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# **REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON MIGRATION**

## **MIGRATION POLICIES ON THE EVE OF THE EU ENLARGEMENT: WHAT CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE EAST EUROPEAN REGION**

### **PROCEEDINGS**

**Kiyv, 9 and 10 October 2003**



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## **OPENING SESSION**

### **Migration: Democracy and Human Rights,**

#### **Speech on behalf of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe , by Mrs Maria Ochoa-Llidó, Head of the Migration and Roma Department Directorate General for Social Cohesion**

Minister,

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends

Dear Minister,

It is a great honour to address you on behalf of the Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe at this important conference on migration, which is taking place in this historic city of Kiev at the kind invitation of the Ukrainian authorities.

That we are meeting here is a sign of the tremendous political progress that has been achieved since the famous events of 1989 and the spread of democracy across our continent of Europe. Ukraine and its neighbours are now well established members of the Council of Europe, a pan European intergovernmental organisation that counts 45 member States.

Let me first of all thank the Ukrainian authorities and especially you Mr Zubchuk, Acting Minister for Internal Affairs, but also the Minister of Foreign Affairs, represented by Deputy Minister Mr Oleksandr Motsyk, for kindly inviting and generously hosting this event in this impressive building, the Ukrainian House.

I would also welcome Ambassador Johannes Landman, Vice-Chairman of the Ministers' Deputies of the Council of Europe, Mr Tadeusz Iwinski, Chair of the PACE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, and the speakers and participants. We have representatives of other international organisations and representatives of national administrations of member States of the Council of Europe and of Belarus, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan and Vietnam who join us for the first time. We have wanted you to be together and have arranged for the representatives of the countries to sit by alphabetic al order, observers and member States together. I am sure you will use the opportunity to create closer bilateral and multilateral links. I would like to thank you all for your presence here today.

Let me now tell you what the Deputy Secretary General would have liked to tell you personally.

Bearing in mind the former controls on population movement, the rights to migrate externally and internally both represent important democratic achievements for the region. They are recognized by Protocol 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights which states that everyone lawfully with the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence; and everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his or her own. These rights may only be restricted for reasons that are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security of public safety, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. All the member States of the Council of Europe from the CIS countries have ratified Protocol 4. And this is a great achievement for human rights. Not only this, but the movement of people is a powerful creator of wealth, employment and economic development; which is why the CoE is so attached to the principle of free movement of people which might well be on the agenda of the upcoming Committee of Ministers meeting in Chisinau.

However, change is not without its problems and difficulties, and the political and economic changes that have taken place over the last twelve years or so in the region, and that are still taking place, are no exception.

All this has created problems of integration for migrants and host societies alike. Extensive land frontiers and easy air links have also combined with weak administrative and control structures to favour irregular migration which sees the region as both one of destination and transit towards Europe. Unfortunately, organised crime has also taken hold of these migration routes, and takes a heavy toll on human lives in the smuggling of desperate migrants and the victims of trafficking. These are problems that you know only too well, and this is why we have organized this conference so that we can learn from each other and try to formulate proposals for common action, rather than separate and individual initiatives.

So, this is the first reason for holding this conference; to provide an opportunity to discuss these problems collectively, on a regional basis, and also with representatives from countries outside Europe whose nationals emigrate, regularly or irregularly, towards Eastern Europe as well as to other European countries. This is why I am particularly pleased to welcome very senior officials and experts from Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan and Belarus.

The second reason, perhaps the most important one, is to discuss with you the possible actions that we should take together to meet the challenges of these problems.

In this context, and with all humility, I would like to offer you the services of the Council of Europe and the collective experience of its member States in this field.

The Council of Europe has almost since its very inception in the aftermath of the Second World War held the issues of migration close to its priorities. I have just mentioned the right to internal freedom of movement and the right to emigrate enshrined in the 1963 Protocol 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Migrants' rights are protected in many other instruments of the Council of Europe; each dealing with specific problems encountered by migrants in the host societies of their countries of destination or transit. These include the European Convention on Establishment of 1955; the European Social Charter of 1961 and its 1996 revised version; the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers of 1977; the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level of 1992; and there are many others.

The Council of Europe Development Bank was also established, partly, to help finance projects for refugees and migrants; and this sector remains one of its priority areas of activity to this very day.

Just one year ago the Ministers of the Council of Europe member States responsible for Migration Affairs met in Helsinki to discuss the theme: *Migrants in our societies: policy choices in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. For the very first time, ministerial representatives of non-member countries which are sending or transit countries of migrants took part in this Conference. These were Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. The Ministers took note of the complex nature of the challenges: the rise in irregular migration, the exploitation of migrants by traffickers, the persistence of xenophobia, racism and discrimination, and the important social and economic impact of migrants on both their countries of origin and destination.

At the end of their discussions, the Ministers recommended that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe implement a plan of action, one of the pillars of which concerns the promotion of regional and international co-operation and, in particular, the strengthening of dialogue and partnership between member and non-member States.

We believe that this dialogue can lead to a constructive and positive approach to the management of migration that would help the migrants to benefit from a legal framework protecting their basic rights and avoiding exclusion. No new dividing lines should be drawn. Central to this approach is the principle of the respect of the dignity of the person. This entails the right of migrants to be treated with dignity and not as criminals who need to be controlled and subjected to criminal sanctions. To this, of course, must be balanced the legitimate concerns of states, not only host states, but also those of countries of origin and transit.

This conference in Kiev is the fourth in a series of such events, bringing together on a regional basis countries of origin, transit and destination. Since October 2001, regional migration conferences organized by the Council of Europe in co-operation with local partners

have taken place in Athens, Sofia and Malta. As you will see, many of the issues are common to your own concerns.

In Malta earlier this year migration experts from the Mediterranean region discussed the following issues:

- how to protect the human rights of migrants
- how to promote dialogue at all levels of government and internationally
- how to establish a genuine co-operation and partnership
- the need for greater harmonization of migration policies
- better policies for the integration of migrants
- how to improve the role of migrants in the development of their countries of origin, and the promotion of sustainable development generally.

You can see from this list that the underlying concept that distinguishes the approach of the Council of Europe is that of promoting a human rights approach to migration.

The human rights approach, which is comprehensive and takes into account all the spheres of life in the society, is an important counterbalance to the fragmented approach taken in some countries, where for example there is no access to social rights for certain groups of migrants or where the focus is entirely on the prevention of irregular migration; or where the easy but inappropriate amalgam between terrorist and migrant is made. Even irregular migrants, as human beings, enjoy fundamental rights. Moreover, the protection of human rights as was pointed out in Malta constitutes a building block for the sustainable development of countries of origin. The successful integration of migrants in host countries does entail costs, but the costs of non-integration are far greater. Every effort needs to be made to make their integration successful.

*What will happen after Kiev?*

I will outline our detailed proposals tomorrow. For the moment I would like to confirm the commitment of the Council of Europe to promoting regional co-operation, and this will continue. Let me stress that this conference in Kiev is part of a continuing process and that the next very important step will take place in December in Rotterdam, with the first meeting of a new political platform on migration which will include all the member and most of the non-member States present here today to discuss migration issues of common interest at the same table.



**Speech of Mr Oleksandr Motyuk,  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine**

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen!

Dear participants of the Conference!

I am glad to welcome you at such a representative and topical forum.

Today we are witnessing the key developments, determining the shape of our continent two years ahead, namely, the biggest wave of EU Eastern enlargement. These processes will undoubtedly affect not only member-states of this institution, but the international community as a whole as well.

Ukraine is consistent in its positive attitude to the EU enlargement. In formation and implementation of our own migration policy we proceed from our strategic goal - European and Euro Atlantic integration, as well as from the new situation emerging around Ukraine due to the present wave of EU enlargement.

Problem of illegal migration is among major challengers of the day. Ukraine regards fight against this negative phenomenon as an important element of guaranteeing Pan European security.

We are confident that the effectiveness of activities in this area to a considerable extent depends on accuracy and coherence of interaction among all members of international community, including countries to which flows of illegal migrants are directed and those which are suppliers of illegal migrants.

Ukraine regards cooperation with its neighboring countries in fight against illegal migration as an integral component of creation of the zone of stability around our country and realization of the European integration objectives through extension of Ukraine's participation in the trans-border and regional cooperation.

Regarding cooperation with our neighbors in the West in issues of combating illegal migration in the light of their accession to EU, we realize that soon our borders with them will be those with the European Union, and already today we have to do our utmost to avoid creation of a new dividing line and at the same time to take measures to transform these borders in a reliable barrier to illegal migration.

As an important task we regard developing of our borders in the West, allowing for more active counteraction to using Ukraine as a transit state for illegal migration. Here we hope to receive support not only by our neighbors in the East but those in the East as well, first of all EU member-states.

I would like to mention that at present, concluding Agreements on readmission not only with our neighboring states and EU, but with countries, which are potential suppliers of illegal migrants, as well, is among the priority tasks of Ukraine's migration policy. This would prevent Ukraine's transformation into a kind of "accumulator" of illegal migrants. In this context we expect to get a comprehensive support by the EU, as it is a common challenge (for EU and Ukraine) requiring common efforts.

Among the steps to be taken at the present stage by Ukraine in its cooperation with EU member-states and candidate-states to prevent illegal migration, the following are of priority importance:

- intensification of interaction among the countries of origin, transit and destination of illegal migrants in the area of common fight against illegal migration and other threats;
- implementation of practical arrangements to create on the new common borders of Ukraine with the enlarged EU conditions similar to those existing at present on the borders between the EU and its candidate-countries;
- prompt elaboration of legal and organizational mechanisms of trans-border cooperation, in particular, development of necessary border infrastructure, liberalization of visa regime between EU and Ukraine and simplification of the border crossing procedure etc.;
- coordination with EU of joint activities in the field of visa regime and transferring in the future the Schengen border into the border with Ukraine. In our opinion, introducing visa regime, strengthening fight against illegal migration and taking security measures on the EU external borders could be carried out together with stirring up of the negotiation process with Ukraine concerning liberalization of visa regime for Ukrainian nationals and cooperation in developing Ukrainian borders.
- adopting experience of Germany and Poland, in particular, in developing border between Ukraine and Poland and using it as an example for all future borders between Ukraine and the enlarged EU for effective cooperation between Ukraine's Border Service and relevant agencies of EU candidate-states.

Summing up, I would like to say that our state is ready for more active involvement in elaboration of European countries common policy in the area of migration, and participation in any forms of cooperation.

I hope that the Conference will contribute to further development of Pan European stability and security.

Thank You for attention.

**Speech of Ambassador Johannes Landman,  
Vice-Chairman of the Ministers' Deputies of the Council of Europe**

Ministers,

Deputy Secretary General,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour for me to be here in Kiev to participate in the fourth Conference of the Council of Europe addressing the question of migration management.

In 7 months' time, on 1<sup>st</sup> May 2004, the European Union will extend its membership eastward to include the new member countries, seven of which are situated in the region: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Thus in the East, the European Union will have a common border with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and, further South, with Romania.

This enlargement is a challenge for whole region. I will go even further. The enlargement has to be seen not as an obstacle but as a means to improve the process of dialogue and co-operation across borders in the region and with the European Union. The enlargement of the EU will contribute to the stability and security of the region. It will contribute to economic growth, improvement of living standards and strengthening of the rule of law and human rights in the region.

The enlargement process of the European Union has refuelled the debate within the Council of Europe on its future role in building Europe without dividing lines (Budapest declaration of the Committee of Ministers, 1999). Crucial issues are being discussed such as the fundamental role of the Council of Europe in the elaboration of European standards and in the protection and promotion of human rights, and its inter-action with the enlarged Union to promote unity across the continent and pan-European values. The question of migration is part of this political agenda.

We must resist the temptation of building a fortress within the greater Europe. The enlargement of the European Union risks creating a sense of exclusion for those residing in states outside of the EU. The role of the Council of Europe in this sense will be determinant. The Council of Europe must continue to stand for a Europe without dividing lines. It must continue to provide a unique and effective framework for bringing together governments across Europe and politicians at parliamentary, local and regional levels on an equal footing. It must continue to play a determining role in establishing pan-European principles of rule of law, democracy, human rights and social cohesion.

These principles are important in the field of migration. The Council of Europe does not prone an open door policy. Member states are entitled to restrict immigration. But this should not be at the expense of fundamental rights. If we are to effectively manage migration flows in the future we should pay particular attention to the human dimension of migration within a clear legal framework.

For several decades now, the Council of Europe has sought to establish a legal framework for the rights and living conditions of migrants. It has drafted relevant instruments such as the European Convention on Establishment (1955), the European Convention on the legal status of migrant workers (1977), and the European Convention on the participation of foreigners in public life (1992).

More recently, with a view to protecting migrant's rights and to facilitate their integration in the societies in which they live, the Committee of Ministers has adopted a number of Recommendations to member states on security of residence of long-term residents (2000), on the legal status of those admitted for family reunification (2002), on measures of detention for asylum seekers (2003) to name but a few.

But now we have to look towards the future. What are some of the priorities set by the Committee of Ministers, particularly in the wake of the Ministerial Conference in 2002 and the enlargement process of the EU?

We shall firstly have to devote intergovernmental efforts on the implementation of the long term strategy for managing migration flows and on concrete policy proposals to help eradicate the causes of irregular migration.

We must step up dialogue and co-operation between all countries affected by these processes. Effective management of flows depends on this dialogue undertaken in a climate of confidence and mutual understanding.

We must develop channels for legal migration, which should be as clear and unambiguous as possible. We must ensure that clear and up-to-date information is available to potential migrants on conditions of entry, residence and employment in the country of destination.

We must step up the fight against smuggling and trafficking of human beings and the exploitation of migrants, including children, finding appropriate solutions with due respect to human dignity. In this respect, the Committee of Ministers has recently set up an interdisciplinary group of experts to draft a European Convention on action against trafficking in human beings. It will not only address the repression of this phenomenon but also its prevention and the protection of victims and their social integration.

These are just some of the areas of our future work, and I look forward to hearing your views over the coming two days. I also welcome the presence of other international organisations (OECD, ILO, IOM, UNHCR and CIS), the Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress. I hope for continuing co-operation between us on migration issues with a view to building on the strengths of each organisation.

In four weeks, my country, the Netherlands, will take the chair of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers. [It is already foreseen that migration issues will be one of the priorities of our Presidency]. In December 2003 we will host, in Rotterdam, the 46th meeting of the European Committee on Migration. The Committee of Ministers agreed in June 2003 to allow the newly created political platform to meet for the first time on 10 December to establish a regular political dialogue on migration issues between member and non member States.

I am sure that the debate of the next two days will certainly contribute to the reflection in that direction.

**Speech of Mr Tadeusz Iwinski,  
Chair of the PACE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population**

Dear Minister,

Dear Ambassador,

Dear participants,

I find the holding of this conference most timely and the theme you have chosen is one of utmost importance. Earlier this week our Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population took part in a Public Seminar on the future of the Schengen Convention, which was organised jointly with the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament.

The political dimension of the Schengen Convention was given particular attention by inviting to a debate between the Italian EU Presidency, the new candidate countries and the new EU neighboring countries – like Poland and Ukraine. The new visa-agreement between Poland and Ukraine was also mentioned in this connection as well as the Polish-Russian agreement on free visas for travel to and from Kaliningrad.

The central issue of the debate was of course the future development of the second generation Schengen Information System, SIS II, and questions related to data protection, including the sharing of data with third countries – signatories as well as non-signatories to the Convention.

As you know, the second generation Schengen Information System is scheduled to become operational in 2006. It is therefore important to analyse all aspects of its functioning as well as its interaction with other existing or planned information systems, such as Europol, EURODAC, VIS, Eurojust, etc. The increased use of biometric identification technology will for these systems represent a performance revolution. This was also acknowledged by the G8 meeting of ministers of justice and internal affairs in Paris beginning of May this year.

The fight against crime and terrorism is a particular problem of migration management policy and has indeed become one of the central issues following the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001. The sharing of information is therefore an important part of combating illegal activities, which I also underlined in my report to the Parliamentary Assembly in 2001 on Transit migration in central and eastern Europe. It is a complex and difficult area of co-operation, but I think that this is one of the big challenges for future co-operation within the East European region. Seminars like the one in Brussels this week could possibly be repeated in an Eastern European setting, and I will bring this idea with me to our next Assembly-session in Strasbourg.

In my report on Transit migration in central and eastern Europe, I illustrated the migration problem by pointing at two issues:

- the considerable number of people displaced or finding themselves within new national borders, and
- the serious problem of human smuggling and trafficking, i.e. irregular migration.

As regards the last problem, we all know that Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine unfortunately have become important recruiting areas for the sex trade and human trafficking. The European Commission estimates that some 120 000 women and children are trafficked into Western Europe each year and a considerable number of the victims come from Eastern Europe.

When the Assembly debated this issue on 25 June this year, it gave its unanimous support to the drawing up of Council of Europe Convention on trafficking in human beings, which should have a clear focus on human rights and victim protection. It should also lead to introducing the offence of trafficking in the criminal law of Council of Europe member states and to a harmonisation of penalties applicable to trafficking.

I believe that this problem should be addressed as a regional East European challenge as well as a pan-European and international matter of great concern.

Regarding the problem of displaced people, we should remember that some 10 million people have moved across the previous internal borders of the former Soviet Union. The break-up of the USSR also resulted in more than 25 million Russians finding themselves outside the new Russian Federation. Ukraine has received about one million new citizens from other CIS countries and about 250 000 Crimean Tatars. I am at present working with a report to be presented to the Assembly next year on the Situation of refugees and displaced persons in the Russian Federation and other CIS countries.

The problems are very complex due to the criminal deportation policy of the former Soviet Union and to the many regional conflicts, in particular in the Caucasus region.

We have therefore treated the problems of refugees and displaced persons in the Southern Caucasus republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in a separate report presented to the Assembly by Mrs. Vermot-Mangold last year. The conflicts originally perceived as short term, remain for the most part unresolved and cause considerable suffering and uncertainty for those who were forced to leave their homes and cannot return. Our Committee advocates a policy of immediate humanitarian and other assistance to those in need, while a political settlement of the conflicts will be pursued in the appropriate fora. The

countries concerned must however, show much more willingness to find pragmatic solutions to their shared problems.

Finally, allow me to return to the problem of refugees and displaced persons in the Russian Federation and other CIS countries. As I already mentioned a large number of persons are concerned and many countries are involved.

Generally speaking, national legislation in Russia and the European CIS countries have improved and in most areas reached satisfactory international standards. The implementation at local and regional level in Russia as well as in Ukraine can still be improved. The propiska regime has not entirely disappeared and Russia does not yet accept the concept of internally displaced person as defined in the 1998 “UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”.

