finland | 31804 | 30180 | 684 | 454 | 486 |
| Sweden | 32631 | 8298 | 15842 | 2925 | 5566 |
| United Kingdom | 67000 | 23000 | 25000 | 3000 | 16000 |
| Iceland | 1006 | 161 | 735 | 40 | 70 |
| Liechtenstein | 64 | 15 | 15 | 9 | 25 |
| Norway | 5550 | 2170 | 2259 | 219 | 902 |
| Switzerland | 23109 | 6384 | 4327 | 3645 | 8753 |

Source: Eurostat, 2000

1. All figures refer to 1998 unless otherwise stated. Figures do not include Former Yugoslavia.
2. 1997.
3. 1990.
4. 1991.

TABLE 15
ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000 (thousands)

(A) WESTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 9.3 | 34.6 | 6.3 | 5.9 | 7.2 | 6.7 | 8.7 | 11.4 | 15.8 | 21.9 | 22.8 | 27.3 | 16.2 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 5.9 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 13.8 | 20.1 | 18.3 |
| BELGIUM | 2.7 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 5.3 | 7.7 | 6.0 | 5.1 | 8.1 | 13.0 | 15.2 | 17.8 | 26.9 | 14.3 | 11.4 | 12.4 | 11.5 | 22.1 | 35.8 | 42.7 |
| DENMARK | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 4.3 | 8.7 | 9.3 | 2.8 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 13.9 | 14.4 | 6.7 | 5.1 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 6.5 | 10.1 |
| FINLAND | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| FRANCE | 18.8 | 19.8 | 22.5 | 14.3 | 15.9 | 25.8 | 23.4 | 24.8 | 31.6 | 60.0 | 56.0 | 46.5 | 28.9 | 27.6 | 26.0 | 20.2 | 17.2 | 20.0 | 22.4 | 30.9 | 38.6 |
| GERMANY | 107.8 | 49.4 | 37.2 | 19.7 | 35.3 | 73.9 | 99.7 | 57.4 | 103.1 | 121.0 | 193.0 | 256.0 | 438.2 | 322.6 | 127.2 | 127.9 | 116.4 | 104.3 | 98.6 | 95.1 | 78.8 |
| GREECE | - | - | - | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 4.3 | 6.3 | 9.3 | 6.5 | 4.1 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 4.3 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 3.0 |
| IRELAND | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 7.7 | 10.9 |
| ITALY | - | - | - | 3.0 | 4.5 | 5.4 | 6.5 | 11.0 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 4.7 | 31.7 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 11.1 | 33.4 | 14.0 |
| LUXEMBOURG (1) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 2.9 | 0.6 |
| NETHERLANDS | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 5.7 | 5.9 | 13.5 | 7.5 | 14.0 | 21.2 | 21.6 | 20.3 | 35.4 | 52.5 | 29.3 | 22.9 | 34.4 | 45.2 | 39.3 | 43.9 |
| NORWAY | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 2.7 | 8.6 | 6.6 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 12.9 | 3.4 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 8.4 | 10.2 | 10.3 |
| PORTUGAL | 1.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| SPAIN | - | - | - | 1.4 | 1.1 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 11.7 | 12.6 | 12.0 | 5.7 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 6.8 | 8.4 | 7.0 |
| SWEDEN | - | - | - | 3.0 | 12.0 | 14.5 | 14.6 | 18.1 | 19.6 | 32.0 | 29.0 | 27.3 | 84.0 | 37.6 | 18.6 | 9.0 | 5.8 | 9.6 | 12.5 | 11.2 | 16.4 |
| SWITZERLAND | 6.1 | 5.2 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 9.7 | 8.6 | 10.9 | 16.7 | 24.4 | 36.0 | 41.6 | 18.0 | 24.7 | 16.1 | 17.0 | 18.0 | 23.9 | 41.3 | 46.1 | 17.7 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 9.9 | 2.9 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 6.2 | 5.7 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 16.8 | 38.2 | 73.4 | 32.3 | 28.0 | 42.2 | 55.0 | 27.9 | 32.5 | 46.0 | 71.2 | 76.5 |
| TOTALS (Western Europe) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 320.3 | 438.7 | 563.2 | 695.5 | 554.2 | 329.1 | 293.1 | 244.5 | 266.8 | 344.1 | 423.7 | 392.2 |