The problem of refugees and displaced persons in Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine will be the focus of my future report and could also be a subject for a regional exchange of problems and experiences. It is particularly important in my view to avoid statelessness and to guarantee that any repatriation of refugees or displaced persons should be totally voluntary.

In summing up, I believe that East European regional co-operation could be particularly useful for the improvement of the regimes for refugees and displaced persons, for the fight against human smuggling and trafficking, and increasingly for data-collection, standardisation and exchange in close co-operation with the European Union.

I thank you for your attention.



**SESSION 1:  
MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS ACROSS THE EASTERN BORDERS OF  
EUROPE**

**Introduction: Eastern Europe: Current and Future Migration Trends,  
by Dr Irina Ivakhniouk,  
Deputy Director of Department of Population, Faculty of Economics, Moscow State  
'Lomonosov' University, Russia**

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Colleagues,

I am honoured to make an introductory presentation at the first session of the Conference, and I hope my vision of the current and future migration trends in the Eastern Europe will be a sort of background for our joined search for better understanding of how migration management strategy can be implemented in the region and what forms of co-operation could be most effective in this context.

As I know, all the participants are supplied with copies of my paper, so I will concentrate on the most significant and most “irritating” issues in order to give food for further discussion.

The purpose of my paper (and my presentation as well) is to highlight international migration picture in the countries situated on the future enlarged EU borders – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The reason for intent interest of the EU towards its eastern neighbours is quite understandable. Naturally, knowing the neighbour living next door is very important for your own wellbeing. If your neighbour is calm, friendly and successful then you can feel secure. But if your neighbour is hostile, secretive, and has a household full of strange, suspicious guests, then there are grounds for concern.

In case of Eastern Europe, we have the fact of close neighbourhood of two separate but interacting big migration spaces, or migration systems: one is the European migration system (within the frames of the European Union) and the other is the new Euro-Asian migration system (which covers the post-Soviet territory and is centered on Russia).

In order not to confuse you with the term migration system I am to explain that in general migration theory there is an international migration systems concept, and in my mind it is quite suitable to describe the present migration picture in Europe and to be of practical use when elaborating migration management strategy in the region.

A migration system is understood as a group of countries connected by existence of relatively large self-containing migration flows between them; these flows are usually based on political, economic and cultural links between these countries. Normally, migration flows

within a migration system are centered on one or several countries of destination, while a system is open, i.e. it has migration links with outside countries and other migration systems as well. Usually, the four major migration systems in the world are identified: the North American, European, Gulf, and Asia-Pacific. Presently, Euro-Asian migration system is likely to be added to this list, first of all due to large scale of international migration movements both within the ex-USSR territory and to and out of other countries of the world.

Therefore, when talking about neighbourhood of two migration systems in Europe I mean re-shaping of European migration space that has happened during the last decade of the 20th century and in very beginning of the 21st century and can be regarded as a serious shift in Europe's migration history: European Union with its relatively open intra-regional borders is becoming a next-door neighbour with the CIS territory where the borders between the member countries are also more or less "transparent". In this context, it is important to understand that the enlarged EU will be facing not only Russia by itself, or Ukraine by itself, or Belarus by itself with their peculiar migration situations but also the whole of Euro-Asian migration system with its general trends and perspectives.

On the other hand, the East European countries who are staying outside EU in the foreseen perspective are to realize that on the other side of their western border there are not just individual countries but a union of countries with common migration policy.

I would like to emphasize that existence of two migration systems on the European continent has absolutely nothing in common with the former division of Europe into two opposing political blocks. Migration systems are not opposing each other, nor contradicting each other, but in order to work out strategy for effective management of migration flows across the so-called "Eastern borders of Europe" there is a need of co-operation not only between bordering countries, but between bordering systems.

In this context, estimations of out-migration potential in the Euro-Asian migration system, its "transit capacity", irregular/illegal migration scale are becoming of crucial importance for EU in elaborating reasonable migration management strategy in collaboration with its eastern neighbours.

Overview of the recent migration trends in the Euro-Asian migration system shows the shift in the structure of migration flows in this area: the stage of panicked, reactive and largely forced migration is over (having peaked in the early 1990s). As well, ethnic factor is considerably decreasing in both internal and external migration flows, while economic factors have gained a greater role. In the recent years Russia has become a migrants receiving country not only due to historical reasons but to economic reasons. Migrants from other CIS countries come primarily in quest of jobs and higher salaries, either they are regular labour migrants or

irregular migrants. It is quite understandable that they prefer Russia as the “easiest” (most suitable) country of destination due to visa-free entry, common language, culture, mutually recognized diplomas and qualifications, etc.

As economic situation in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Central Asian countries is much worse than in Russia, remittances help migrants’ families in their motherlands survive. Moreover, this issue is closely related to regional security: since Russia can absorb inflows of the CIS citizens (and provide them with jobs and earnings), it makes an input to the regional social stability. Otherwise, social outburst in the countries that are obviously skidding on their way to market economy could be a reason for new waves of forced migrants and refugees from Euro-Asian migration system to outside. This conclusion is of crucial importance in the context of European migration system perspectives: as Russia reduces migration pressure from this region on the EU, the latter should be strongly interested in positive economic dynamics in the country.

At the same time, migration links between two migration systems, especially between the border countries have become relatively stable during the last decade. Overall, migration flow from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus towards the West consists of various categories: permanent migrants, asylum seekers, business migrants, temporary labour migrants, circular (“shuttle”) migrants, irregular migrants, transit migrants, etc.; I should stress again: major part of them are motivated primarily by economic factors.

This point is closely related to the change of the shape of European migration system and makes the issue of management of migration between future member-states of the EU and the CIS countries very topical. For example, in Russia (as well as in Ukraine) there exists a certain segment of population whose well-being strongly depends on their trips abroad. According to some estimates, the incomes of around two million households in Russia are derived from international migration. Data from Ukraine or Moldova shows that every third household has at least one family member working abroad. Many of these migrants are oriented to the Central European countries that are to join the EU. The problem is that, after EU expansion, the border restrictions will become inevitably more strict and many of these people will be either left without a source of income or forced to become irregular persons within the EU.

Well, irregular migrants. It is the most “disturbing” issue in the context of new migration trends in the Eastern Europe. The fact that a big portion of international migration to this region, within the region, through the region and out of the region is taking place in non-controlled, irregular form is a matter of particular concern both to the countries of the region and for the EU. It is important to understand that as irregular migrants are primarily

motivated by employment reasons, their number is closely related to the labour absorption capacity in receiving countries. So-called “grey” labour market sectors are most attractive for irregular migrants. Therefore, domestic labour market regulation and control should be the most effective method to limit irregular migration.

At the same time, regarding to transit migrants, practical cooperation between the EU, on the one side, and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, who are an important link in the migration chain between Asia and Europe, on the other side, looks both possible and promising. Due to geographical location of the three countries, relatively “transparent” borders within the post-Soviet territory, weak institutional capacity of CIS governments to manage migration, poor legislation in this field, disorganization of national labour markets with significant informal sector, high level of corruption – all these factors have determined a new role of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as the “Euro-Asian corridor” and “way station” for transit migrants (mainly irregular) from Asian and African countries to Europe. At the present moment it is much easier for a transit migrant to enter the post-Soviet territory than to depart. The CIS western frontiers in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are controlled much more strictly than its eastern frontiers. By prohibiting the irregular exit of those migrants who have violated the terms of their visas, or have used forged documents, the Russian, Ukrainian or Belarussian border guards are in fact turning their countries into a “settling tank” for irregular migrants.

According to the Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs data, at the present time there are over 300 thousand transit migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ethiopia and other countries “stuck” in Russia. Besides, there is a significant flow of migrants who illegally penetrate Russian borders trying to reach EU countries.

Here, we face a crucially important issue: usually transit illegal migrants do not act by themselves. They are managed by well-organized criminal structures specializing in migrant smuggling. In general, illegal migration is no longer a spontaneous process in the world. It is a well-organized and extremely profitable business with low risks.

At least two major conclusions are to be made from understanding of this fact: (1) efforts to combat irregular migration should be focused not on irregular migrants by themselves but on those structures who are managing them; (2) these should be coordinated and combined efforts of all the countries concerned by negative effects of irregular migration at international and regional levels.

In conclusion, I would like to say that coming to coordinated decisions is a long and arduous process. The more or less accepted opinion is that migration regulation should be a sphere of active co-operation among the interested countries: countries of destination,

countries of origin and countries of transit. The effectiveness of this cooperation highly depends on whether the mutual interests will be fully and properly understood and addressed.

It appears that when the current trends in the East European region are understood in the context of interrelation of two migration systems it can provide a more reasonable approach to implementation of migration management strategy and a positive shift in migration policies from reactive to proactive. As there is a changing variety of migration flows within Euro-Asian system it needs a range of migration policy dimensions related to labour migration regulation, prevention of irregular migration, combating of trafficking in migrants, etc. Diverse categories of migrants moving across eastern border of the enlarging EU involve different types of people and motivations; and they are managed by different institutions. The trend is: the less is the regulating role of a State and international bodies in migrants' management, the more is the role of informal, often criminal smuggling and trafficking institutions.

The alternative way is to develop legitimate, regular forms of international migration, primarily labour migration. This should be the essence of practical co-operation between EU and its eastern neighbours in view of the future enlargement of the European migration space (or European migration system if you agree to my vision of the situation).

*Introduction*

The forthcoming enlargement of the European Union means a new phase in European history, being a symbol of a victory of integration processes over long-lasting trend of division of the world (and of Europe in particular) into two opposing blocs. The first stage of EU enlargement in 2004 and the perspective of further integration of the whole continent into common economic space is an obviously process, rich in potentials and opportunities, but also in contradictions and problems that need radical changes in the policies of governments and supranational bodies, and in the action of economic and social actors<sup>1</sup>. In this context current international migration trends in the region are a good example.

During the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and in very beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe is witnessing a serious shift in its migration history. Collapse of the socialist block and disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia followed by political and economic crisis in many new countries have caused numerous migration flows of different nature within European space. These migration flows have already made an input in immigration community in Europe and turned such countries as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary into “new” destination and transit territories.

Political and economic interest of Central European countries for integration with prosperous Western Europe is resulting in the European Union eastward expansion. This means new re-shaping of European migration space: European Union with its relatively open intra-regional borders is becoming a next-door neighbour with the CIS territory where migration movements between the member countries are also more or less “transparent”. This is the reason for intent interest of the EU towards its eastern neighbours. Naturally, knowing the neighbour living next door is very important for your own wellbeing. If your neighbour is calm, friendly and successful then you can feel secure. But if your neighbour is hostile, secretive, and has a household full of strange, suspicious guests, then there are grounds for concern.

At the same time Russia and other European ex-USSR states – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova – look closely at integration processes related to the EU enlargement bearing in mind their own possible future joining with the Union in the far-away perspective.

Management of migration flows between the EU and its eastern neighbours could be a field for working out common approaches in practical questions of further cooperation in a

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<sup>1</sup> Corrado Bonifazi, Central and Eastern European countries and the new reality of European international migration // In: Irena E Kotowska and Janina Jozwiak (eds.) Population of Central and Eastern Europe. Challenges and Opportunities. European Population Conference. Warsaw, 26-30 August 2003. Statistical Publishing Establishment. Warsaw, 2003, p. 415.

more general sense. However, effective management of migration is to be based on proper knowledge of migration scale, trends and perspectives understood in the context of economic, social and political development. For this reason the paper is focused primarily on international migration situation in three countries bordering the EU new accession states – Russia, Ukraine, Belarus (see table 1). At the same time, migration exchange between two major migration systems at the European continent – one, within the frames of the expanding European Union, and the other, that covers the post-Soviet territory and is centered on Russia – are to be analyzed in the context of large-scale migration flows *through* the territory of three mentioned countries westwards. It regards to migration flows from Caucasus states, Central Asian countries, as well as far-off Asian and African states (China, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, Ethiopia, etc.) that use the ex-USSR territory as a transit route westwards.

**Table 1.**  
**Population and migration in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 2000**

	Russia	Ukraine	Belarus
Population size	145,184,800 <sup>1</sup>	49,036,500 <sup>2</sup>	9,990,435 <sup>3</sup>
Immigrants	359,330 <sup>4</sup>	53,712 <sup>5</sup>	25,943 <sup>6</sup>
Emigrants	145,720 <sup>7</sup>	100,325 <sup>8</sup>	13,812 <sup>9</sup>
Refugees and persons in refugee-like situations from former Soviet states	667,093 <sup>10</sup>	3,584 <sup>11</sup>	66 <sup>12</sup>
Refugees and persons in refugee-like situations from non-former Soviet states	9,710 <sup>13</sup>	2,221 <sup>14</sup>	403 <sup>15</sup>
“Repatriates”	189,691 <sup>16</sup>	21,585 <sup>17</sup>	9,284 <sup>18</sup>
Irregular migrants	1,300,000-1,500,000 <sup>19</sup>	1,600,000 <sup>20</sup>	50,000-150,000 <sup>21</sup>
Persons detained at the border	3,997 <sup>22</sup>	763 <sup>23</sup>	376 <sup>24</sup>
Persons detained for irregular staying in the country	150,000 <sup>25</sup>	24,000 <sup>26</sup>	n/a
Persons deported from the country	21,100 <sup>27</sup>	12,700 <sup>28</sup>	264 <sup>29</sup>

**Notes:**

<sup>1</sup> Data from Russia’s National Committee on Statistics, as of 31.12.2000

<sup>2</sup> Data from Ukraine’s National Committee on Statistics, as of 31.12.2000

<sup>3</sup> Data from Belarus Ministry of Statistics and Analysis, end of year

<sup>4</sup> Data from Russia’s National Committee on Statistics. Total number of persons who moved to Russia for permanent residence during 2000

<sup>5</sup> Data from Ukraine’s National Committee on Statistics. Total number of persons who moved to Ukraine for permanent residence during 2000

<sup>6</sup> Data from Belarus Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. Total number of persons who moved to Belarus for permanent residence during 2000

<sup>7</sup> Data from Russia’s National Committee on Statistics. Total number of persons who left Russia for permanent residence during 2000

<sup>8</sup> Data from Ukraine’s National Committee on Statistics. Total number of persons who left Ukraine for permanent residence during 2000

<sup>9</sup> Data from Belarus Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. Total number of persons who left Belarus for permanent residence during 2000

<sup>10</sup> Data from Ministry of National and Migration Policy. Total number of migrants from former Soviet Union states who were granted with status of refugee or “forced migrant”, as of 31.12.2000

<sup>11</sup> Data from State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, as of 31.12.2000. Of these, 811 persons obtained refugee status; 2,773 persons were recognized to be in refugee-like situations

and got humanitarian assistance from Ukrainian Government (primarily Georgians from Abkhazia)

<sup>12</sup> Data from Committee on Migration at the Ministry of Labour, by the end of year

<sup>13</sup> Of these, 9,180 persons were registered by UNHCR as refugees; 530 persons who obtained refugee status according to the Ministry of National and Migration Policy

<sup>14</sup> Data from State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, as of 31.12.2000. Of these, 2,150 persons from non-former Soviet Union states were granted with refugee status; 71 persons were recognized to be in refugee-like situations and got humanitarian assistance from Ukrainian Government

<sup>15</sup> Data from Committee on Migration at the Ministry of Labour, by the end of year

<sup>16</sup> Data from Russia’s National Committee on Statistics. Total number of ethnic Russians who moved to Russia from other former Soviet republics during 2000.

<sup>17</sup> Data from Ukraine’s National Committee on Statistics. Total number of ethnic Ukrainians who moved to Ukraine from other former Soviet republics during 2000.

<sup>18</sup> Data from Belarus Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. Total number of ethnic Belarussians who moved to Belarus from other former Soviet republics during 2000

<sup>19</sup> Estimation of the Ministry of National and Migration Policy

<sup>20</sup> Estimate mentioned during the parliamentary discussion on the draft Law On immigration. Grazhdanin, Information Bulletin, 2000, No: 29. UNHCR. Kiev

<sup>21</sup> Estimation of the Committee on Migration at the Ministry of Labour. See: International Seminar “Main directions and ways to develop cooperation of Border Guards of the CIS, UNHCR and IOM against irregular migration and for protection of the rights of refugees”. Minsk, 2001

<sup>22</sup> Data from the Russian Federal Frontier Service

<sup>23</sup> Data from the State Border Security Committee. Total number of persons who were apprehended while attempting to enter Ukraine

<sup>24</sup> Data from State Committee of Border Guards

<sup>25</sup> Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Total number of persons who were fined for holding expired visas

<sup>26</sup> Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

<sup>27</sup> Data from the Federal Frontier Service. Total number of persons who were deported from Russia during 2000. Of these, 2,700 were deported with escort.

<sup>28</sup> Data from the State Border Security Committee. Number of persons who were deported from Ukraine during 2000

<sup>29</sup> Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Number of persons who were deported from Belarus during 2000

**Source:** IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 68, 118, 148.



### *Definitions*

In order to realize the scale and characteristics of a phenomenon we are facing to, it is necessary to shape it by giving its proper definition. With regard to international migration it is particularly topical: a paradox but a fact that until now, in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there is no common, universally accepted understanding of international migration.

The United Nations 2002 estimate for the number of international migrants in the world is 175 million persons (as a total of foreign-born population). This estimation is based on “classical” understanding of international migrants as people who have moved to other country for permanent residence. So, it does not include neither seasonal migrants, nor circular migrants, nor irregular migrants, nor tourists.

However, it is important to take into account that the essence of international migration and its structure are changing in course of time. Definition of international migration and its classification should be changing correspondingly. For example, when half a century ago the United Nations recommended to exclude *tourist* trips from international migration statistics, it was quite reasonable and understandable for that moment. However, nowadays the evidence of Eastern Europe, for example, demonstrates that the nature of tourist trips has dramatically changed. The actual purposes of people arriving to this or that country with tourist visa can differ from recreation or sightseeing. Frequently, the “tourists” category is hiding business-migrants, circular “shuttle migrants”, irregular labour migrants, etc. For example, the major part of Russian “shuttle migrants” (petty traders), or “chelnoks” (as they are called in Russia) make their business trips to Poland? Italy or Greece with tourist visa and are fixed by statistics as “tourists” though they are *economic migrants by nature*. Many irregular labour migrants use tourist visa to enter the country of destination/. They are registered by tourist statistics, however, they have nothing in common with “classical tourists”.

So, in our opinion, to have the realistic picture of the scale of international migration in the world and especially in particular regions where circular or irregular migrations are realized predominantly in the form of tourist trips (Eastern Europe is the most obvious example) it is necessary to broaden the narrow frames of “classical” definition of international migration and if not statistically, then at least analytically, bear in mind that actual scale of international migration in the region is much greater that registered by migration statistics. For example, over 4 million persons who annually depart from Russia as “tourists” is in fact a very diversified category of international migrants. (6 lines deleted)

Already in mid-1990s Marek Okolski, professor of the Warsaw University came to a conclusion that “classical” definition of international migration as of non-return permanent migration is too tight for analyzing contemporary migration trends in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. He offered to use the term *incomplete migration*: “It involves persons

described as “false tourists” characterized by a flexible employment situation and generally relatively low social status ... who are continually in touch with the members of their households remaining at home”<sup>2</sup>. Later, Mary Kritz, the International Union for Scientific Studies of Population (IUSSP) General Secretary and professor at the Cornell University argued: “It is correct that settlement migration which dominated international flows for a couple of centuries has basically ended... However, the era of international migration has not ended”<sup>3</sup>. Instead, we would say, *the era economic forms of migration* has started. In the global context, the total number of labour migrants is estimated as over 40 million (120 million with family-members) in 2001 compared to 3.2 million in 1960.

In our opinion, *international migration of population* is to be understood as movements of population through international borders related to change of permanent residence and citizenship caused by various reasons (economic, family, ethnic, political and others) or to temporary stay in the country of arrival of long-term (over one year), seasonal (less than one year) or circular (daily) character, as well as to episodic trips for business, rest, treatment, etc. Correspondingly, *international migrant* is a person who moves across state border with the purpose of change of residence, work or other actions (study, rest, business, etc.) permanently or for a certain period (from 1 day to several years).


When analyzing migration situation at the post-Soviet territory these notes seem to be of particular importance. For example, in the Russian migration literature there are many arguments emphasizing that “international migrations at the post-Soviet territory are freezing”<sup>4</sup>. Such conclusions are usually based either on comparison with the scale of the former inter-republic migration movements in the USSR (however, it’s a well known fact that internal migration is much more numerous than international migration, especially in big countries) or on non-return migration balance. If we take into consideration migration for permanent residence alone, we do see for Russia the decline from 900 thousand persons in 1994 to 72 thousand persons in 2001. However, if we include all types of migration flows in the analysis (including non-return permanent migration as well) we will watch the seven-times growth of gross migration of Russians and foreign citizens between 1987 and 2001 – up to 40 million (as you see from diagram 1).

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<sup>2</sup> Marek Okolski (1999) Migration pressures on Europe // In: European Populations: Unity in Diversity. Ed. by D. van de Kaa et al. Dordrecht, Boston, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 163.

<sup>3</sup> Mary Kritz (2002) International Migration to Multiple Destinations // “The World in the Mirror of International Migration”. Scientific series “International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World” Volume 10, Moscow MAX Press, p. 99.

<sup>4</sup> Zh. Zayonchkovskaya (2000) Migration Policy // The Russia’s Development Programme up to 2010 (Draft), The Center for Strategic Research, Moscow.



Source: Data from the National Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation (Goskomstat).

Thus, when analyzing migration movements across Eastern European border we are going to highlight all the variety of migrations, including migration for permanent residence, labour migration, irregular migration, and transit migration as well. Lack of reliable data does not give us an opportunity to make the in-depth analysis of tourist trips of the CIS citizens to Europe that could be reasonable in the above context. However, we keep in mind that “tourism” being effective and positive way for growing knowledge of peoples about each other and profitable branch of industry in many countries, is at the same time a channel for economic migrants to enter countries of destination.

#### *Euro-Asian migration system*

In terms of international migration systems concept<sup>5</sup> the vast territory of the former Soviet Union can be regarded as a new independent international migration system centered on Russia.

Definition of a migration system is related to existence of relatively large self-containing migration flows between the countries that are connected by political, economic and cultural links. Migration flows within a migration system are usually centered on one or several countries of destination, while a system is open, i.e. it has migration links with outside countries and other migration systems as well. Usually, the four major migration systems are identified: the North American, European, Gulf, and Asia-Pacific<sup>6</sup>. Presently, Euro-Asian

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Kritz M., Lean Lim L, Zlotnik H. (eds.) (1992) *International Migration Systems: A Global Approach*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

<sup>6</sup> Simmons A., Piche V. (2002) *Teaching Migration and Globalisation* // “Genus”, vol. LVIII (n. 3-4), p. 116.

migration system is to be added to this list, first of all due to large scale of international migration movements both within the ex-USSR territory and to and out of other countries of the world. Gross non-return migration between former Soviet states in 1992-2001 was over 20 million, and net migration to Russia from other countries of the region was + 4,4 million persons<sup>7</sup>.

In the globalizing world the main receiving countries (that are usually the centers of migration systems) are not “pure migrants receivers”; they also produce migrants. Mary Kritz argues that “significant number of migrants to developed countries originate from other developed countries”. This is proved by “the presence of the United Kingdom, United States, Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Australia, New Zealand, France, Canada and Germany in the list of top 30 migration senders”<sup>8</sup>. In the case of the Euro-Asian migration system, Russia, being the principal receiving county in the region is also generating migration flows to other countries of the world. However, this fact does not call into question its position as the center of an “independent” migration system.

Being a center of a new migration system Russia acts as a *sending* and – to a much greater extent – as a *receiving* and *transit* country. In accordance with the United Nations classification, in the 1990’s Russia gained the second position in the world hierarchy of receiving countries after the USA with total number of immigrants 13.2 million<sup>9</sup> (see diagram 2). Though Russia’s national statistics data is different from the UN criteria of *foreign-born persons*, the total number of immigrants to Russia in 1992-2001 – 10.7 million persons (among those: 6.5 million of officially registered as “arrived for permanent residence”, 1.2 million of refugees, 3 million of non-status immigrants<sup>10</sup>) – also confirms Russia’s second position among the major receiving countries of the world<sup>11</sup>.

During rather short period of time ex-USSR countries have faced a variety of international migration flows including migrations for permanent residence, forced migrants flows, temporary labour migrations, transit migrations, illegal migrations, etc.

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
<sup>7</sup> Russia’s Statistical Yearbook 2001. Moscow, Goskomstat.

<sup>8</sup> Mary Kritz (2002) International Migration to Multiple Destinations // “The World in the Mirror of International Migration”. Scientific series “International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World” Volume 10, Moscow MAX Press, p. 103, 109.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations (2002) International Migration. New York, October 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Non-status immigrants are not illegal migrants. This category has appeared as a result of “transparent” borders between former Soviet states when people who moved to Russia in the beginning of 1990’s succeeded in living and working there for years, however, due to poor legislation couldn’t obtain the Russian citizenship.

<sup>11</sup> Vladimir Iontsev, Irina Ivakhniouk (2002) Russia in the World Migration Flows: Trends of the Last Decade (1992-2001) // In: The World in the Mirror of International Migration. Scientific series “International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World” Volume 10, Moscow MAX Press, p.52.



Source: United Nations (2002) International Migration. New York, October 2002.

The structure of these flows has been changing: in early 1990's forced migration flows (mainly ethnical by nature) prevailed, they were caused by post-collapse political shock and nationalist unrest in the new sovereign countries where "aliens" were severely oppressed and pushed out by new nationalist elites<sup>12</sup>. However, since mid-1990s the motivations behind migrations have shifted; economic factors (both push and pull) have gained a greater role. Economically, Russia looks more attractive than the majority of neighbouring countries. According to Goskomstat official data, Gross National Product per capita in Russia in 1996 was 6,742 USD; it is twice higher than in Ukraine (3,325 USD), threefold higher than in Moldova (2,100 USD), and five times higher than in Tadjikistan<sup>13</sup>. Average wages (in USD equivalent) in Ukraine is 2.1 times less than in Russia, in Kazakhstan – 1.7 times less, in Kyrgyzstan – 3.8 times, in Moldova – 4.5 times, in Armenia – 6.6 times, in Azerbaijan – 9.4 times, in Tadjikistan – 30 times<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> The only exception in this context is Russia where the idea of ethnically homogenous country has never been even discussed for historical reasons.

<sup>13</sup> Labour Migration in Russia (2001) Volume 2 of the series "Migration of Population". Editor of the series O. Vorobyeva. Supplement to "Migration in Russia" Journal. Moscow, p. 82.

<sup>14</sup> Socio-Economic Situation in Russia (2001) Statistical Review. Goskomstat. Moscow.

So, if at the initial stage of Euro-Asian international migration system formation in the beginning of the 1990's Russia gained the role of its center mainly due to historical reasons (for over three centuries Russia was sending migrants to marches of the Empire and during the Soviet period – to the “fraternal republics” where a numerous “Russian Diaspora” has emerged<sup>15</sup>), presently Russia is becoming an *economic* center attracting migrants from CIS countries. The main motivation of their migration to Russia is related to economic reasons: migrants come in quest of jobs and higher salaries, either they are regular labour migrants or irregular migrants.

Economic situation in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Central Asian countries is much worse than in Russia, so remittances help migrants' families in their motherlands survive. Moreover, this issue is closely related to regional security: since Russia can absorb streams of CIS citizens (who prefer Russia as the “easiest” country of destination due to visa-free entry, common language, culture, mutually-recognized diplomas and qualifications, etc.) and provide them with jobs and earnings, it makes an input to the regional social stability. Otherwise, social outburst in the countries which are obviously skidding on their way to market economy could be a reason for new waves of forced migrants and refugees from Euro-Asian migration system to outside. This conclusion is of crucial importance in the context of European migration system perspectives: as Russia reduces migration pressure from this region on EU, the latter should be strongly interested in positive economic dynamics in the country.

At the same time, migration links between two migration systems, especially between the neighbouring countries have become stable during the last decade. Overall, migration flow from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus towards the West consists of various categories: business migrants, temporary labour migrants, circular (“shuttle”) migrants, irregular migrants, transit migrants, etc., all of whom are motivated *primarily by economic factors*.

This point is closely related to the change of the shape of European migration system and makes the issue of management of migration between future member-states of the EU and the CIS countries very topical. For example, in Russia (as well as in Ukraine, for example) there exists a certain segment of population whose well-being strongly depends on their trips abroad. According to some estimates, the incomes of around two million households in

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<sup>15</sup> During pre-Soviet period (1796-1916) the total number of population who have moved from European part of Russia to its border regions exceeded 12.6 million; among them 7 million (80% of them were ethnic Russians) have moved to the territories that are now the “new independent states”. During the Soviet period migration balance of Russia with other republics was –4 million persons (Population Encyclopedia (1994), Moscow, p.235; Kabuzan V. (1996) Russians in the World, Saint-Petersburg).

Russia are derived from international migration<sup>16</sup>. However, we suppose that the real number is much higher if we take into consideration all the categories of economic migrants (seasonal migrants, contract workers, day labourers, petty traders, and irregular migrants). In Ukraine, according to experts' estimations, from 2 to 7 million persons take part in various forms of economic migration<sup>17</sup>. In Moldova and Armenia, every third household had one or more family members working abroad<sup>18</sup>. Many of these migrants are oriented to the Central European countries that are to join the EU. The problem is that, after EU expansion, the border restrictions will become inevitably more strict and many of these people will be either left without a source of income or forced to become irregular persons within the EU.

In order to avoid this, it is important to undertake official, governmental efforts to provide migration opportunities under the new conditions, i.e. when a new, common immigration policy comes into force. This looks especially topical since cheap foreign labour from neighbouring countries has become a structural element in some industries in the Central European countries. We do not have reliable data at our disposal, but we can suppose that, for example, the garment industry in some regions of Poland has increased its competitiveness thanks to woman-migrants from Ukraine and Russia.

So, while in the first decade after the collapse of the socialist bloc Central European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia) were in a sort of intermediate position in the European migration picture<sup>19</sup> experiencing the inflow from the eastern neighbouring states and the outflow to the prosperous Western European countries, nowadays they are definitely tied up at the EU harbour. Thus, at the very beginning of the current century a new re-shaping of the European migration space is taking place that will surely affect future migration trends in the continent.

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<sup>16</sup> Labour Migration in Russia (2001) Volume 2 of the series "Migration of Population". Editor of the series O. Vorobyeva. Supplement to "Migration in Russia" Journal. Moscow, p.21.

<sup>17</sup> Irina Prybytkova (2003) Labour Migration in Ukraine in Transition Period // In: Labour Migration in CIS: Social and Economic Effects. Edited by Zh. Zayonchkovskaya. Moscow, p. 26.

<sup>18</sup> IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 17.

<sup>19</sup> In mid-1990s international migration analysts tended to describe Central and Easter European countries as a common "new migration space" (see, for example, Okolski, Marek (1999) Migration pressures on Europe // In: European Populations: Unity in Diversity. Ed. by Dirk van de Kaa et al. Dordrecht, Boston, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 162).

*Migration for permanent residence*

Dynamics of migration flows for permanent residence within the CIS space was similar in all the countries of the region: after migration “boom” in the first half of the 1990’s consisting mainly of ethnic migrants who were scared to stay in new sovereign states in the status of ethnic minorities (moreover – oppressed minorities), the situation was gradually normalizing. By the year 2000 “repatriation”<sup>20</sup> of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians decreased in comparison with 1997: in Russia – for 40%, in Ukraine – for 25%, in Belarus – 45%<sup>21</sup>. In Russia, the share of Russian “repatriates” in net migration decreased notably: from 70% in 1997 to 55% in 2000. Net migration in 2000 was around 266 thousand persons with immigration four times higher than emigration (see table 2). In Belarus, migration balance with all the CIS countries was also positive (16,8 thousand persons in 2000), while gradually declining (in 1998 – 24.1 thousand, in 1999 – 22.1 thousand)<sup>22</sup>. Ukraine was the only country in the European part of the CIS that was losing population: immigration to the country in 2000 was 49.7 thousand, emigration from the country was 55.4 thousand, so net migration was –5.7 thousand<sup>23</sup>. It is worth mentioning that Russia and Belarus stayed to be principal Ukraine’s migration partners, as negative migration balance with these two countries exceeded positive migration balance with the rest.

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<sup>20</sup> We prefer to put “repatriation” in quotes as in fact persons who have moved from their native places to other regions of the USSR during the Soviet or pre-Soviet period were not emigrants as it was internal but not international migration by nature. So, they did not leave their motherland (or *patria*), as their motherland was in fact the whole Soviet Union. Correspondingly, their return migration (or migration of their descendants) in the post-Soviet period can’t be defined as “repatriation” in its classical meaning, as “return to the *country* of citizenship, permanent residence or origin”.

<sup>21</sup> IOM (2002) Migration trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 68, 118, 148.

<sup>22</sup> Data from the Belarus Ministry of Statistics and Analysis.

<sup>23</sup> Data from Ukraine’s National Committee on Statistics.



**Table 2. Permanent and long-term migration between Russia and former Soviet states, 2000**

Country	Immigration	%	Emigration	%	Balance
Armenia	15,951	4.6	1,519	1.8	14,432
Azerbaijan	14,906	4.2	3,187	3.8	11,719
Belarus	10,274	2.9	13,276	15.9	-3,002
Georgia	20,213	5.8	1,802	2.2	18,411
Kazakhstan	124,903	35.7	17,913	21.5	106,990
Kyrgyzstan	15,536	4.4	1,857	2.2	13,679
Moldova	11,652	3.3	2,237	2.7	9,415
Tadjikistan	11,043	3.2	1,158	1.4	9,885
Turkmenistan	6,738	1.9	676	0.8	6,062
Ukraine	74,748	21.3	35,601	42.7	39,147
Uzbekistan	40,810	11.7	3,086	3.7	37,724
<b>Baltic states:</b>					
Estonia	786	0.2	385	0.5	401
Latvia	1,785	0.5	365	0.4	1,420
Lithuania	945	0.3	376	0.4	569
<b>Total</b>	<b>350,290</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83,438</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>266,852</b>

Notes:

1. Immigration is understood as number of persons who have got long-term residence
2. Emigration is understood as number of persons who have moved from Russia for

Source:

Data from the Russia's National Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat).

**IOM (2002) Migration Trends in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia.**

As to migration exchange with the countries outside CIS region, the trends were also changing being rather “universal” for the three countries under research. Total number of emigrants to non-former Soviet states was gradually decreasing. In 2000, emigration from Russia was 62 thousand persons (see table 3), from Ukraine – 45 thousand, from Belarus – 6,4 thousand. “Ethnic component” of migration outflow was decreasing though still significant. Germany, Israel and the United States were still main countries of destination due to relatively open immigration policy related to certain ethnic groups. In 2000, about 65% emigrants from Russia (40 thousand persons), 26% emigrants from Ukraine (11,5 thousand), 14% emigrants from Belarus (918 persons) departed to Germany<sup>24</sup>. However, migration outflow from Ukraine and Belarus stayed “traditionally” focused on Israel (40% in both) while in case of Russia emigration to Israel was decreasing: 15% of emigrants from Russia

<sup>24</sup> IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 75, 127, 155.

departed to Israel in 2000 (in comparison with 25% in 1996). Notably, while in 1993-1995, almost half of emigrants from Russia were ethnically German and around 12% were Jews, in 2000 the proportion of Germans fell to a third and that of Jews – to 7%. At the same time, emigration of ethnic Russians increased 1.5 times in comparison with 1993. In 2000, 42% of emigrants were Russians, significantly surpassing Germans and almost quintuple the number of Jews<sup>25</sup>.

In the context of Germans-Jews share decline in emigration outflow (due to decrease of migration potential of these ethnic groups), the growing trend of “titular” nations emigration (Russians from Russia, Ukrainians from Ukraine, Belarussians from Belarus) was becoming obvious.

Taking the example of Russia we can analyze the ways of how CIS citizens carry out their westward emigration. Firstly, for the constantly growing number of prosperous Russians (who nonetheless wish to change the country of their permanent residence), immigration to the country of destination as business migrants – investors, entrepreneurs, or real estate owners – is becoming prevalent. Despite few reliable statistics, we can still assume – according to information from immigration agencies – that no less than half of the above-mentioned growing numbers of ethnic Russians took this form of immigration during recent years.

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<sup>25</sup> Population of Russia 2001. Annual Demographic Report. Ed. by A. Vishnevsky, Moscow, Universitet Publishing House, p. 116.

**Table 3. Permanent and long-term migration between Russia and non-former Soviet states, 2000**

Country	Immigration	%	Emigration	%	Balance
Afghanistan	245	2.7	180	0.3	65
Canada	50	0.5	841	1.3	-791
China	1,121	12.4	658	1.1	463
Finland	83	0.9	1,142	1.8	-1,059
Germany	1,753	19.4	40,443	64.9	-38,690
Greece	182	2	-	-	-
Israel	1,508	16.7	9,407	15.1	-7,899
North Korea	32	0.3	47	0.1	-5
Poland	61	0.7	135	0.2	-74
Syria	358	4	54	0.1	304
USA	439	4.9	4,793	7.7	-4,354
Others	3,208	35.5	4,582	7.4	-1,202
Total	9.04	100	62,282	100	-53,242

Notes:

1. Immigration is understood as number of persons who have got long-term residence permit.
2. Emigration is understood as number of persons who have lost permanent residence permit. According to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs number of official permissions for emigration for permanent residence was 77,600 in 2000.