(B) CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.0 | 1.9 | 0.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| CZECH REPUBLIC | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.8 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 7.3 | 8.8 |
| HUNGARY (2) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 17.4 | 18.3 | 53.4 | 16.2 | 5.4 | 3.4 | 5.9 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 7.4 | 11.5 | 7.8 |
| POLAND (3) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.8 | 2.4 | 0.6 | 2.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 4.6 |
| BULGARIA (4) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | 3.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 1.8 |
| SLOVAK REPUBLIC (5) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 1.6 |
| ROMANIA (6) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.6 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.4 |

Sources: UNHCR, IGC, various Ministries of the Interior

NOTES:
All figures include dependants except France and Spain which refer only to principal applicants.
1. Figures for 1988 and 1989 were less than 100.1993-1995 data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the 1995 report to the OECD by the Luxembourg SOPEMI Correspondent.
2. 1991 -1993 includes temporary protected persons from Former Yugoslavia.
3. 1993 figure includes temporary protected persons from Former Yugoslavia.
4. Number of applicants received between July 1993 and the end of May 1994. Source Council of Europe (Nov 1994).
5. Source: Ministry of Interior, in the 1995 report to the OECD by the Slovak Republic's SOPEMI Correspondent.
6. Analysed requests.

**TABLE 16**
**ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES, 1985, 1992, 1999 and 2000**

| | 1985 | | | 1992 | | | 1999 | | | 2000 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | absolute figures | proportion of EU & EFTA total (per cent) | per 10,000 population | absolute figures | proportion of EU & EFTA total (per cent) | per 10,000 population | absolute figures | proportion of EU & EFTA total (per cent) | per 10,000 population | absolute figures | proportion of EU & EFTA total (per cent) | per 10,000 population |
| EU 15 | 159180 | 93.8 | 4.4 | 672380 | 96.7 | 18.3 | 352380 | 83.5 | 9.4 | 389590 | 93.3 | 10.3 |
| Austria | 6724 | 4.0 | 8.9 | 16238 | 2.3 | 20.6 | 20137 | 4.8 | 24.9 | 18280 | 4.4 | 22.5 |
| Belgium | 5387 | 3.2 | 5.5 | 17675 | 2.5 | 17.6 | 35778 | 8.5 | 35.0 | 42690 | 10.2 | 41.6 |
| Denmark | 8698 | 5.1 | 17.0 | 13884 | 2.0 | 26.9 | 6476 | 1.5 | 12.2 | 10080 | 2.4 | 18.8 |
| Finland | 18 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3634 | 0.5 | 7.2 | 3106 | 0.7 | 6.0 | 3320 | 0.8 | 6.4 |
| France | 28925 | 17.0 | 5.2 | 28872 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 30830 | 7.3 | 5.2 | 38590 | 9.2 | 6.5 |
| Germany | 73832 | 43.5 | 9.5 | 438191 | 63.0 | 54.6 | 95113 | 22.5 | 11.6 | 78760 | 18.9 | 9.6 |
| Greece | 1400 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 2108 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 1528 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 3000 | 0.7 | 2.8 |
| Ireland | - | - | - | 40 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 7850 | 1.9 | 21.0 | 10920 | 2.6 | 28.9 |
| Italy | 5400 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 2590 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 18450 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 18000 | 4.3 | 3.1 |
| Luxembourg | 78 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 120 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 2930 | 0.7 | 68.3 | 590 | 0.1 | 13.4 |
| Netherlands | 5644 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 20346 | 2.9 | 13.4 | 39286 | 9.3 | 24.9 | 43890 | 10.5 | 27.5 |
| Portugal | 70 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 655 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 310 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 200 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| Spain | 2300 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 11712 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 8410 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 7040 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| Sweden | 14500 | 8.5 | 17.4 | 84018 | 12.1 | 97.2 | 11771 | 2.8 | 13.3 | 16370 | 3.9 | 18.4 |
| United Kingdom | 6200 | 3.7 | 1.1 | 32300 | 4.6 | 5.6 | 70410 | 16.7 | 11.9 | 97860 | 23.4 | 16.3 |
| EFTA 4 | 10530 | 6.2 | 9.7 | 23210 | 3.3 | 20.3 | 69800 | 16.5 | 58.8 | 27990 | 6.7 | 23.3 |
| Iceland | - | - | - | 15 | 0.0 | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Liechtenstein | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10 | 0.0 | 3.0 |
| Norway | 829 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 5238 | 0.8 | 12.3 | 9100 | 2.2 | 20.5 | 10320 | 2.5 | 22.9 |
| Switzerland | 9703 | 5.7 | 15.0 | 17960 | 2.6 | 26.2 | 60700 | 14.4 | 85.2 | 17660 | 4.2 | 24.5 |
| EEA (EU + (EFTA - Switzerland)) | 160010 | 94.3 | 4.4 | 677640 | 97.4 | 18.2 | 361480 | 85.6 | 9.5 | 399920 | 95.8 | 10.5 |
| EU 15 + EFTA 4 | 169710 | 100.0 | 4.6 | 695590 | 100.0 | 18.4 | 422180 | 100.0 | 10.9 | 417580 | 100.0 | 10.7 |