Source: Data from the Russia's National Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat).  
IOM (2002) Migration Trends in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Besides, temporary migration of the Russian citizens to Europe (education, business, labour, tourism) is in fact “pregnant” with emigration: graduates of European universities sometimes choose to stay and work in their countries of education, labour migrants enjoying successful employment start applying for permanent residence permits, “tourists” often turn out to be illegal labour migrants, etc.

Consequently, under the conditions when emigration vector is changing from forced migration of primarily “privileged” ethnic groups to ethnically diverse (still less numerous) outflow where economic determination prevails, we clearly see the shift in migration trends towards “classical” international migration model where national and international management of migration becomes a core factor for its trends and future perspectives.

*Refugees and asylum seekers*

Refugees flows from the Euro-Asian migration system to the enlarging EU strongly depend on intra-system situation in this field. For the whole decade, Russia was a receiving

center for over 3 million refugees from other “new independent states”. In 2000, there were 667,093 refugees and “forced migrants”<sup>26</sup> (of whom 25,535 were refugees and 641,558 were “forced migrants”) whereas nearly half a million persons who had received a status of refugees or “forced migrants” in the early 1990’s lost their status between 1998 and 2000<sup>27</sup>.

Besides, as of end of 2000, UNHCR has registered 9,180 refugees in Russia from countries outside the ex-USSR regions (7,862 of them were Afghans). At the same time Ukraine hosted 2,961 refugees, 72.6% of whom were from countries outside the ex-USSR region (mainly Afghanistan). In addition, there were 1,893 asylum-seekers in Ukraine, primarily from Afghanistan and Chechnya, and 2,844 persons in refugee-like situations, mainly Georgians from Abkhazia. As to Belarus, number of refugees there did not exceed 500 persons<sup>28</sup>.

Since in February 1993 Russia ratified the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol, it is to fulfill its international responsibilities related to asylum seekers. However, in fact asylum seekers in Russia (and even to a greater extent in Ukraine that has not ratified the above Convention) face great difficulties in registering their claims; they have to withstand exceedingly long refugee status determination procedures, and in the meantime are left without any legal status or material support and are often subjected to police harassment<sup>29</sup>.

Besides, after 1999 UNHCR and a number of NGOs started phasing out, intending to turn over their caseloads to development organizations. Unfortunately, the latter were not ready to commit themselves to these responsibilities. As the result, the predicament of the forced migrants reached a critical juncture: their poverty level increased, yet humanitarian assistance declined dramatically and development assistance was not available. Faced with a total absence of options, a growing number of forced migrants emigrate to European countries and other countries of the world through irregular channels<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> According to Russian legislation, the status of “forced migrant” is granted to citizens of ex-USSR countries who find themselves in refugee-like situations provided they acquire Russian citizenship.

<sup>27</sup> Data from the UNHCR Office in the Russian Federation.

<sup>28</sup> IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 69, 120, 150.

<sup>29</sup> IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 130.

<sup>30</sup> IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 18.

**Table 4. Asylum applications submitted by citizens of former Soviet Union countries (excluding Baltic states) in Europe, by country of asylum, 1998-2001 (persons)**

Country of asylum	1998	1999	2000	2001
Austria	260	633	788	2,774
Belgium	2,272	7,926	12,973	5,336
Bulgaria	26	157	449	182
Czech Republic	271	574	3,289	10,548
Denmark	295	356	1,071	661
Finland	98	251	452	553
France	997	2,470	3,345	5,760
Germany	7,539	9,833	7,641	10,335
Greece	5	22	17	42
Hungary	94	264	284	168
Ireland	267	728	1,230	1,593
Italy	53	111	346	309
Luxemburg	24	59	49	133
Netherlands	3,216	5,499	4,185	3,211
Norway	221	774	1,051	3,535
Poland	1,140	1,141	2,243	2,807
Portugal	24	21	23	14
Romania	6	10	2	15
Slovakia	20	26	37	162
Slovenia	7	47	118	24
Spain	723	2,068	1,359	873
Sweden	497	1,085	1,453	2,658
Switzerland	1,866	1,444	1,148	1,612
United Kingdom	2,820	4,110	4,275	885
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22,741</b>	<b>39,609</b>	<b>47,827</b>	<b>54,190</b>

Notes:

1. The data are derived from provisional monthly data and may therefore differ slightly from officially published annual data.
2. Belgium and France count in only the number of cases (principal applicants only).
3. Germany adds the dependants in the total only when a separate application is filled.
4. For the UK, the figures include an estimate of the number of dependants.
5. The data for other countries are supposed to cover every individual.

Source: Governments, compiled by UNHCR.

This seems to be the main reason for steady growth of number of asylum seekers flow from former Soviet Union countries to Europe: from 23 thousand in 1998 to 54 thousand in 2001, i.e. twofold in four years (see tables 4 and 5). The principal refugee sourcing countries in the CIS region are Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia while the European countries

which received the major asylum applications from the citizens of former Soviet Union countries in 2001 were the Czech Republic (19%), Germany (19%), France (10%), Belgium (10%), Norway (6%). For comparison: in 1998 the list of top-receivers of asylum applications was headed by Germany (34%), Netherlands (15%) and the United Kingdom (13%) (see table 4). This shift mainly results from restricting of national legislation relating to status of refugees in traditional refugees receiving countries while in the others (especially countries in transition) humanitarian assistance is becoming an issue of crucial importance in the social values hierarchy.

**Table 5. Asylum applications submitted by citizens of former Soviet Union countries (excluding Baltic states) in Europe, by country of origin, 1998-2001 (persons)**

Country of origin	1998	1999	2000	2001
Armenia	5,322	8,573	6,711	6,602
Azerbaijan	3,157	6,216	3,928	3,472
Belarus	630	1,334	2,426	2,787
Georgia	4,108	3,426	3,571	6,010
Kazakhstan	390	1,151	2,693	1,255
Kyrgyzstan	17	428	893	586
Moldova	1,091	2,592	3,597	5,169
Russia	5,833	11,441	17,285	16,865
Tadjikistan	203	187	251	222
Turkmenistan	16	12	34	58
Ukraine	1,826	3,617	5,171	9,893
Uzbekistan	138	631	1,267	1,271
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22,741</b>	<b>39,609</b>	<b>47,827</b>	<b>54,190</b>

Notes:

1. The data are derived from provisional monthly data in the countries of asylum and may therefore differ slightly from officially published annual data.
2. The figures reported under Russia refer to citizens of the Russian Federation as well as of the former Soviet Union who in fact live in Russia.

Source: European Governments, compiled by UNHCR.

It is quite clear that not all asylum applications are approved and only a small portion of asylum seekers are granted with refugee status. In the recent years “refugee channel” is often used by economic migrants who would like to improve their living standards. However, international conventions on refugees and national legislation in different countries definitely declare that persons who leave their country in quest of better living conditions or better job can’t pretend for refugee status.

### *Labour migration*

During the 1990's, regular labour migration between the enlarging European Union and its eastern neighbouring countries was growing steadily, resulting from post-socialist states "entrance" into the world labour market. However, Russia and other former Soviet Union states have not become big labour exporters to outside the region despite numerous forecasts of politicians, journalists and even some scholars. In accordance with official estimates, totally about 120 thousand regular labour migrants from CIS countries (documented with appropriate permits) are staying now in European countries<sup>31</sup>. The most important reasons for so "modest" stock of ex-Soviet labour migrants are: "language barrier" which was the natural result of the region's long-term "iron curtain" isolation; poor informational base concerning employment abroad; the absence of experienced recruiting companies for exporting labour; unfavourable conditions of joining the international labour market that means that former Soviet citizens are to compete with labour migrants from other countries many of whom have already had the experience of staying and working in labour importing countries or can lean for support of ethnic nets in a hosting country<sup>32</sup>.

For these reasons, migrations in search of employment were mainly limited by the frames of the former common country and centered on Russia which is going through transition period relatively more successfully. In the recent years, labour migration is becoming prevailing type of population mobility within the Euro-Asian migration system. In this context, position of Russia as the main center attracting migrants from former Soviet Union states as well as from other countries (Turkey, China, former Yugoslavia, etc.) is especially obvious. We have already mentioned differences in per capita GNP and in average wages between Russia and other CIS states, Central Asian republics in particular.

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<sup>31</sup> Labour Migration in CIS: Social and Economic Effects. Edited by Zh. Zayonchkovskaya. Moscow, 2003.

<sup>32</sup> Andrey Kamenskiy (2002) Contemporary Russia in International Labour Migrations // In: World in the Mirror of International Migration. Scientific series "International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World" Volume 10, Moscow MAX Press, pp. 87-88.

**Table 6. Stock of labour migrants from former Soviet states in certain European countries, thousands**

Countries of employment	Countries of origin	Number of work permits
Austria, 1997 <sup>1</sup>	Former USSR	3.8
Czech Republic, 2000 <sup>2</sup>	Ukraine	15.8
	Russia	1.1
	Moldova	1.5
	Belarus	1.1
Denmark, 1997 <sup>1</sup>	Former USSR	0.9
Finland, 2000 <sup>2</sup>	Former USSR	9.3
Hungary, 2000 <sup>2</sup>	Former USSR	5.2
Poland, 2001 <sup>3</sup>	Ukraine	2.8
	Belarus	0.7
	Russia	0.7
United Kingdom, 1998 <sup>1</sup>	Former USSR	5

Notes and sources:

<sup>1</sup> Data from Eurostat, 2002;

<sup>2</sup> Data from OECD, 2002;

<sup>3</sup> Data from National Labour Office (number of work permits issued in 2001).

However, it is only one dimension of the problem. Another decisive motivation for labour migration inflow to Russia is situation at its national labour market. Russia's labour market is in the process of reshaping in accordance with new economic conditions. So, there is lack of balance between labour demand and supply. High demand for low-skilled manual labour in agriculture, construction industry, transports is not covered by national labour resources. Russian citizens ignore these jobs due to low salary, non-prestigiousness, severe working conditions. Over 800,000 vacancies are registered in employment offices over Russia<sup>33</sup>.

However, official statistics on annual employment of foreign labour force in Russia can hardly give an idea of real labour migrants inflow to Russia as the process is taking place primarily in a covert, clandestine, irregular form. In 2001, over 283 thousand foreign workers

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<sup>33</sup> Labour Migration in Russia (2001) Volume 2 of the series "Migration of Population". Editor of the series O. Vorobyeva. Supplement to "Migration in Russia" Journal. Moscow, p. 83.



were registered in Russia<sup>34</sup>. The total number of work permits issued between 1992 and 2001 was over 1.5 million. However, these figures likely show “the peak of an iceberg” only: number of irregular workers is estimated as 3-4 million. This fact demonstrates high labour migration potential in the neighbouring countries. In case of predominance of regulative but not restrictive measures of governmental labour migration policy Russia can benefit from this potential.

As to labour migration from Russia and other former Soviet states to EU member and candidate states, the same trend – prevalence of irregular labour migration – is typical. During the last decade citizens of some post-Soviet states succeeded in formation of more or less stable ethnic nets in European countries. Labour migration surveys bring evidence of existence of well-developed migration nets of Moldavians (in Mediterranean region, especially in Portugal, Italy, Greece, Israel) and Ukrainians (in Central and Southern Europe)<sup>35</sup>. Nets constructed on reliable contacts with partners and employers in European countries allow migrants to find long-term work there (usually irregular), and develop into informal social institutions that provide relatives, friends and other would-be migrants and new coming migrants from the same country with information at local labour markets in receiving countries, ways of employment, etc. In course of time, nets provide self-containment of migrations (including irregular flows) from their countries of origin to countries of destination.

Labour migrants originating from Russia, Ukraine and Moldova are in the list of 5 top sending countries in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia<sup>36</sup>. Estimation of Izabela Korys is likely to take into consideration all the categories of economic migrants (seasonal migrants, contract workers, day labourers, petty traders, and irregular migrants). Anyway, border restrictions related to EU expansion will surely affect these migrations and will probably increase their irregular segment.

The oncoming flow of labour migrants from EU countries and candidate countries to Russia and other ex-USSR states is of principally different nature. They are mainly high-class specialists posted by their companies and young graduates who find it easier to begin a career not in their own countries but in transition countries where, getting a post in multinational companies' branches they can hope for rapid professional and career growth<sup>37</sup>. As an example, table 7 shows number of workers from European countries employed in Russia, as

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<sup>34</sup> Federal Migration Service (2002) Information and Statistical Bulletin. No:1. FMS MVD RF, Moscow, p. 181.

<sup>35</sup> Labour Migration in Russia (2001) Volume 2 of the series “Migration of Population”. Editor of the series O. Vorobyeva. Supplement to “Migration in Russia” Journal. Moscow, p. 18.

<sup>36</sup> Izabela Korys (2003) Migration trends in Poland and other post-socialist countries: similarities and differences. Paper presented at the European Population Conference, August 26-30, 2003, Warsaw.

of 2000. They all have work permits and long-term residence permits, so they are employed as “classical” temporary labour migrants. Situation with import of foreign labour force from Europe to Russia or other CIS countries – who are in need of high-class specialists for transformation of their economy or in need of foreign investments that are usually followed (in case of less developed countries) by flow of managers and specialists from countries of capitals origin – will hardly change after EU enlargement and new migration rules.

**Table 7. Number of workers from certain European countries employed in Russia, 2000**

Countries	Number of work permits
Austria	291
Belgium	189
Czech Republic	242
Denmark	195
Finland	1,891
France	1,228
Germany	1,610
Greece	56
Ireland	122
Italy	695
Netherlands	350
Norway	219
Poland	2,621
Portugal	143
Slovakia	359
Spain	186
Sweden	239
Switzerland	173
United Kingdom	1,758
Other European countries <sup>1</sup>	5,917
Total	18,284

Note: <sup>1</sup> Excluding Turkey (20,915 work permits)

Source: Federal Migration Service (2002) Information and Statistical Bulletin. No:1. FMS MVD RF, Moscow, pp. 172-175

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<sup>37</sup> This tendency was highlighted by Marek Okolski (1999) Migration pressures on Europe // In: European Populations: Unity in Diversity. Ed. by Dirk van de Kaa et al. Dordrecht, Boston, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 165.

### *Irregular migration*

Large-scale irregular migration, being one of the main features of the Euro-Asian migration system, is a matter of particular concern for European Union, especially in light of its forthcoming enlargement. It is often regarded as the most “disturbing” issue and regional security threat in the context of new migration trends at the European continent.

Generally, large-scale migration can be a challenge to national and regional stability by itself as it causes economic, social, ethnic, etc. problems, primarily in receiving societies. However, when a big portion of international migration *to* a region, *within* a region, *through* a region and *out of* a region is taking place in non-controlled, irregular or illegal form it carries threats to regional and international security issues. That is the case of Euro-Asian migration system.

The post-September 11<sup>th</sup> tendency for unfavourable attitudes on migration<sup>38</sup> is leading to the mis-association of migrants, particularly irregular ones, with terrorists and criminals. In fact, battle against terrorism turns into irrational battle against migration in general. The term “migrant” is becoming filled with negative meaning. This misconception – when expressed in anti-migration actions – can have the opposite result to the desired one. The experience of the last four decades of migration policy in different countries of the world shows that restrictive migration regulations were always followed by increases in irregular migration (in the 1960’s in the USA, in the 1970’s and in the 1990’s in Europe).

In order to understand what irregular migration in a certain region is, whether it is a regional security threat, and in what ways it can be counteracted, it is crucially important to analyze complex, multi-ply structure of irregular/illegal migration flows. To a great extent irregular migrants are *labour migrants by nature*. It is especially true for internal Euro-Asian migration system flows: the overwhelming number of irregular migrants there are job-seekers from ex-USSR countries who primarily come to Russia where economic situation is relatively better, and labour market with its huge shadow segment offers wide opportunities for irregular employment. Many of them would prefer regular employment, however, its sphere is artificially narrowed by Russia’s inefficient legislation.

In fact, existing economic system and tightening migration rules in Russia provoke large-scale irregular migration. Migrants who come to Russia in quest of jobs can find workplaces in the shadow sphere much easier – they will not be asked registration and other

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<sup>38</sup> See, for example, Mary Kritz (2002) Time for National Discussion on Immigration // International Migration Review, Vol. 36, No: 1.

papers there. Production of the shadow sector of Russia's economy is estimated in a quarter of GNP, and employment – in 15-30% of the total labour force<sup>39</sup>.

Since the end of the 1990's, a tendency of re-orientation of labour migration inflows from regular to irregular forms is obviously seen. It is a result of worsening financial situation of many industrial enterprises that have officially hired foreign workers before and also of tightening regulation for employment of migrant workers in accordance with new legislation.

Estimates of irregular migration in Russia vary from 2 million to 15 million<sup>40</sup>. We would say that the most realistic figure is 3-4 million, however, we have reasons to suppose that the restricting trend in migration regulation can provoke further growth of irregular migration. For example, 25-times increase in fee for employers hiring foreign workers in 2002 would only push migrant workers in the illegality<sup>41</sup>.

There is no need to speak about negative effects of irregular migration here. They are well known and they are typical for all countries that are to cope with it. For Russia, "negative degree" of these effects is maybe even higher because irregular migrants disorganize national labour market that is still on the path to market economy, they increase illegal employment sphere and, consequently, impede the transition process. Besides, as irregular migrants do not have any labour or social guarantees, they are forced to use ethnic solidarity mechanisms to survive. This often means formation of closed ethnic communities that act in cooperation with organized criminal groups. It results in anti-immigrant trends in the society, growth of ultra-right parties, pogroms, etc.

Regretfully, reaction of Russian authorities to negative effects of irregular migration spreads on international migration as a whole. This results in restrictive character of management of migration focused on migration control enforcement and working out mechanisms of deportation. Alternative measures, such as legalization of migrants and widening of legal field for migration – are out of sight of governmental bodies responsible for management of migration.