Source: Eurostat, IGC, UNHCR

Notes:
EEA, 1985, 1999 estimated
EFTA, 1985, 1999 estimated
EU15, 1985 estimated, 1999 provisional
Italy, 1999 provisional
Norway,1999 estimated
Switzerland,1999 estimated

TABLE 17
ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SELECTED EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES BY TOP 10 NATIONALITIES OF ORIGIN 1988 AND 1997

Absolute Figures

| 1988 | Poland | Turkey | F Yugoslavia | Iran | Sri Lanka | Romania | Lebanon | Hungary | Zaire | Ghana | Total Applications |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 41024 | 33943 | 23451 | 17015 | 7885 | 7072 | 6380 | 5862 | 5465 | 5024 | 216711 |
| Belgium | 171 | 346 | 321 | 206 | 36 | 69 | 60 | 46 | 461 | 1145 | 4510 |
| Denmark | 594 | 87 | 13 | 827 | 605 | 267 | 228 | 34 | 3 | 23 | 4668 |
| Germany | 29023 | 14873 | 20812 | 7867 | 3383 | 2634 | 4233 | 1996 | 0 | 1304 | 103076 |
| Spain | 2086 | 0 | 0 | 819 | 0 | 121 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 95 | 4516 |
| France | 1040 | 6735 | 267 | 324 | 1498 | 658 | 40 | 58 | 4255 | 1240 | 34352 |
| Netherlands | 461 | 381 | 121 | 641 | 404 | 155 | 239 | 165 | 448 | 920 | 7486 |
| Austria | 6670 | 644 | 477 | 613 | 1 | 2134 | 141 | 2610 | 5 | 12 | 15790 |
| Portugal | 7 | 0 | 3 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 252 |
| Sweden | 609 | 869 | 609 | 5022 | 42 | 862 | 760 | 831 | 0 | 0 | 19595 |
| United Kingdom | 70 | 335 | 10 | 395 | 400 | 10 | 150 | 20 | 155 | 170 | 5740 |
| Switzerland | 293 | 9673 | 818 | 291 | 1516 | 161 | 529 | 0 | 136 | 113 | 16726 |

| 1997 | F Yugoslavia | Iraq | Turkey | F Soviet Union | Afghanistan | Sri Lanka | Romania | Somalia | Iran | DR Congo | Total Applications |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 40209 | 31288 | 23404 | 19720 | 13433 | 11421 | 9008 | 7570 | 7249 | 6399 | 255495 |
| Belgium | 1736 | 232 | 444 | 1481 | 116 | 143 | 601 | 122 | 95 | 1244 | 11788 |
| Denmark | 711 | 831 | 87 | 334 | 264 | 150 | 35 | 1164 | 158 | 11 | 5100 |
| Germany | 17471 | 14088 | 16840 | 10793 | 4735 | 3989 | 794 | 898 | 3838 | 1920 | 104353 |
| Spain | 83 | 44 | 5 | 474 | 35 | 10 | 1515 | 55 | 168 | 114 | 4975 |
| France | 1021 | 213 | 1367 | 833 | 120 | 1582 | 5140 | 0 | 0 | 1187 | 21416 |
| Netherlands | 3788 | 9641 | 1135 | 1957 | 5920 | 1497 | 75 | 1280 | 1253 | 592 | 34443 |
| Austria | 1025 | 1585 | 477 | 104 | 766 | 49 | 50 | 72 | 656 | 0 | 6991 |
| Portugal | 0 | 0 | 1 | 31 | 1 | 0 | 42 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 269 |
| Sweden | 3088 | 3057 | 208 | 612 | 176 | 34 | 37 | 364 | 356 | 36 | 9678 |
| United Kingdom | 2230 | 1075 | 1445 | 1995 | 1085 | 1830 | 605 | 2730 | 585 | 690 | 32500 |
| Switzerland | 9056 | 522 | 1395 | 1106 | 215 | 2137 | 114 | 884 | 129 | 605 | 23982 |

Proportion of Total Asylum Applications for each reporting country (per cent)

| 1988 | Poland | Turkey | F Yugoslavia | Iran | Sri Lanka | Romania | Lebanon | Hungary | Zaire | Ghana | Total Applications |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 18 9 | 15 7 | 10 8 | 7 9 | 3 6 | 3 3 | 2 9 | 2 7 | 2 5 | 2 3 | 100 0 |
| Belgium | 3 8 | 7 7 | 7 1 | 4 6 | 0 8 | 1 5 | 1 3 | 1 0 | 10 2 | 25 4 | 100 0 |
| Denmark | 12 7 | 1 9 | 0 3 | 17 7 | 13 0 | 5 7 | 4 9 | 0 7 | 0 1 | 0 5 | 100 0 |
| Germany | 28 2 | 14 4 | 20 2 | 7 6 | 3 3 | 2 6 | 4 1 | 1 9 | 0 0 | 1 3 | 100 0 |
| Spain | 46 2 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 18 1 | 0 0 | 2 7 | 0 0 | 2 2 | 0 0 | 2 1 | 100 0 |
| France | 3 0 | 19 6 | 0 8 | 0 9 | 4 4 | 1 9 | 0 1 | 0 2 | 12 4 | 3 6 | 100 0 |
| Netherlands | 6 2 | 5 1 | 1 6 | 8 6 | 5 4 | 2 1 | 3 2 | 2 2 | 6 0 | 12 3 | 100 0 |
| Austria | 42 2 | 4 1 | 3 0 | 3 9 | 0 0 | 13 5 | 0 9 | 16 5 | 0 0 | 0 1 | 100 0 |
| Portugal | 2 8 | 0 0 | 1 2 | 4 0 | 0 0 | 0 4 | 0 0 | 0 8 | 0 8 | 0 8 | 100 0 |
| Sweden | 3 1 | 4 4 | 3 1 | 25 6 | 0 2 | 4 4 | 3 9 | 4 2 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 100 0 |
| United Kingdom | 1 2 | 5 8 | 0 2 | 6 9 | 7 0 | 0 2 | 2 6 | 0 3 | 2 7 | 3 0 | 100 0 |
| Switzerland | 1 8 | 57 8 | 4 9 | 1 7 | 9 1 | 1 0 | 3 2 | 0 0 | 0 8 | 0 7 | 100 0 |

| 1997 | F Yugoslavia | Iraq | Turkey | F Soviet Union | Afghanistan | Sri Lanka | Romania | Somalia | Iran | DR Congo | Total Applications |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 15 7 | 12 2 | 9 2 | 7 7 | 5 3 | 4 5 | 3 5 | 3 0 | 2 8 | 2 5 | 100 0 |
| Belgium | 14 7 | 2 0 | 3 8 | 12 6 | 1 0 | 1 2 | 5 1 | 1 0 | 0 8 | 10 6 | 100 0 |
| Denmark | 13 9 | 16 3 | 1 7 | 6 5 | 5 2 | 2 9 | 0 7 | 22 8 | 3 1 | 0 2 | 100 0 |
| Germany | 16 7 | 13 5 | 16 1 | 10 3 | 4 5 | 3 8 | 0 8 | 0 9 | 3 7 | 1 8 | 100 0 |
| Spain | 1 7 | 0 9 | 0 1 | 9 5 | 0 7 | 0 2 | 30 5 | 1 1 | 3 4 | 2 3 | 100 0 |
| France | 4 8 | 1 0 | 6 4 | 3 9 | 0 6 | 7 4 | 24 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 5 5 | 100 0 |
| Netherlands | 11 0 | 28 0 | 3 3 | 5 7 | 17 2 | 4 3 | 0 2 | 3 7 | 3 6 | 1 7 | 100 0 |
| Austria | 14 7 | 22 7 | 6 8 | 1 5 | 11 0 | 0 7 | 0 7 | 1 0 | 9 4 | 0 0 | 100 0 |
| Portugal | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 4 | 11 5 | 0 4 | 0 0 | 15 6 | 0 4 | 4 1 | 0 0 | 100 0 |
| Sweden | 31 9 | 31 6 | 2 1 | 6 3 | 1 8 | 0 4 | 0 4 | 3 8 | 3 7 | 0 4 | 100 0 |
| United Kingdom | 6 9 | 3 3 | 4 4 | 6 1 | 3 3 | 5 6 | 1 9 | 8 4 | 1 8 | 2 1 | 100 0 |
| Switzerland | 37 8 | 2 2 | 5 8 | 4 6 | 0 9 | 8 9 | 0 5 | 3 7 | 0 5 | 2 5 | 100 0 |