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<sup>39</sup> Radaev V. (1999). Shadow Economy of Russia. Reshaping // In: "Pro et Contra". Winter, p. 10

<sup>40</sup> For estimates offered by experts, journalists, politicians please refer to G.Vitkovskaya (2002) Irregular Migration in Russia: Situation and Policy of Counteraction // In: Illegal Immigration. Scientific series "International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World" Volume 9, Moscow MAX Press; IOM (2001) Irregular Migration in Russia: Opening the Debate, IOM Open Forum, Moscow Migration Research Programme, Information Series, No: 1, Moscow; Krasinets E.S., Kubishin E.S., Tiuriukanova E.V. (2000) Illegal migration to Russia. Moscow, Academia, p. 82; Tchernenko A. (2002) Russia's Migration Policy Concept . Paper presented at the Gosudarstvennaya Duma (Parliament) discussion on December 9, 2002; Gazeta, March 12, 2003; Vremya MN, December 12, 2002; Chuykin M. Russia is Becoming a Heaven for Illegal Migrants // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 5, 1999.

<sup>41</sup> Vremya Novostei, April 25, 2002.

However, it is obvious that non-official labour migrants from ex-USSR countries is not the only group of irregular migrants in Russia; they are complemented by transit migrants from Asian and African countries that use ex-USSR territory as a transit Euro-Asian “corridor” on their way to Western Europe (to be discussed below). Moreover, quite often Russia is used as a “staging post” for irregular migrants from other CIS countries on their way to the West: here they earn money for further westward migration and gain psychological adaptation to irregular status in more or less customary environment (common language, close labour traditions and requirements, etc.).

In the latest years, irregular migration in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus has become an issue of political and public debate. It is not an exaggeration to say that among the problems related to international migration, irregular migration and its effects on these countries’ economy and society are the most discussable at the governmental level, among experts, and in media as well. The perspective of EU enlargement and restricting of migration regulations coming from the west are making this discussion even more acute.

European Union countries as well as candidate countries are obviously concerned with irregular migrants “drainage” through the borders with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus. However, the fact that the major part of CIS citizens (or in a wider sense – citizens of different countries arriving from or through CIS space) who are working in Europe are irregular migrants – this fact mainly results from EU restrictive migration policy. Usually, these people arrive to European countries not with job contract but with tourist visa (or maybe with forged papers) and overstay there to work in irregular status. Men find work mostly as construction workers or farm labourers, and women as domestic workers or in the “sex industry”. Perhaps, it is not so difficult to bring them out, however, the absence of agreements on readmission makes their deportation difficult and non-effective. Besides, we should not forget that cheap labour of irregular migrants (in combination with lack of rights) is extremely profitable for employers in receiving countries. It is the main reason for growing irregular migration in the world despite official counteracting measures.

Expired visas, absence of work permits, non-regulated relations with employers are the most common reasons for irregular status of thousands of labour migrants from Russia and other ex-USSR countries staying at the EU territory. Consequently, they are out of frames of any social and legal guaranties and can’t be properly defended by their governments in case of their rights’ oppression. As to their State, this situation results in its negative “reputation” of an irregular migrants supplier. For future labour migrants it means suspiciousness of the receiving country when they are looking for a job or applying for visa. Cases of visa refusals for CIS citizens, for example, for those who would like to be employed within the frames of international youth employment programmes like Work & Travel, Work & Study, Au Pair are

numerous. The refusals are caused by usual practice of young Russian, Ukrainian, etc. citizens disregarding regulations of staying and employment in a hosting country.

### *Transit migration*

A noticeable feature of the Euro-Asian migration system are numerous overt and covert migration routes from Asian and African countries to Europe that pierce the post-Soviet territory. Attractiveness of this region for being used as a transit “corridor” and a “way station” for (mainly irregular) migrants is determined by: relatively “transparent” borders within the post-Soviet territory (in combination with agreements on visa-free entry that were signed by some CIS states with the third countries<sup>42</sup> it provides a rather comfortable and cheap land route for transit migrants from Asia to Russia or for onward travel to the West); weak institutional capacity of CIS governments to manage migration; poor legislation regulating foreigners’ entry, residence and employment on the territory of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; disorganization of the national labour markets, with a significant informal sector, where irregular migrants most often derive their income; high level of corruption.

Other important factors are geographical: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus stand on the route from Asia to Europe, and economic: intermediate economic position of these countries between developed and developing countries makes them a “natural” channel for migrants from developing countries.

Approximately a third of the persons apprehended at the borders and within ex-Soviet states are Chinese, while the rest are Afghans and migrants from South and South-East Asia (mainly from Viet Nam, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka). Afghans are the largest group of transit migrants in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. They enter through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan; Chinese enter through Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan. Irregular migrants enter the Euro-Asian space through the Central Asian countries and the Russian Far East and leave it through Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the north-western region of Russia. Russia thus finds itself at both the receiving and sending ends of irregular migration, and the Russian territory has become a convenient transit area for irregular migrants. Most migrants travel in groups, and for those arriving by air, the main hub

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<sup>42</sup> For example, there are agreements on visa-free entry between China and Kyrghyzstan and between Kyrghyzstan and Kazakhstan and between Kazakhstan and Russia (Sadovskaya E. Prevention of Irregular Migration in Kazakhstan // In: Illegal Immigration. Series “International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World. Vol. 9, Moscow, MAX Press, 2002, p.51.

are Moscow's international airports. Although routes change frequently in keeping with increased border control, the primary routes remain the following<sup>43</sup>:

- Georgia/Armenia/Azerbaijan – Moscow – Saint-Peterburg – Estonia/Latvia – Poland
- Afghanistan – Turkmenistan – Gur'ev (Kazakhstan) – Volgograd (Russia) – Ukraine/Belarus – Poland – Germany
- Atyrau (Kazakhstan) – Astrakhan – (Russia) – Krasnodar (Russia) – Stavropol (Russia) – Ukraine/Belarus – Poland – Germany
- Afghanistan – Tadjikistan – Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) Alma-Aty (Kazakhstan) – Aktyubinsk (Kazakhstan) – Ural'sk (Kazakhstan) – Saratov (Russia) – Samara (Russia) – Saint-Petersburg – Scandinavia
- Afghanistan – Tadjikistan – Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) – Pavlodar (Kazakhstan) – Russia
- Central Asia – Russia – Ukraine – Moldova – Romania – Hungary – EU countries
- Middle East/South-East Asia – Turkey – Ukraine/Belarus – Poland – Germany

The overwhelming majority of irregular migrants enter CIS states regularly, with a visa (mainly for tourism, transit, personal reasons, business, study and work) issued on the basis of an invitation from a travel agency, firm or even a state entity, or by claiming asylum (figure 1). Irregular entry may consist of either crossing the border control posts (either independently or with the help of locals or professional smugglers)<sup>44</sup> or going through these posts with forged or invalid travel documents, with no document at all, or through corruption<sup>45</sup>. The experts note the growing market for forged passports with legal Russian, Belarussian and Ukrainian visas in Moscow.


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<sup>43</sup> IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 37-38.

<sup>44</sup> In Ukraine, the number of irregular migrants apprehended in 2000 at the Russian-Ukrainian border outside border control posts increased by 120% as compared to 1999, and the number of those apprehended at the Ukrainian-Belarussian border increased by 140%.

<sup>45</sup> The Ukrainian authorities apprehended over 700 persons with forged documents in 2000. Every Year Belarussian Border Guards apprehend some 25,000-35,000 persons with invalid documents and 400 persons with forged passports. In Russia, more than 1,000 persons were apprehended in 2000 while attempting to exit the country towards western countries with forged documents IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 45.

**Figure 1.**  
**Modalities of irregular migration in the Euro-Asian migration system**



Source: IOM (2002) Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2001-2002 Review, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 38.

Transit migrants tend to spend some time in Russia or other CIS states to prepare for their onward travel, purchase forged documents, wait to be joined by other migrants, etc.

According to Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the present time there are over 300 thousand transit migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Pakistan, India, Sri-Lanka, Turkey, Ethiopia and other countries “stuck” in Russia. Besides, there is a significant flow of migrants who illegally penetrate Russian borders trying to reach EU countries.

It is admittedly unfortunate that, until now, Russian official structures did not manage to properly control the arrival and staying of transit migrants in the country. After entering with a transit or tourist visa (or crossing the border illegally) they usually escape from control of migration regulating bodies. The 2000 CIS initiatives<sup>46</sup> directed at developing of cross-border cooperation, enforcement of migration control, organization of regional

<sup>46</sup> On January 25, 2000, the countries-participants of the CIS Agreement on Combating Illegal Migration in the Region (signed on March 6, 1998) agreed to organize a common database on illegal migrants and other “unwanted persons”. Russia was declared as a coordinating country for implementation of this initiative.



migration information and analytical centers and the united migration data base, have good potential to improve the situation.

However, at the present moment it is much easier for a transit migrant to enter the post-Soviet territory than to depart. The CIS western frontiers in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are controlled much more strictly than its eastern frontiers. By prohibiting the irregular exit of those migrants who have violated the terms of their visas, or have used forged documents, the Russian, Ukrainian or Belarussian border guards are in fact turning their countries into a “settling tank” for irregular migrants. As a result, “transit” lasts for years, a transit migrant turns into irregular migrant and most often finds himself in socially dangerous criminal environment.

Here, we face a crucially important issue: usually transit irregular migrants do not act by themselves. They are managed by well-organized criminal structures specializing in migrant smuggling. In general, irregular migration is no longer a spontaneous process in the world. It is a well-organized and extremely profitable business with low risks. According to a number of estimates, the overall annual profit from the smuggling of migrants in the world is 5 to 7 billion dollars.

#### *Migrants smuggling and trafficking business*

After the post-Soviet territory became open for international migrations it is the sphere of particular interest for the global migrant smuggling network.

On the internal and external borders of the former USSR there exist numerous channels for migrant smuggling. (For example, 90% of irregular migration to Russia comes from Kazakhstan, where there are almost 7,600 km of practically open border.)

International criminal network specializing in smuggling of migrants and trafficking in migrants controls the majority of legal and semi-legal labour recruiting agencies, marriage bureaus, visa brokers and other intermediates involved in “international migration business”. They have stable contacts in migrants’ countries of origin, transit and destination and provide a wide range of services related to regular or irregular border crossing.

This means that in counteracting irregular migration the State is facing not individual migrants but a strong criminal structure. The “Russian segment” of this structure is technically advanced (this is obviously seen from high-quality forged passports, stamps, documents, invitations, visas, etc.) and flexible (it easily corrects its activities in accordance with change in situation at border control posts). Besides, their activity is usually diversified: migrant smuggling channels often coincide with drugs trafficking channels.

At least two major conclusions are to be made from understanding of this fact: (1) efforts to combat irregular migration should be focused not on irregular migrants by themselves but on those structures who are managing it; (2) these should be coordinated and combined efforts of all the countries concerned by negative effects of irregular migration at international and regional levels.

Over the past five years, the number of those detained at Russian borders has increased almost tenfold. This figure includes citizens of thirty countries with which Russia shares no common border. In 1999-2000, the Russian Federal Frontier Service, together with law-enforcement agencies, detained more than 5,000 irregular migrants and exposed about 400 criminal groups specializing in moving irregular migrants<sup>47</sup>.

This activity of the Russian law-enforcement agencies is primarily aimed at protecting Russia's interests and its national security while simultaneously safeguarding the interests of those transit migrants' target countries. It would be logical to assume that common interests need common efforts (in the framework of information exchange, international agreements counteracting irregular migration, etc.). If European countries are interested in preventing irregular migration "from afar" – as they should – then they should become the initiators of international programs and agreements in this domain, of joint scientific projects in international migration in the context of soft security threats and of in-depth studies on the most topical issues (for example, the prospects of cross-border cooperation in preventing irregular migration; the impact of CIS temporary irregular labour migrants on the EU candidate-countries' industries; human trafficking in the CIS region).

We should keep in mind that irregular migration – like international migration of population in general – is a supra-national phenomenon. To regulate it, combined international efforts of all the involved countries are needed. Otherwise *supra-national* character of migration will contradict to *national* regulating concepts. This can cause so called crisis of management, i.e. loss of control over migrations (the case of Russia proves that). The growth of the scale of irregular migration is a result of this process.

### *Chinese migration*

Chinese migration needs special emphasis in the context of migration challenges and regulations debate due to China's extremely high demographic and migration potential and the current growth of number of Chinese migrants and Chinese ethnic communities in many countries of Europe. It seems strange that the Western world is concerned with potential

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<sup>47</sup> IOM (2001) Irregular Migration in Russia: Opening the Debate, IOM Open Forum, Moscow Migration Research Programme, Information Series, No: 1, Moscow, p. 3.

threats of Muslim, or Arabic migration but practically ignores the challenge of Chinese migration that can mean a serious shift in the global political situation in perspective<sup>48</sup>.

The following brief analysis of China migration to Russia is a good example of general Chinese international migration strategy. In the recent years, Chinese migration to Russia exceeded the frames of a particular migration issue in the Far East region; slowly and silently it becomes an issue of Euro-Asian system' scale and tends to be a new challenge for European system. In the context of transit migration aimed at the EU, Chinese migrants carry a significant potential in demographic, economic and political dimensions<sup>49</sup>.

Demographic potential of this highly populated country is well known. Due to the age structure of Chinese population, for several decades, the share of population in the age group 16-65, i.e. labour cohorts, will be exceeding 70%. This means that China's labour resources are enormous. The State has been unable to use them efficiently during the last decades. It is unlikely to make good use of them in the coming years as well. Therefore, it is quite understandable that some percentage of Chinese citizens will try to seek for jobs and earnings in other countries.

After the strategy of openness in China has been declared, over 10 million Chinese citizens annually take part in international migration<sup>50</sup>; this number is increasing for more than 30% every year.

For Russia, Chinese migration is an extremely topical issue already now. Chinese migrants are the most numerous foreign population group after Ukrainians in the country. For China, Russia is not simply the nearest neighbour with extensive common border. Russia's geopolitical location determines its significant role in Beijing's strategy, in particular after the new external economic strategy has been declared at the Third Session of the All-Chinese Assembly in spring 2000. This strategy has gained popularity as the slogan "To go outside"<sup>51</sup>. One of the goals of the strategy "To go outside" is to provide a breakthrough to world markets, including international labour market, and to support economic progress in China by means of other countries' raw materials and financial resources. The growing Chinese

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<sup>48</sup> The distinguished American economist and demographer Paul Demeny is one of few Western scholars who broaches this question in: Paul Demeny (2002) Prospects for International Migration: Globalization and its Discontents // In: "Journal of Population Research", 2002, No: 1, vol. 19, pp.65-67.

<sup>49</sup> A threat for European civilization to be replaced by Asian civilization in Europe is well argued in: Okolski, Marek (2002) The Incoming Civilizations, the Outgoing Civilizations on the Turn of the 20th Century. Reflection from the Perspective of Demography // In: "The World in the Mirror of International Migration". Scientific series "International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World" Volume 10, Moscow MAX Press, pp. 153-170.

<sup>50</sup> China Statistical Yearbook, 2001 (Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001), Beijing.

<sup>51</sup> V. Gelbras (2002) Chinese Migration and Chinese Communities in Russia // In: The World in the Mirror of International Migration. Scientific series "International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World" Volume 10, Moscow MAX Press, p. 23.

migration and activities of Chinese ethnic communities all over the world are to play crucial role in realization of this strategy.

In this context, Russia is regarded, first, as a suitable field for economic activities of hundreds of thousands of Chinese migrants; second, as a fathomless source of raw materials (for example, timber and metals necessary for Chinese industries); third, as a “staging post” for Chinese migrants on their way to western countries.

For the present, the total number of Chinese migrants who live in Russia more or less permanently is about half a million<sup>52</sup> (the most reasonable estimate from a long row of existing estimates). However, this figure will be inevitably growing along with the process of Russia’s economic recovery. Besides, there is a numerous number of Chinese “tourists” who come to Russia for business or private purposes, and irregular migrants.

The most important factor for growing Chinese migration to Russia is a huge difference in demographic potentials on the two sides of Russian-Chinese border. Population in three Chinese provinces neighbouring Russia’s Far East exceeds 110 million persons and population density is 130 persons per square kilometer, while in four Russian administrative regions close to the border – Jewish Autonomous Region, Amur Region, Primorskiy Region and Khabarovskiy Territory – population density is only 4 persons per square kilometer, i.e. 30 times less, and number of citizens is less than 6 million. Moreover, during the last decade outflow of population from the mentioned Russia’s Far East regions to the central parts of the country was over 1 million persons, i.e. every sixth citizen has departed. This demographic disproportion alone can be a strong reason for the flow of China’s North-Eastern regions’ population through the Russian boundary.

When in the beginning of the 1990’s Russian territory was opened for Chinese labour migrants<sup>53</sup> it resulted in large-scale (poorly controlled) migration to the Russia’s Far East. That hasty agreement has brought many labour migrants to Russia as well as people whose ultimate goal is to reach Western Europe via Russian territory. Many migrants stayed in Russia as irregular migrants. Even after the “open border” policy was cancelled in 1994, the “floodgate” of Chinese migration was not closed completely: it became primarily irregular. One of prognosis argues that by mid-21<sup>st</sup> century number of Chinese people in Russia will enumerate 8-10 million, so they will be the second ethnic group in Russia after Russians<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> V. Gelbras (2001) *The Chinese Reality of Russia*. Moscow, Muravey Publishing House.

<sup>53</sup> Inter-governmental Agreement between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China “On principles of employment of Chinese citizens in enterprises and organizations in Russia” signed on August 19, 1992.

<sup>54</sup> E. Verlin (2002) “Black Cash” and Yellow Danger // In: “Expert”, No: 11, March 18 (in Russian).

The question is not how to impede Chinese migration but how to control the process and manage it in accordance with the needs of Russia's economy. Nowadays, irregular Chinese migrants (particularly in the Far East region and in the Southern Siberia) often cooperate with local criminal groups in their illegal business activities. The 2001 Agreement on good-neighbourliness between Russia and China includes statements concerning necessity to prevent irregular migration, and irregular transit in particular. However, practical measures to combat irregular migration are not detailed, neither are bilateral measures to provide legislative field for regular migration.

The supporting element for Chinese irregular migration in Russia (as well as in the entire world) is Chinese ethnic communities. In a number of Russian cities they have developed into strong independent economic and social structures, a sort of enclaves in Russia's economy. Having at their disposal community's independent press, financial system, various legal and semi-legal companies, hotels, hostels, warehouses, etc., the Chinese ethnic communities have become the coordinating centers for Chinese migrants' business activities.

Within the Chinese community in Moscow there have developed semi-legal agencies dealing with invitations and visa "support" for Chinese people who would like to immigrate to Russia or to other countries using Russia as a transit stage. In Chinese papers published in Moscow one can easily find hypes of companies who openly offer smuggling of Chinese migrants to Schengen countries, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Latin America.<sup>55</sup> Thus, the Chinese intermediate companies feel comfortable in Russia: they operate with significant financial resources, use "advantages" of corruption of officials, succeed to find "weak points" in Russia's border control.

Surveys of Chinese migrants in Russia prove that over half of them have an intention not to stay in Russia for a long time but to move to other (mainly European) country after having accumulated money or graduated from Russian higher school institutions. Therefore, the Chinese migration potential is growing not only in China itself but also in Russia and other countries where economic and political conditions are suitable for business but not for permanent staying.

#### *Demographic context*

The purpose of this brief section in the present paper is to highlight the changing role of international migration in both migration systems that should be taken into consideration when elaborating migration regulation strategies at national and regional levels.

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<sup>55</sup> V. Gelbras, Chinese Migration and Chinese Communities in Russia (2002) // In: The World in the Mirror of International Migration. Scientific series "International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World" Volume 10, Moscow MAX Press.

In the EU nations, depopulation trends and population ageing have made international migration a non-alternative factor of demographic development. In the 1990's, nearly 88% of the total population growth in the European Union countries was resulting from net migration (compared to 36% in the 1960's and 48% in the 1970's)<sup>56</sup>. In Germany, Italy and other European countries where population growth rate is negative, immigration is the only source of the increase of population size.

In Russia, natural decrease of population in 1992-2001 was -7.7 million persons. For 44% (3.4 million persons) it was compensated by net migration. However, demographic situation in Russia can be characterized not as depopulation like in European countries but as demographic crisis. It can hardly be reversed by international migration, however, by means of migrants inflow negative demographic trends can be partially improved.

This fact should be beared in mind for perspectives of restrictive measures of migration regulation in the Russia's context. Already now Russia is in need of additional labour force. According to national statistical data, in 2000, 6% of enterprises in Russia faced labour deficit; by 2002 they were 30%<sup>57</sup>. Lack of labour force is especially topical issue for the Ural Region where big factories are located: now they are in the process of recovery. In case of successful development of Russia's economy lack of labour force will impede economic progress.

However, demographic trends are likely to worsen the situation in the nearest years: after 2006 the steady decrease of number of population in labour-active age groups will start due to existing age structure and low fertility. The elder age groups (born during after-war compensation rise in fertility) who are to leave labour-active age cohorts will be twice more numerous than the number of young age groups born during the 1990's.

Long-term demographic perspective is even more distressing: by 2050 number of population in Russia will be probably not more than 90 million persons (40% less than current number), labour age groups will decline from 60% to 47%, while population over 60 years will increase twofold: from 20% to 43%<sup>58</sup>.

These figures highlight Russia' need for migrants. Labour demand will necessarily cause labour migration inflow. The question is, whether foreign labour comes to Russia's

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<sup>56</sup> Iontsev, Vladimir and Ivakhniouk, Irina (2002) Russia in the World Migration Flows: Trends of the Last Decade (1992-2001) // In: World in the Mirror of International Migration. Scientific series "International Migration: Russia and the Contemporary World" Volume 10, Moscow MAX Press, pp. 54-55.

<sup>57</sup> Zh. Zayonchkovskaya (2002) Labour Immigration from the CIS countries to Russia. Paper presented at the IOM/ILO Conference "Labour Markets and Labour Immigration in Russia: Demand, Offer and Reaction of the Accepting Society". Moscow, November 29, 2002.

<sup>58</sup> Population of Russia, 2001. Annual Demographic Report. Edited by A.Vishnevskiy. Moscow, Universitet Publishing House, pp. 182-193.

labour market on regular basis or on irregular basis. The answer strongly depends on a migration policy concept that would not run contrary to the country's economic and demographic interests. Even in counteracting irregular migration Russia should chose reasonable combination of restrictive and regulative measures in order to provide a balance between national security, on the one hand, and its demographic and economic interests, on the other.

*Kaliningrad Province: Russia's enclave in the future EU*

The forthcoming eastward enlargement of the EU raises a series of problems for policymakers on both sides. Some of these problems require making concerted decisions urgently, before Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and other candidate-states join the EU. One pressing issue concerns Kaliningrad Province, which is non-contiguous with the main territory of the Russian Federation. Once the EU includes Lithuania and Poland, Kaliningrad Province will be an enclave surrounded by the EU on three sides and the Baltic Sea on the other. Thus, the question has been raised about how to regulate the movement of people and goods between this enclave and the rest of Russia.

A likely thorn in the side of the European Union may be irregular migration from (and through) Kaliningrad Province towards West. For these reasons, a small province of fewer than one million people has become the stumbling-block for Russian and EU decision-makers. The problem is exacerbated by trends in the province's demographic and economic development. Population dynamics, age structure and labour market demands have made this "island" heavily dependent on migrants in the past, in the present and for the future.

The demographic history of the province is closely linked to migration, to be more exact, to official recruitment campaigns, and migration inflow continues to this day. The migration ratio in Kaliningrad Province (over 9 migrants per 1000 persons of the economically active population) is the highest in Russia<sup>59</sup>. Net migration – both internal (from other territories of Russia) and international (from neighbouring Poland, Lithuania and some CIS states) has become an important compensatory factor for the natural population decrease and for the replenishment of the local labour supply. The provincial economy is based on transportation and construction industries, which are integrated with similar industries in neighbouring countries. Besides, it strongly depends on supplies from "continental" Russia. The future transformation of EU boundaries can increase the Province's isolation from both directions.

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<sup>59</sup> IOM (2001) *Irregular Migration in Russia: Opening the Debate*, IOM Open Forum, Moscow Migration Research Programme, Information Series, No: 1, Moscow, p. 12.

On the other hand, the investment inflow to Kaliningrad<sup>60</sup> over the past couple of years is stimulating an economic revival and a correspondingly inflow of migrants from other – less successful – regions of Russia, as well as ones from other countries. According to the economic forecast of the Russian government, within a few years Kaliningrad Province will become one of the most developed regions in Russia. If this comes true, then the province will become even more attractive for migrants. This situation will definitely raise the question: to what extent and under what conditions can a society based on democratic values provide freedom of movement for those who choose to live and to work in Kaliningrad Province.

The November 2002 EU – Russia summit in Brussels agreed on a special “Facilitated Transit Document” (FTD) regime for Russian citizens traveling through Lithuanian territory. Under this agreement, two types of FTD will be issued. For multi-entry transit by rail citizens of Kaliningrad Province or any other regions of Russia are to apply to Lithuanian consulate; after necessary checking procedures an application will be satisfied or rejected/ The same regime is relating to persons traveling by automobile transport. As to single trip by rail, FTD will be issued to transit passengers according to their Russian passport (after 31.12.2004 – to international passport only) when buying a railway ticket. FTD is to be the statistical and immigration control method covering the passage of people through what will be EU territory. The FTD regime looks like the most reasonable solution under existing and foreseen circumstances.

However, a year after Brussels summit practical mechanism of transit is still a “hot item” under discussion. While Lithuania agrees to follow EU decisions on this item, in fact it intends to tie up transit regulations to its own political interests. Thus, regulation of vexed question on “disputable territories” at the Lithuanian-Russian border<sup>61</sup> was closely connected to conditions of Kaliningrad transit for Russian citizens. Therefore, in the short distance from EU enlargement Kaliningrad Province remains politically sensitive and technically unsolved issue in Russia – EU relationships.

#### *Management of migration: need for a complex approach*

The above arguments highlight Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as active participants of international migration flows, being sending, receiving and transit countries simultaneously. Variety of migrations coming to and from this region in the context of present demographic

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<sup>60</sup> Besides investments from the Russian Federal Government, EU gives preferences to Kaliningrad in the context of its Baltic Sea initiatives by investing in its economics (Free Trade Zone development, fishing industry recovery, improvement of transport facilities), human resources development (TEMPUS Programme), ecological monitoring, energy supply, health services development, etc. Total investments of European Union to Kaliningrad Province are about 40 million euro (www.eur.ru January 2003). Besides, investments from Scandinavian countries in development of seaport facilities are to enlarge the scale of commodities transit.



and economic trends needs careful and “multi-reasonable” approach for management of migration.

However, frequent restructuring in government departments and changes in key staff, unwieldy and sometimes corrupt bureaucracies, lack of experienced personnel, and the scarcity of financial resources, have all contribute to low effectiveness of managing migration in the region. Another major factor in this list is the lack of cooperation among law enforcement and migration agencies within former Soviet states and with neighbouring countries.

In most CIS countries a wide range of legislation was adopted in the post-Soviet period in the fields of migration, refugees and citizenship, although normative measures often failed to address the full range of migration issues or conflicted each other. They were seldom accompanied by regulations detailing implementing mechanisms, were poorly understood by law enforcement personnel who did not receive adequate training, were not implemented consistently, if at all, and were seldom enforced by the courts. It is understandable: the laws on citizenship, refugees and forced migrants and social guarantees for international migrants were formulated during a very short period of time following their emergence as sovereign states, when there was an urgent need for national legislation. Laws were hastily written under conditions of panicked and/or forced migration flows. However, during the last decade the situation has been radically changing, and the laws have grown outdated.

In the latest 3-4 years, a new packet of laws was under development. In Russia, a new 2002 Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation and a 2002 Law on Citizenship came into force. In Ukraine, in January 1999 a President’s Decree on Immigration Control was issued, in 2001 a new Citizenship Law, the Law on Immigration and revised Law on Refugees were adopted. Laws on state borders and the immigration control service, and on asylum procedures were under consideration.

At the same time, there is an obvious lack of bilateral, inter-governmental agreements on international migration, in particular concerning social security for labour migrants from one country working in the territory of another country<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>61</sup> “Agreement on State Border with Lithuania” was ratified by Russian Gosudarstvennaya Duma (Parliament) on 21 May 2003.

<sup>62</sup> Russia has agreements on employment and social security for the citizens of one country working in the territory of another country with some former Soviet states – Armenia (1994), Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova (1993), Kyrgyzstan (1996), and agreements on social and legal guaranties for permanent migrants who have moved from one country to another – with Azerbaijan (1997), Armenia (1997), Georgia (1994), Kazakhstan (1995), Kyrgyzstan (1995), Tadjikistan (1992), Turkmenistan (1993) and Ukraine (2001). As to non-former Soviet Union states, there are several agreements on co-operation in the field of social security with the countries of the former socialist block, signed in the 1950s and 60s: with Czechoslovakia signed on 02.12.1959 (now valid for the Czech Republic and Slovakia); with Bulgaria signed on 11.12.1959; with Romania signed on 24.12.1960; with Hungary signed on

The undeveloped and inadequate state of national legislation on migration improperly narrows the scope of legitimate migration and consequently broadens the scope of irregular migration. However, migration legislation is not drafted in a vacuum. It is a manifestation of official migration policy. In Russia, the debates on a reasonable concept for a migration policy have been going on for over ten years; however, so far there has been no common attitude towards migration either in society or among policy-makers. Many groups are now calling for a scrutinization of migration policy, especially in the field of immigration and transit migration. If this entails improved border controls, restrictions on irregular migration and illegal employment, the scrutiny could be regarded as advantageous. However, if it results in restrictions on labour migration and permanent immigration to Russia, it can damage national interests (mostly, in economic and demographic dimensions).

Besides imperfections in regulatory legislation on migration, other obstacles are institutional “musical chairs”. In Russia, for example, management of migration in the last decade was one of the most uncertain and unstable elements of federal government policy. In 1992, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) was founded. Its activities were mainly directed at forced migrants, in accordance with migration situation of the time. However, other forms of international migration dropped from sight. When, in 2000, the FMS was abolished, the responsibility for the management of migration was transferred to the Ministry of Federation, National and Migration Policy. Even the title of the Ministry demonstrates that migration policy was regarded primarily as an internal matter. International migration was again forgotten. One year later, in September 2001, the Ministry was restructured, and since February 2002 the management of migration together with migration policy has come under the Ministry of Home Affairs. This time, actions against irregular migration became the core principle in the field of migration. Terrorist attacks in the USA stimulated the worldwide campaign against terrorism, which, in the Russian context, became synonymous with efforts against migration to Russia in general.

However, the world experience in combating irregular migration undoubtedly proves that it cannot be defeated by an “administrative storm”. For Russia, this statement is especially sensitive as migrations at the former Soviet Union space are mostly resulting from historical reasons; they are to be managed in a different manner than those from outside the region. For this reason, balance between restricting measures and regulating measures of migration management is to be provided. Russia is surely in need of border control improvements. Development of international instruments, like readmission agreements, is also a topical issue. Russian legislation should envisage punishment for organization and

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20.12.1962 and with Mongolia signed on 06.04.1981. Nowadays, they are obviously outdated. The agreement on social security between Russia and Spain, signed 11.04.1994, is the only example of modern bilateral regulation of social guarantees for international migrants in the Russian legislation.

aiding in human trafficking and illegal moving of citizens of the third countries through the territory of Russia. At the same time, these restrictive measures should not run contrary to the country's reality resulting from hundreds of thousands "irregular" migrants from CIS countries who are de facto permanent residents of Russia. A survey of irregular migrants from Ukraine in Moscow in 2000<sup>63</sup> showed that 20% of respondents live in Moscow for over three years; among these – 50% live in Moscow for over five years. The fact they work and find means of subsistence in Russia proves that the country is in need of them. The fact that they are not in a regular status is likely to prove that they are forced for that. A normal man prefers not "to sit on a shaky chair" and pay bribes to put his child to a kinder-garden, school, hospital, etc. Meanwhile, complicated bureaucratic procedures related to registration, citizenship, or even labor contract leave many of these migrants on "irregular field". In fact, the State itself is becoming the reason for growing irregular migration.

While elaborating strategy of cooperation in the field of management of migration between EU and Russia it should be taken into account that "new sovereign countries" surrounding Russia constitute a separate migration system. Current and future development of this system is resulting from: unequal demographic and economic trends in the countries of the region that tend to be a common labour market, on the one hand, and close interrelationships of the whole system with European countries, especially the EU "new comers", on the other hand.

The more-or-less accepted opinion is that the spontaneous character of migration processes in the territories of Russia and other CIS states should be legally regulated. The opinion is the same for both temporary and permanent types of migration. Once a legitimate legal foundation has been made to cover migration, international co-operation and agreements in this sphere should become possible.

In our opinion, migration regulation should be a sphere of active cooperation among the interested countries: countries of destination, countries of origin and countries of transit. The effectiveness of this cooperation highly depends on whether the mutual interests will be fully and properly understood and addressed. Crucial issues related to migration – such as the Kaliningrad muss – highlight the correctness of this idea.

Here, we see a vast field for collaboration between enlarging EU and its eastern neighbours in different aspects, from technical cooperation to their gradual integration to European Community. In this context, a suggestion made by President Putin last year seems to be of a certain interest. Vladimir Putin suggested including Russia in the Schengen zone and providing visa-free entry to Europe for Russian citizens. It may seem absurd or ridiculous

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<sup>63</sup> IOM (2002) Immigration Policy of Russia: Ethnic Context. IOM Open Forum. Moscow Migration Research Programme, Information Series, No: 5, p.18.

for the present moment. However, in-depth analysis of this perspective can prove the opposite. I mean that when a country enters the Schengen zone it undertakes certain compulsory responsibilities including securing its borders with the third countries. In case of Russia this stands for strengthening its border control on the Eastern side, restricting transit migrants control, developing of the general migration database, combating irregular migration in all its forms, migrants smuggling in particular. Who will benefit from these positive changes in management of migration in Russia? Russia itself – for sure. Its western neighbouring countries – the enlarging European Union – undoubtedly. We can remind: the present shift in migration trends in Europe seemed unrealistic not so long ago, however, now we are witnessing the most profound and positive change in enlarging European migration space (or European migration system if we follow the migration systems concept again).

### *Conclusions*

Arriving at coordinated decisions is a long and arduous process, which increasingly highlights the problems and intricacies under discussion. As the situation unfolds, new agenda items keep emerging. Currently, when the Europe is becoming increasingly integrated and national interests are converging, cooperation in migration policy with “outside countries” is becoming a point of vital interest for all involved parties.

Migrations from the east to European Union (both of East European countries’ citizens and transit migrants, primarily from Asia) can have a serious influence on social, economic, demographic, cultural, ethnic processes in the countries of Central and Western Europe. The analysis of these migrations is especially topical in the context of the enlarging European migration space.

The East European countries who are staying outside EU in the foreseen perspective are to realize that on the other side of their western border there are not just individual countries but a union of countries with common migration policy. On the analogy, the European Union is facing from the east not only Ukraine, Belarus, or Russia with their peculiar migration situations but also the whole of Euro-Asian migration system with its general trends and perspectives.

Understanding of this fact results in a more reasonable approach to migration management strategy and practical dialogue between countries of destination, origin and transit that could provide a positive shift in migration policies from reactive to proactive. As there is a changing variety of migration flows within Euro-Asian system it needs a range of migration policy dimensions related to labour migration regulation, prevention of irregular migration, combating of trafficking in migrants, etc. Diverse categories of migrants moving

across eastern border of the enlarging EU involve different types of people and motivations, they are managed by different institutions. The trend is: the less is the regulating role of State and international bodies in migrants' management, the more is the role of informal, often criminal smuggling and trafficking institutions.

So, the programmes providing legal framework for both permanent and temporary migrants in the EU (for example, in terms of improvement of information supplies for potential migrants with special emphasis on benefits of regular employment; government control over the market of cheap, low-skilled labour by means of labour legislation improvement, development of bilateral inter-governmental agreements on employment and social guarantees for migrants from East European countries) look both possible and promising.

Irregular migration from Euro-Asian migration system and through it is a painful item in cooperation between two regions in the migration sphere. It is important to understand that irregular migrants are primarily motivated by economic/employment/labour reasons. Therefore, their number is closely related to the labour absorption capacity in receiving countries. "Grey" labour market sectors are most attractive for irregular migrants. Domestic labour market regulation and control could be the most effective method to limit irregular migration. It is worth noting that Russia, being a center of Euro-Asian migration system is presently a labour migrants (primarily irregular) receiving country, and this role can strengthen in the course of positive economic dynamics in the country. This fact can highlight new perspectives of migration situation development at the continent. At the same time practical cooperation between the EU, on the one side, and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, who are an important link in the migration chain between Asia and Europe, on the other side, looks both possible and promising.

Another lesson from this history is the impossibility of eliminating irregular migration without enormous compromises to citizen rights and freedoms. Again, the alternative way is to develop legitimate, regular forms of international migration, primarily labour migration. This should be the essence of practical cooperation between EU and its eastern neighbours in view of the future enlargement of the European migration system.