Source Eurostat, IGC, UNHCR

Note
1997 figures for Austria and Portugal refer to 1996 as these are the latest available data

TABLE 18
NUMBER OF DECISIONS MADE ON ASYLUM APPLICATIONS AND CORRESPONDING RECOGNITION RATES FOR SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1990-2000

| Country | 1990 | | 1991 | | 1992 | | 1993 | | 1994 | | 1995 | | 1996 | | 1997 | | 1998 | | 1999 | | 2000 | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions | RR | Decisions |
| Austria | 12640 | 6.8 | 19690 | 12.5 | 23490 | 9.7 | 15400 | 7.8 | 9020 | 7.5 | 7620 | 13.0 | 8750 | 8.2 | 7930 | 8.1 | 4340 | 11.5 | 8230 | 41.7 | 5789 | 17.3 | 122899 |
| Belgium | 1600 | 33.1 | 2640 | 23.5 | 4340 | 20.7 | 4840 | 23.3 | 6370 | 25.0 | 5540 | 25.5 | 7110 | 23.6 | 9170 | 20.4 | 6530 | 26.0 | 4570 | 32.4 | 4556 | 26.2 | 57266 |
| Denmark | 2300 | 30.4 | 3160 | 31.3 | 3260 | 23.3 | 2930 | 22.2 | 2400 | 28.3 | 23320 | 21.3 | 12440 | 11.6 | 10370 | 9.5 | 8290 | 13.1 | 7510 | 15.2 | 7034 | 17.2 | 83014 |
| Finland | 490 | 4.1 | 2390 | 0.8 | 2070 | 1.4 | 3560 | 0.6 | 910 | 3.3 | 680 | 1.5 | 600 | 1.7 | 580 | 1.7 | 630 | 1.6 | 1850 | 1.6 | 1806 | 0.5 | 15566 |
| France | 87360 | 15.4 | 78450 | 19.7 | 36650 | 28.0 | 35490 | 27.9 | 29720 | 23.7 | 28960 | 15.6 | 22200 | 19.5 | 24170 | 17.0 | 22750 | 17.5 | 24150 | 19.3 | - | - | 389900 |
| Germany | 122790 | 5.3 | 140420 | 8.3 | 172830 | 5.3 | 364360 | 4.5 | 263970 | 9.7 | 145040 | 16.2 | 152830 | 15.8 | 122880 | 14.8 | 143940 | 7.9 | 96770 | 11.3 | - | - | 1725830 |
| Greece | 5900 | 19.3 | 7370 | 4.5 | 3520 | 5.7 | 750 | 5.3 | 760 | 11.8 | 1250 | 16.0 | 1880 | 8.5 | 2450 | 5.3 | 4200 | 3.8 | 2140 | 7.0 | 1969 | 11.3 | 32189 |
| Iceland | 10 | - | 10 | - | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | 40 |
| Ireland | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 40 | - | 70 | 28.6 | 80 | 50.0 | 630 | 33.3 | 1520 | 11.2 | 4190 | 12.2 | 8954 | 2.4 | 15484 |
| Italy | 1380 | 59.4 | 16460 | 4.9 | 6960 | 4.9 | 1430 | 9.1 | 1690 | 17.8 | 1720 | 16.9 | 690 | 24.6 | 1660 | 21.1 | 3420 | 30.1 | 2300 | 35.2 | 25000 | 6.6 | 62710 |
| Liechtenstein | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 190 | - | - | - | - | - | 190 |
| Luxembourg | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 40 | 25.0 | 20 | - | 110 | 36.4 | - | - | - | - | 170 |
| Netherlands | 10550 | 6.5 | 17240 | 4.5 | 32090 | 15.3 | 30770 | 33.6 | 51490 | 12.9 | 28220 | 28.3 | 57760 | 15.3 | 30770 | 21.5 | 26140 | 9.0 | 60920 | 2.5 | 53468 | 1.7 | 399418 |
| Norway | 5670 | 2.3 | 5820 | 2.1 | 7230 | 1.9 | 14930 | 0.3 | 13030 | 0.2 | 5070 | 0.6 | 3780 | 0.3 | 3970 | 2.3 | 5480 | 2.0 | 11620 | 1.5 | 7852 | 1.2 | 84452 |
| Portugal | 50 | 20.0 | 210 | 14.3 | 460 | 4.3 | 680 | 5.9 | 460 | 2.2 | 560 | 3.6 | 240 | 4.2 | 220 | - | 90 | - | 280 | 7.1 | - | - | 3250 |
| Spain | 3480 | 14.1 | 6040 | 9.3 | 10850 | 2.4 | 17540 | 7.4 | 12820 | 4.9 | 6770 | 6.8 | 4780 | 5.0 | 4980 | 3.2 | 6110 | 3.9 | 6510 | 4.5 | 7535 | 4.9 | 87415 |
| Sweden | 27310 | 7.9 | 37300 | 3.8 | 28010 | 2.2 | 79490 | 1.3 | 52440 | 1.5 | 9260 | 1.6 | 6310 | 2.1 | 13570 | 9.7 | 13570 | 8.1 | 10640 | 6.4 | 17049 | 2.0 | 294949 |
| Switzerland | 12160 | 7.2 | 30630 | 3.8 | 37580 | 3.8 | 34770 | 11.0 | 35510 | 8.3 | 28050 | 9.4 | 24670 | 9.2 | 22050 | 12.0 | 20690 | 9.8 | 57340 | 3.6 | 55273 | 3.7 | 358723 |
| UK | 4030 | 22.8 | 5030 | 10.1 | 19130 | 5.9 | 17430 | 9.1 | 17150 | 4.8 | 23420 | 5.6 | 35340 | 6.3 | 29890 | 13.3 | 26730 | 20.0 | 28150 | 25.2 | 98395 | 10.4 | 304695 |

Source: UNHCR (2000), Tables V.4, V.10

Notes:
RR refers to Recognition Rate, the percentage of substantive decisions granting 1951 Geneva Convention refugee status.

1. All 2000 data provisional and refer to first instance decisions.

TABLE 19
MAIN REGULARISATION PROGRAMMES OF IMMIGRANTS IN AN IRREGULAR SITUATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1981-2000

| | 1981-82 | 1985-86 | 1987-88 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992-93 | 1996 | 1997-98 | 1998 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France (1) | 121 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 78 | - | - |
| Greece (2) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 370 | - | - |
| Italy (3) | - | - | 119 | 218 | - | - | 148 | - | 350 | - |
| Portugal (4) | - | - | - | - | - | 39 | 22 | - | - | - |
| Spain (5) | - | 44 | - | - | 110 | - | 21 | - | - | 127 |

1. 1981-82 excludes seasonal workers (6681) and approx. 1,200 small traders not broken down by nationality
2. Holders of white card (first stage of regularisation)
3. 1996 data refer to permits for work. If including spouses and children the total would equal 227,300.
   1998 data equate to the number of applications received.
4. A new regularisation has started from May 2000,
   concerning those entering without documents before December 31st 1999
5. Number of applications received. A new regularisation program ran from 23rd March to 31st July 2000,
   Data relate to the number of applications received.

Source: OECD, (2000:82) Trends in International Migration.