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## **Point of view of the different actors:**

### **Migration in the Caucasus Region: Trends, Determinants and Perspectives, by Mr Dalkhat M. Ediev, Professor of Karachay-Cherkessian State Technological Academy**

The paper concerns historical trends, determinants, and prospects of migration in the Transcaucasia and the Russian Caucasus. Due to economic differentials, rise of ethnic conciseness, and demographic pressure movement of Russians to Caucasian autonomies and republics was replaced by out-migration. Caucasian nationals were also moving from the republics of each other and from their own republic to Russian Caucasus. Regional ethnic conflicts resulted in huge forced movements of nearly the same directions as of economic migrations. As a result of these movements ethnic composition of Caucasian regions became, in general, more uniform. Although migration peaks in the region have gone, most migration determinants still persist and grant continuation of main migrations with a rate depending on future political and economic developments.

#### **1. Historical, geographic and economic introduction: Caucasian migrations of the Soviet period**

The Caucasus region consists of two parts: the northern Caucasus belonging to Russia, and the Transcaucasia or the South Caucasus shared by Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Russian Caucasus includes seven national republics (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkesia, and Adygeya) and two krays populated mostly by Russians (Krasnodarsky and Stavropolsky). The so called Northern Caucasian Economic Region includes, in addition, the Rostovskaya oblast and the Kalmyk republic. Finally, the Southern Federal District of Russia includes two more oblasts – Volgogradskaya and Astrakhanskaya. These geographic definitions are to be kept in mind when a scholar analyzes regional statistics from different sources. Concerning data published for the region it should be noted that different statistical studies can cover differing geographic areas. Besides, it is important to note that demographic sources differ in how detailed they are. For example, the list of ethnic groups for territories of the region as it is published by the Soviet census handbooks differs from one census to another. Direct use of census data can sometimes mislead a researcher. In addition, when it comes to migration data, coverage, quality, and methodology of soviet migration statistics was not consistent. For these reasons we rely mostly on corrected census data for the Soviet period and on migration data for the post Soviet period in the following study.

The demographic map of the Caucasus region has been formed and reshaped by migration in both the historical and recent times. The geopolitical value of the region, its ethnic diversity, relatively poor economic development, and demographic pressure remain

among the main determinants of the population movements to, from, and in the Caucasus region.

Geographic isolation of the North Caucasus from the Transcaucasia was always a suppressing factor for migration between these two regions. In fact, Caucasian local nationalities were in tighter migration relations with the Russian krais and Russia as a whole than to each other with only a few exceptions (Dagestan and Azerbaijan, Georgia and North Ossetia were in close contact with each other since long ago). In addition to the geographic factor, the economy also played its role. Concerning the economic development, the Caucasus was always a lesser developed region of the USSR. As for the Caucasus itself, Russian krais and Azerbaijan had more resources. Better economic development of the krais and high demographic pressure in ethnic territories was always pushing economic migrants from the Transcaucasia and North Caucasian autonomies to the Russian krais and beyond the Caucasus.

Another factor of Caucasian migrations as well as of the Soviet migrations as a whole, is of political nature. Soviet ethnic and economic policy as well as the national policy of ethnic autonomies and republics was one of the main migration determinants in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Historical roots of the current situation can be traced back to the time when the Russian Empire moved south and the region was set under control of Russia. As a result of colonization, Northern Caucasian mountain peoples were locked in high lands with only a small amount of arable lands and the long-term process of movement “from mountains to the plane” began. At the same time Russia started to establish Russian settlers in order to fix her presence in the region. Russian migration was also encouraged by poor living conditions in Central Russia and by a transfer of technologies from Russia.

The resulting multi-ethnic mosaic of the region, its economic underdevelopment, land shortage among mountain peoples, and colonization prehistory were sources of many actual and latent political problems for the Soviets. As everywhere in the USSR, the Soviets tried to solve these problems by establishing ethnic autonomies, fixing the ethnic composition of the region and its autonomies, and by economic development of the region. It was the beginning of the Soviet era, when most of the modern Caucasian boundaries and ethnic identities were fixed. Soviet ethnic policy of that period had a long-lasting effect on population movements. On the one hand, national autonomies were established in order to overcome the remains of colonial times and prevent ethnical tensions. On the other hand, most of ethnic groups were divided among some of the national autonomies that were established. Karachays' lands belonged both to the Karachay Autonomous Oblast (part of the later Karachay-Cherkessian AO) and the Kabard-Balkar AO; similarly split were the lands inhabited by Kabardins (many Kabardins also stayed in the Cherkess AO, which later merged into the Karachay-Cherkessian AO); Ossetians were divided by the border between the Russian Federation (the North

Ossetian AO) and Georgia (the South Ossetian AO); Ingushs lived both in the Chechen-Ingush AO and the North Ossetian AO; Chechens resided in the Chechen-Ingush AO and the Dagestan ASSR; some Dagestan nations (Lezgins, Avars, Nogays, Dargins, and Czakhurs) lived in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Stavropol krai, and Chechen-Ingush AO; from the Czars' times Armenians were settled in the Azerbaijan territory of Nagorny Karabakh; finally, Ukrainians and Russians were spread along the whole region. In addition, Adygeys, Cherkesses, and Kabardins, which are close to each other ethnically, lived separately in three autonomies; similarly divided were Karachays and Balkars as well as Abkhazs and Abazins. Still on the other hand the Soviets succeeded in stabilizing this ethnical division by enforcing the assimilation of several ethnic groups by others and by developing the ethnical conciseness of the 'titular' nations. The most spectacular achievement of Soviet assimilation policy was the transformation of more than one million Caucasian Ukrainians into Russians during a decade. Similarly, many Abazins and almost all Kabardins of the Karachay-Cherkessia were turned into Cherkesses; and Karachays of the Kabardino-Balkaria were turned into Balkars. Homogenization was fostered in the Transcaucasia as well, with the newly established Azeri identity uniting the Transcaucasian Turks, and Georgian minorities to be assimilated by Georgians. At the same time, economic development, industrialization, and forced migration by the government mixed the population of the USSR, bringing more Russians into industrial sectors of the Transcaucasia and spreading Caucasian populations throughout the whole country.

During Stalin's time, the government reshaped the ethnical landscape of the region by repressing some of the ethnic groups. Germans, Karachays, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushs, Balkars, Meskhetian Turks were deported *en masse* from the region to Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Siberia, and the Far East. Many Russians (Cossacks), Kurds, Greeks, and others were also deported from parts of the Caucasus region. Collectivization and other repressions also moved many people to the East. Additionally, Eastern and Asian parts of the Soviet Union were fed by an influx of immigrants from central regions of the Russia – later they'll return back to Russia and many of them to the Caucasian region. Shortly after World War II about 150 000 Armenians were repatriated to Armenia from the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Khrushchev returned most of the deported nations back to their homelands. Yet, some of them were still deprived of the territories they inhabited for centuries, and this incomplete restoration of violated rights bore many latent problems – problems which fully manifest themselves the post soviet time.

In 1960s the Soviet Union, with the rural population prevailing before, turns into an urbanized state. In 1960-70s the urbanization and many industrial projects moved several millions of Russians from Central Russia to the Periphery. About a million of them (897

thousands) settles in the Caucasian cities, and – what is much more important for recent migration trends – many Russian settlers moved to the Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Eastern parts of the Russian Federation. Although, some of them also moved to the Transcaucasia, the Transcaucasian republics soon became a source of Russian emigration.

Emigration of Russians from the Transcaucasian republics can be attributed to several factors: native ethnic groups became able to provide workers in non-agricultural sectors, which were previously dominated by Russians; the development of native culture (national radio, national TV, national literature, practice of native languages) was suppressing the Russian self-manifestation in national republics; national policy was aimed at fostering participation of locals in government, management, education and science, and culture. All these factors were supported by the demographic pressure of local rural populations, which was usually growing faster than those of urban Russians. Demographic pressure was pushing locals from the country to cities, where they competed with Russians for a better life. The same demographic pressure and rising ability to provide skilled workers resulted also in an outflow of local nationals from the Transcaucasia to other parts of the Soviet Union and primarily to its western parts and Russia. Indeed, the same processes with some delay took place in national autonomies of the Northern Caucasus.

The tables below (tables 2 to 9) depict these processes in figures. All the tables have a similar structure and cover the period from 1926 to 1989 [sources of data: Kabuzan 1996; Uralanis 1978; Goskomstat of Russia. 1991, 1998; Central Statistical Agency of the USSR. 1928a, 1928b, 1929a, 1929b, 1962, 1963, 1973; 1980, Russian Institute for Historical Studies 1992; Historical Institute of the USSR 1991; Goskomstat of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic 1997]. They present the geographic distribution of a given ethnic group, its average annual growth rates, and estimates of regional net migration rates. Due to the shortage of reliable historical data on migration, the net migration rates are estimated roughly by comparing the growth rate in a given region with the growth rate for the USSR as a whole. This technique assumes similarity of vital rates of a given nationality in all regions concerned. In some cases this assumption is crucially wrong (e.g. negative estimates for the rate of Armenians' migration to Russia in 1926-1970 are a result of lower fertility among Russian Armenians) but usually it provides reliable results. An analytical study of the problem mentioned suggests that an error in the net migration estimate for a given region is a product of the fertility differential in and outside the region and of the share of the population concerned beyond the region. Usually this error could not be higher than 0.5% at annual base. Such a bias in migration estimates is very likely for a population that moves from a highly populated area with high fertility. Hence it is likely that the procedure applied in the paper underestimates migration rates of non-Russians from their autonomies or Republics. Another source of errors is a change in the ethnic group's number, which occurs as a result of international migration or assimilation. As for the international migration it had a little effect in the Soviet period

covered by the work except for Armenians' repatriation after World War II [Anderson and Silver 1983, 1989]. Actually, we have corrected the change rates of Soviet Armenian population for years 1939-1970 in order to eliminate the effect of the repatriation. Another 'external' source of change in ethnic numbers is due to assimilation. This process was taken into account in several ways. Firstly, Ukrainians and Russians were analyzed together in order to eliminate the impact of Ukrainians' assimilation by Russians. Similarly, North Caucasian groups, which exchanged their population through assimilation (Kabards, Abazins, Adygeys, and Cherkesses; Karachays and Balkars; Dagestan peoples) were analyzed in larger groups. As for the Transcaucasia, according to estimates made in [Anderson and Silver 1983], only Georgians were gaining through assimilation (of South Ossetians first of all). This assimilation process was of minor importance for Georgians (it increased the Georgian population by about 0.1%) but of a valuable impact for South Ossetians (resulting in an overestimation of their rate of emigration from Georgia to about 1%). Finally, Russians emigration rate from Caucasians' ethnic territories could be slightly overestimated due to different levels of assimilation by Russians in the Caucasus and beyond. Yet, based on the results of [Anderson and Silver 1983] we estimate that this overestimation could be of minor importance (about 0.03% yearly). Still another source of the estimation's bias is connected to age structure differentials between migrants and non-migrants. Economic migrants are usually younger than the population they departed from. In fact, such a difference suppresses the change rate of a sending population in the years after out migration happened. It is likely that this factor resulted in overestimation of rates of Russians' migration from Northern Caucasian autonomies at the end of 20<sup>th</sup> Century. This conclusion is supported by figures available for Dagestan. According to the migration statistics [Ilyashenko 2003], the rate of Russians' out-migration from Dagestan was about 0.5%-0.7% at the end of 1980s while our estimation procedure suggests the rate of 1.7% on average for 1979-1989. It should be noted, yet, that this discrepancy is partly due to unregistered population movements.

Over all the accuracy of the method used can be verified by comparing estimates based on it to available migration statistics for Transcaucasian republics and Russia, which presumably is more reliable than statistics for northern Caucasian regions of Russia. Table 1 presents estimates for average yearly migration based on estimates presented in the paper and on migration data for 1980-1989 [UN 2002: 43, 46, 64; UN estimates are based on migration statistics of Russia, the main migration partner of the Transcaucasia]. Note that estimates presented in the paper are based on analyses made for ethnic groups of interest in the Caucasian study framework only (Russians, Ukrainians, all Caucasians, Kalmyks, Germans, Jews, Kurds, Greeks, Koreans, and Turks). Hence, they do not include data on Central Asian and Kazakhstan ethnic groups and ethnic groups of the West of the USSR (Byelorussians, Moldavians, etc.). Although, this is of minor importance for the subject matter of the paper, it results in an underestimation of the immigration to Russia as whole. Given this note, it is clear

from table 1 that indirect estimation used in the paper provides reliable results. Some discrepancies in figures for Transcaucasian republics are likely to be explained by undocumented flows of Armenians from Azerbaijan and Georgia and of Azeri from Armenia and Georgia following the ethnic tensions as well as by migration to Ukraine and other territories outside the Russia, which were not taken into account by the UN.

<b>Table 1. Average yearly net migration estimates based on the indirect technique presented in the paper and on official migration data</b>		
Region	Average yearly net migration (thousands) in 1979-1989	
	estimate based on the results presented	estimate based on migration data
<b>Russia</b>	100,2	147,8
The Caucasus	-67,1	tn. a.
Northern Caucasus	-13,3	n. a.
<b>Transcaucasia</b>	-51,1	n. a.
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	-21,7	-20,27
Nagorno-Karabakh ASSR	0,4	n. a.
<b>Armenia</b>	-5,0	-7,97
<b>Georgia</b>	-17,2	-10,41
Abkhaz ASSR	-1,3	n. a.
S.-Ossetian AO	-0,9	n. a.

The dynamics of Russian and Ukrainian populations in the Region of the Caucasus and beyond is presented in table 2. Russians and Ukrainians are compounded in order to eliminate the effect of assimilation of Ukrainians by Russians. In 1926-1939 Russians migrated from nearly all Russian territories. They moved both to national republics and autonomies. Studying the period involved, the severe famine of 1933-1934 should be taken into account. The famine was especially brutal in the Northern Caucasus. Hence, negative estimates for the migration balance in the Northern Caucasian Krays could reflect higher mortality in those regions. In the period between 1939 and 1959, when the Soviet Union was involved into the brutal World War II, similar movements took place with some exceptions. Many people were evacuated to the Soviet East during the war. Later they partly moved back to the West. Anyway, during these movements Russia lost many Russians and Ukrainians. Transcaucasia as a whole was also a source of Russian migrants – that is natural as the region was not the main place where war refugees were evacuated to. Additionally, other factors, which pushed Russians from the national republics as it was mentioned before, also played a role. Anyway, Azerbaijan and Armenia seem to have a negative migration balance for the period considered. Krasnodarsky Krai was attracting Russian migrants – probably as a result of refugee movements back to the West and of a reversal of migrations between the Krasnodarsky Krai and Adygeya. Perhaps, Stavroplye could also be a net receiver of Russians if not for the territorial transfers to Checheno-Ingushetia after the restoration of that republic. All the autonomies except for Adygeya and Kalmykyia (the latter region is presented here for comparison purposes) were gaining Russian population through migration. This is natural as

these regions were being industrialized after the war. Industrial and urban development of Kalmykia was slow due to Stalin's deportation of Kalmyks and lack of natural resources. This is why Russian immigration to that region rose later, in 1959-1970s only, after the resettlement of Kalmyks' ASSR. In 1959-1970 old 'industrial' migrations to the East were combined with 'economic' migrations to the Central Russia, which had a higher level of living standards, and with 'demographic' migrations produced by demographic pressure differentials. National autonomies and Transcaucasian republics, which had less urbanized, younger, and faster growing populations, turned with time into stable sources of migrants. The demographic pressure expelled both locals and Russians from these regions. Despite similar demographics, Checheno-Ingushetia had lower Russian out migration compared to Dagestan. This can be explained by higher industrialization and urbanization on the one hand and by fostered development of the region after its restoration in late 1950s. In 1959-1970 only the autonomies with less demographic pressure and Armenia remained net receivers of Russians. By 1989 all Caucasian autonomies and republics became net senders of Russians to Caucasian krais and Central and Western Russia.

As an over all result of the different migration waves mentioned the Caucasus did not gain or loose Russian and Ukrainian population during 1926-1989s. Yet, migration had a remarkable effect on the distribution of Russians in the region. Russian krais lost their population through migration while autonomies and Transcaucasian republics gained their Russian and Ukrainian populations. The only exceptions were Azerbaijan and Dagestan, which had no sizable effect of migration on their Russian population when the whole period of 1926-1989 is concerned.

Tables 3 to 9 present data and estimates for main Caucasian ethnic groups (Azeri, Armenians, Georgians, Abkhazs, and Northern Caucasians).

Table 3 presents dynamics and distribution of Azeri population. Azeri moved from the Transcaucasia to Russia, and from the autonomies to the rest of Northern Caucasus and Russia. They were driven from the Transcaucasian neighbors of Azerbaijan since 1930s. As for Azerbaijan itself its Azeri migration balance was nearly positive, although this estimate could partly be a result of higher fertility among Azerbaijan Azeri as it was noted before. It is more likely that net Azeri emigration was slightly above zero at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Azeri population of the Nagorno-Karabakh was fed by immigration except for late 1980s when due to ethnic conflict in the area Azeri fled from the Karabakh and Armenia. Dynamics for the Caucasian krais is not clear due to absence of reliable and consistent data. Yet, it can be stated that during the whole period of 1926-1989 the Azeri population in these regions grew due to migration at annual rate of 6.6% (4.2% for 1939-1989). Over all the Azeri migration in 1926-1989 was negative for their regions of traditional residence (Transcaucasia and Dagestan) and positive for others. The total effect of migration on the share of Azeri

living in Azerbaijan was almost negligible. Yet, given the higher fertility rate among Azerbaijan Azeri this means a positive out-migration from the republic.