TABLE 20
ESTIMATES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING, BY REGION, 1994-2001

| Time Period | Region | Number | For Whom | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annually | Globally | 4 million | All (Smug./Traff.) | IOM, 1996 |
| Annually | Globally | 700,000 to 2 million | Wom. & Chil. | US Government, 1998 |
| Annually | Globally | 1-2 million | Wom. & Chil. | US Department of State, 1998 |
| Annually | Globally | 1 million+ | Wom. & Chil. | Hughes, 2001 |
| 1993 | into EU | 50 000 | All (Smug.) | Heckmann et al., 2000 |
| 1999 | into EU | 400,000+ | All (Smug.) | Heckmann et al., 2000 |
| Annually | to EU & CEE | 300 000 | Women | Economist.com, 2000 |
| 1993 | to W. Europe | 100,000 to 220,000 | All (Traff.) | Widgren, 1994 |

compiled by the Migration Research Unit, 2001

TABLE 21
PRICE PAID TO TRAFFICKERS

| Destination / route taken | Price (US$ per person) |
|---|---|
| **via Europe** | |
| Bulgaria - Europe | 4000 |
| Greece - France, Italy Germany | 800 - 1200 |
| Turkey - Greece | 1400 |
| Hungary - Slovenia | 1500 |
| Kurdistan - Germany | 3000 |
| North Africa - Spain | 2000 - 3500 |
| Sri Lanka - Turkey | 4000 |
| Pakistan - Turkey | 4000 |
| Dominican Republic - Europe | 4000 - 10000 |
| Dominican Republic - Austria | 5000 |
| China - Europe | 10000 - 15000 |
| Afghanistan / Lebanon - Germany | 5000 - 10000 |
| Iraq - Europe | 4100 - 5000 |
| Iran - Europe | 5000 |
| Palestine - Europe | 5000 |
| **via USA** | |
| China - New York | 35000 |
| China - USA | 30000 |
| Middle East - USA | 1000 - 15000 |
| Pakistan / India- USA | 25000 |
| Mexico - Los Angeles | 200 - 400 |
| **via Canada** | |
| Iran / Iraq | 10000 |
| Venezuela - Canada | 1000 - 2500 |
| **via Ireland** | |
| Africa - Ireland | 5000 |
| Eastern Europe - Ireland | 3000 |
| **others** | |
| China - Argentinia | 30000 |
| Arab states - UAE | 2000 - 3000 |
| Philippines - Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan | 3500 |

Various sources.

# GRAPHS

## FIGURE 1 - NET MIGRATION AS A COMPONENT OF AVERAGE ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1997-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 2a - STOCK OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 2b - STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN GERMANY, 1980-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 2c - STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN SELECTED SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 2d - STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 2e - STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN SELECTED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1987-2000**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 3a - STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 3b - STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN SELECTED SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 3c - STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 3d - STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN SELECTED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1987-2000




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 4a - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 4b - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 4c - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO SELECTED SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 4d - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 4e - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO SELECTED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1989-2000**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 4f - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO THE BALTIC STATES, 1989-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 4g - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO RUSSIA, 1989-2000




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 5a - OUTFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION FROM THE BENELUX COUNTRIES, 1980-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 5b - OUTFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION FROM SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 5c - OUTFLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION FROM SELECTED SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 5d - PERMANENT EMIGRATION FROM SELECTED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1989-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 5e - PERMANENT EMIGRATION FROM THE BALTIC STATES, 1989-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 5f - PERMANENT EMIGRATION FROM SELECTED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1989-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 6a - NET FLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO/FROM SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 6b - NET FLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO/FROM SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 6c - NET FLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO/FROM GERMANY, 1980-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 6d - NET FLOWS OF FOREIGN POPULATION TO/FROM SELECTED SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 7a - STOCK OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 7b - STOCK OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 7c - STOCK OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN SELECTED SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99


**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 7d - STOCK OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-99




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 7e - STOCK OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN SELECTED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1989-98




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 8a - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN LABOUR TO SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1981-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 8b - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN LABOUR TO SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1981-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 8c - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN LABOUR TO SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1981-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

**FIGURE 8d - INFLOWS OF FOREIGN LABOUR TO SELECTED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1989-99**




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 9a - ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 9b - ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 9c - ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 9d - ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1980-2000




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 9e - ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN GERMANY, 1980-2000




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**

## FIGURE 9f - ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1989-2000




**For sources and explanatory notes, please refer to corresponding table.**