**Table 2. Geographic distribution, dynamics, and migration estimates for Russians and Ukrainians combined**

Region	Population		Average annual growth rates and estimated net migration rates									
	1926	1989	1926-1939	Migr.	1939-1959	Migr.	1959-1970	Migr.	1970-1979	Migr.	1979-1989	Migr.
USSR	108986	189331	1,2%		0,9%		1,0%		0,6%		0,5%	
Russia	81945	124229	1,0%	-0,2%	0,4%	-0,5%	0,8%	-0,2%	0,6%	0,0%	0,6%	0,1%
The Caucasus	4804	8577	1,7%	0,5%	0,9%	0,0%	1,3%	0,2%	0,3%	-0,4%	0,2%	-0,3%
N. Caucasus	4432	7699	1,0%	-0,2%	1,0%	0,1%	1,5%	0,4%	0,4%	-0,2%	0,4%	-0,1%
Krays	4027	6276	0,1%	-1,1%	0,8%	-0,1%	1,5%	0,5%	0,5%	-0,1%	0,5%	0,0%
Autonomies	405	1423	6,6%	5,3%	1,7%	0,9%	1,3%	0,2%	-0,2%	-0,8%	-0,3%	-0,8%
Krasnodarsky	2639	4189	0,2%	-1,0%	1,0%	0,1%	1,4%	0,4%	0,5%	-0,2%	0,4%	-0,1%
Stavropolsky	1388	2087	0,0%	-1,2%	0,4%	-0,4%	1,7%	0,6%	0,7%	0,0%	0,8%	0,3%
Dagestan	102	174	2,7%	1,4%	2,2%	1,4%	-0,2%	-1,2%	-1,2%	-1,8%	-1,2%	-1,7%
Chechen-Ingush ASSR	87	306	7,0%	5,7%	2,8%	1,9%	0,4%	-0,6%	-1,0%	-1,6%	-1,3%	-1,8%
N.-Ossetian ASSR	65	199	5,7%	4,4%	1,8%	0,9%	1,1%	0,0%	0,0%	-0,7%	-0,6%	-1,1%
Kabard-Balkar ASSR	33	254	11,9%	10,5%	1,0%	0,1%	2,7%	1,6%	0,8%	0,2%	0,3%	-0,2%
Karachay-Cherkess AO	63	182	5,2%	3,9%	0,9%	0,1%	1,3%	0,2%	0,2%	-0,5%	0,7%	0,2%
Adygey AO	56	307	9,4%	8,1%	0,8%	-0,1%	3,0%	1,9%	0,4%	-0,3%	0,3%	-0,2%
Kalmyk ASSR	30	126	9,8%	8,5%	0,2%	-0,6%	1,7%	0,6%	0,3%	-0,4%	-0,3%	-0,8%
Transcaucasia	372	878	7,6%	6,3%	0,4%	-0,4%	0,0%	-1,0%	-0,6%	-1,2%	-1,3%	-1,8%
Azerbaijan	239	425	6,7%	5,4%	-0,2%	-1,1%	0,1%	-0,9%	-0,7%	-1,4%	-1,7%	-2,2%
Armenia	22	60	7,5%	6,2%	0,4%	-0,4%	1,3%	0,3%	1,1%	0,5%	-2,8%	-3,3%
Georgia	110	394	9,4%	8,1%	1,3%	0,5%	-0,3%	-1,3%	-0,8%	-1,4%	-0,6%	-1,1%
Abkhaz ASSR	21	87			1,8%	0,9%	0,6%	-0,4%	-1,7%	-2,3%	-0,4%	-0,9%

**Table 3. Geographic distribution, dynamics, and migration estimates for Azeri**

Region	Population (thousands)		Average annual growth rates and estimated net migration rates									
	1926	1989	1926-1939	Migr.	1939-1959	Migr.	1959-1970	Migr.	1970-1979	Migr.	1979-1989	Migr.
USSR	1707	6770	2,2%		1,3%		3,7%		2,5%		2,1%	
Russia	28	336	3,4%	1,1%	2,5%	1,2%	2,8%	-0,9%	5,3%	2,7%	8,2%	6,0%
The Caucasus	1676	6299	2,2%	0,0%	1,2%	-0,1%	3,8%	0,1%	2,4%	-0,1%	2,0%	-0,2%
N. Caucasus	24	102	2,5%	0,2%								
Krays	0	19	18,7%	16,1%								
Autonomies	23	82	2,3%	0,1%	0,9%	-0,3%	3,3%	-0,4%	2,3%	-0,3%	2,2%	0,0%
Dagestan	23	75	2,2%	0,0%	1,0%	-0,3%	3,3%	-0,4%	1,9%	-0,6%	1,6%	-0,6%
Transcaucasia	1653	6197	2,2%	-0,1%	1,2%	-0,1%	3,8%	0,1%	2,4%	-0,1%	1,9%	-0,2%
Azerbaijan	1438	5805	2,0%	-0,2%	1,4%	0,2%	3,8%	0,1%	2,5%	0,0%	2,1%	0,0%
Nagorno-Karabakh ASSR	11	41			1,2%	0,0%	3,8%	0,1%	3,6%	1,0%	0,9%	-1,2%
Armenia	77	85	4,2%	1,9%	-1,0%	-2,2%	2,9%	-0,7%	0,9%	-1,6%	-6,2%	-8,2%
Georgia	138	308	2,4%	0,2%	-1,0%	-2,3%	3,2%	-0,5%	1,8%	-0,7%	1,9%	-0,3%

Table 4 presents data and estimates on Armenian populations. Note that the Soviet Armenian population change rates for 1939-1979 and, therefore, estimates of migration rates for that period are obtained with corrections made for international immigration of about 150,000 Armenians repatriated from the Middle East and the Mediterranean after World War II. Repatriates were allocated as follows: 90,000 in 1939-1959, 40,000 in 1959-1970, and 20,000 in 1970-1979 [Anderson and Silver 1983: 477; Anderson and Silver 1989: 611]. Given the assumption of higher fertility among Armenians residing in Transcaucasia [The Big Russian Encyclopedia 1994: 95], one could conclude from the figures presented that Armenians fled from all the Transcaucasia to Russia. Perhaps, at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century they fled from the Northern Caucasus as well. But later inflows to the Northern Caucasus from the South seem to overwhelm migration from the region to central parts of Russia.



Fleeing of Armenians from Transcaucasian neighbors of Armenia was always at high levels. It was accelerated in 1980s when many Armenians and Azeri flew from each others republics as a result of ethnic conflicts.

**Table 4. Geographic distribution, dynamics, and migration estimates for Armenians**

Region	Population (thousands)		Average annual growth rates and estimated net migration rates									
	1926	1989	1926-1939	Migr.	1939-1959	Migr.	1959-1970	Migr.	1970-1979	Migr.	1979-1989	Migr.
USSR	1568	4623	2,5%		1,1%		2,1%		1,7%		1,1%	
Russia	195	532	0,9%	-1,6%	0,8%	-0,3%	1,4%	-0,7%	2,2%	0,6%	3,9%	2,7%
The Caucasus	1495	4194	2,2%	-0,3%	1,3%	0,2%	2,3%	0,2%	1,7%	0,0%	0,9%	-0,2%
N. Caucasus	162	293	-3,0%	-5,3%	1,1%	0,0%	1,8%	-0,5%	2,0%	0,3%	4,0%	2,9%
Krays	142	242	-4,2%	-6,5%	1,0%	-0,1%	1,9%	-0,3%	2,5%	0,8%	4,7%	3,5%
Autonomies	20	51	2,6%	0,1%	1,5%	0,4%	1,2%	-0,9%	0,4%	-1,3%	1,3%	0,3%
Transcaucasia	1333	3911	2,6%	0,1%	1,3%	0,2%	2,3%	0,2%	1,7%	0,0%	0,7%	-0,4%
Azerbaijan	282	391	2,5%	0,0%	0,7%	-0,5%	0,8%	-1,3%	-0,2%	-1,8%	-1,9%	-3,0%
Nagorno-Karabakh ASSR	97	145			-0,9%	-2,0%	0,9%	-1,2%	0,2%	-1,5%	1,7%	0,6%
Armenia	744	3084	2,8%	0,3%	1,9%	0,8%	3,3%	1,1%	2,4%	0,7%	1,2%	0,2%
Georgia	307	437	2,3%	-0,1%	0,3%	-0,8%	0,2%	-1,9%	-0,1%	-1,7%	-0,2%	-1,3%
Abkhaz ASSR	37	77			1,3%	0,2%	1,4%	-0,8%	-0,2%	-1,9%	0,4%	-0,6%
S.-Ossetian AO	1	1			0,3%	-0,8%	-1,9%	-4,0%	-3,0%	-4,6%	-0,2%	-1,3%

Georgian figures are presented in table 5. Georgians' fertility was not as high as that of Azeri and Armenians. Hence, one can expect that at least the signs of migration estimates given in the table are reliable. Until the 1980s Georgians were migrating from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Transcaucasia as a whole to Russia. Yet, this migration was at a lower rate compared to Azeri and, perhaps, to Armenians. Main waves of Georgian migration to Russia happened at the beginning of the period (which is natural in view of strong Georgian positions in the political elite of Stalin's time) and in 1980s. Later movements can be partly attributed to the escape of Georgians from both Ossetias and to economic migration. It should also be noted that Georgian emigration from Georgia could slightly be underestimated (at rate of about 0.1% yearly) due to assimilation of non-Georgians by Georgians [Anderson and Silver 1983].

Table 6 concerns Abkhazs – another nationality of Georgia. They were continuously leaving Georgia to Russia during all the period presented in the table.

Ossetians, who were involved in ethnic conflicts in Georgia, are presented in table 7. Their migration rate from Georgia is likely to be overestimated due to their assimilation by Georgians [Anderson and Silver 1983] – at the rate up to 1-2% yearly. Taking the assumed fertility differentials as well as assimilation differentials into account, they were moving from the Caucasus and especially from both Ossetias to the rest of the USSR and Russia. Nearly the same can be concluded about all the Northern Caucasian nationalities, which were not deported in 1940s to the East (see table 8). In addition to moving outside the Caucasus, they were migrating to Caucasian krays with an exception made for the period covering WWII (1939-1959), when Caucasian locals seem to refuge to their own autonomies.

Table 5. Geographic distribution, dynamics, and migration estimates for Georgians

Region	Population (thousands)		Average annual growth rates and estimated net migration rates									
	1926	1989	1926-1939	Migr.	1939-1959	Migr.	1959-1970	Migr.	1970-1979	Migr.	1979-1989	Migr.
USSR	1821	3981	1,6%		0,9%		1,7%		1,1%		1,1%	
Russia	21	131	5,9%	4,1%	1,4%	0,4%	1,7%	-0,1%	2,9%	1,8%	3,9%	2,7%
The Caucasus	1814	3839	1,5%	-0,1%	0,9%	0,0%	1,7%	0,0%	1,0%	0,0%	1,0%	-0,1%
N. Caucasus	16	36	0,9%	-0,7%	1,0%	0,1%	1,8%	0,1%	1,5%	0,5%	1,7%	0,6%
Krays	8	17	-1,0%	-2,6%	1,3%	0,4%	1,9%	0,2%	2,3%	1,3%	2,3%	1,2%
Autonomies	8	19	2,4%	0,8%	0,8%	-0,1%	1,7%	0,0%	0,9%	-0,2%	1,1%	0,0%
N.-Ossetian ASSR	6	12			1,3%	0,4%	2,2%	0,4%	1,1%	0,0%	0,8%	-0,3%
Transcaucasia	1798	3803	1,5%	-0,1%	0,9%	0,0%	1,7%	0,0%	1,0%	0,0%	1,0%	-0,1%
Azerbaijan	10	14	0,5%	-1,1%	-0,3%	-1,2%	1,1%	-0,6%	0,7%	-0,4%	2,2%	1,1%
Armenia	0	1	5,0%	3,3%	2,1%	1,2%	3,3%	1,5%	1,8%	0,7%	0,4%	-0,7%
Georgia	1788	3787	1,5%	-0,1%	0,9%	0,0%	1,7%	0,0%	1,0%	0,0%	1,0%	-0,1%
Abkhaz ASSR	76	240			2,7%	1,8%	2,1%	0,4%	0,7%	-0,3%	1,2%	0,1%
S.-Ossetian AO	23	29			-0,2%	-1,1%	0,5%	-1,2%	0,0%	-1,0%	0,1%	-1,0%

Table 6. Geographic distribution, dynamics, and migration estimates for Abkhazs

Region	Population (thousands)		Average annual growth rates and estimated net migration rates									
	1926	1989	1926-1939	Migr.	1939-1959	Migr.	1959-1970	Migr.	1970-1979	Migr.	1979-1989	Migr.
USSR	57	105	0,3%		0,5%		2,2%		1,0%		1,5%	
Russia	0	7	14,8%	14,5%	4,3%	3,8%	5,0%	2,8%	6,0%	5,0%	6,0%	4,4%
The Caucasus	57	96	0,1%	-0,1%	0,4%	-0,1%	2,1%	-0,1%	0,8%	-0,2%	1,2%	-0,3%
Transcaucasia	57	96	0,1%	-0,1%	0,4%	-0,1%	2,1%	-0,1%	0,8%	-0,2%	1,2%	-0,3%
Georgia	57	96	0,1%	-0,1%	0,4%	-0,1%	2,1%	-0,1%	0,8%	-0,2%	1,2%	-0,3%
Abkhaz ASSR	55	93			0,4%	-0,1%	2,1%	-0,1%	0,8%	-0,2%	1,2%	-0,3%

Table 7. Geographic distribution, dynamics, and migration estimates for Ossetians

Region	Population (thousands)		Average annual growth rates and estimated net migration rates									
	1926	1989	1926-1939	Migr.	1939-1959	Migr.	1959-1970	Migr.	1970-1979	Migr.	1979-1989	Migr.
USSR	272	598	2,1%		0,8%		1,5%		1,2%		1,0%	
Russia	157	402	1,7%	-0,4%	1,2%	0,4%	2,2%	0,6%	1,3%	0,1%	1,3%	0,3%
The Caucasus	270	525	1,6%	-0,4%	0,5%	-0,2%	1,6%	0,1%	1,0%	-0,2%	0,8%	-0,2%
N. Caucasus	155	359	1,4%	-0,7%	1,1%	0,3%	2,1%	0,6%	1,1%	0,0%	1,1%	0,1%
N. Ossetia	139	335	1,4%	-0,7%	1,3%	0,6%	2,0%	0,5%	1,2%	0,0%	1,1%	0,1%
N. Caucasus – outside the N. Ossetia	16	24	1,7%	-0,3%	-1,6%	-2,3%	3,4%	1,8%	0,5%	-0,7%	0,8%	-0,2%
Transcaucasia	114	166	2,0%	-0,1%	-0,2%	-1,0%	0,7%	-0,8%	0,7%	-0,5%	0,2%	-0,8%
Georgia	113	164	2,1%	0,0%	-0,2%	-1,0%	0,6%	-1,0%	0,7%	-0,4%	0,2%	-0,8%
S.-Ossetian AO	55	65			-0,6%	-1,4%	0,3%	-1,2%	-0,2%	-1,3%	0,0%	-1,0%

Caucasian ethnic groups, which were deported during Stalin's rule, have specific migration patterns. Therefore, data and estimates for these groups are given separately (table 9). In addition to migration factors common for the rest of Caucasians (movement to Russian krays and beyond the Caucasus), they experienced brutal deportation to the Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Siberia in 1943-1944. The deportation suppressed their growth rates in 1939-1959 and left many of them in the regions of exile. Their return back to the Caucasus after late 1950s partly compensates for the migration from their autonomies. Even now significant populations of deported peoples stay in the Central Asia and Kazakhstan, providing a remarkable stock of immigrants to Russia and the Caucasus.

Region	Population (thousands)		Average annual growth rates and estimated net migration rates									
	1926	1989	1926-1939	Migr.	1939-1959	Migr.	1959-1970	Migr.	1970-1979	Migr.	1979-1989	Migr.
USSR	1177	3263	1,9%		0,6%		2,8%		1,8%		1,9%	
Russia	983	2744	1,6%	-0,3%	0,6%	0,1%	3,0%	0,2%	1,9%	0,1%	2,0%	0,1%
The Caucasus	1169	2896	1,7%	-0,2%	0,5%	-0,1%	2,9%	0,0%	1,7%	-0,2%	1,4%	-0,5%
N. Caucasus	979	2494	1,4%	-0,5%	0,6%	0,0%	3,0%	0,2%	1,7%	-0,1%	1,5%	-0,4%
An ethnic autonomy	921	2319	1,3%	-0,6%	0,7%	0,1%	3,0%	0,2%	1,7%	-0,1%	1,4%	-0,5%
N. Caucasus – outside an ethnic autonomy	58	175	3,0%	1,0%	-0,8%	-1,4%	3,5%	0,6%	2,4%	0,6%	3,1%	1,2%
Transcaucasia	190	402	3,0%	1,0%	-0,2%	-0,8%	2,0%	-0,8%	1,2%	-0,6%	0,8%	-1,1%
Azerbaijan	73	234	4,3%	2,4%	-0,2%	-0,8%	3,6%	0,7%	1,6%	-0,2%	1,2%	-0,6%
Georgia	117	169	2,0%	0,1%	-0,2%	-0,7%	0,5%	-2,2%	0,7%	-1,1%	0,2%	-1,6%

Region	Population (thousands)		Average annual growth rates and estimated net migration rates									
	1926	1989	1926-1939	Migr.	1939-1959	Migr.	1959-1970	Migr.	1970-1979	Migr.	1979-1989	Migr.
USSR	481	1435	2,0%		0,2%		3,5%		2,1%		2,3%	
Russia	479	1343	1,8%	-0,1%	-1,8%	-2,0%	6,8%	3,2%	2,3%	0,2%	2,3%	0,0%
Outside the Caucasus Region	11	210	2,9%	0,9%	14,3%	14,0%	-7,4%	-10,5%	2,7%	0,6%	5,1%	2,7%
N. Caucasus	468	1225	2,0%	0,0%	-1,9%	-2,1%	6,7%	3,1%	2,1%	-0,1%	1,9%	-0,4%
An ethnic autonomy	450	1099	1,7%	-0,2%	-1,8%	-2,0%	6,3%	2,7%	1,9%	-0,2%	1,8%	-0,5%
N. Caucasus – outside an ethnic autonomy	18	127	6,2%	4,2%	-3,2%	-3,5%	12,1%	8,3%	3,5%	1,3%	2,7%	0,4%

Concluding this historical preview we can point to the following main migration flows, which were active till the end of the Soviet era:

Due to urbanization and industrialization Russians moved to national autonomies and republics; later, due to increased skills of locals and due to their demographic and political pressure Russian flows changed their direction to Central Russia and the Western USSR

Due to demographic and economic pressure and improved ties to the rest of the USSR, natives of all the national autonomies and republics continuously moved to Russian territories both in the Caucasus and beyond

As a rule, Caucasian nationals were continuously departing from the national autonomies and republics of other Caucasians

In fact, these migrations did not stop after the break-up of Soviet Union. In contrast, they were even reinforced by the independence attained by national republics, by rising interethnic tensions, and by the economic deterioration of the former USSR and, especially, of its national republics. As before, the Transcaucasian states and the North Caucasian republics remain sources of demographic pressure and economic out migration as well as of Russian outflow.

## 2. Post soviet migration determinants in the Caucasus region: Overview

After the dissolution of the USSR economic devastation hit all the former Union. Yet, the crisis was by far more devastating in the Asian and Southern Republics [World Bank 1994; Eurostat 1994; Statistical Committee of the CIS 1994, 1996, 2000; Institute for Social-Economic Research. 1995, 1996; UNDP 1997; Iontsev and Sagradov 2002; Goskomstat of Russia. 2003a; Granberg and Zaitseva 2003] (see some indicators in table 10).

Index	GDP annual growth rate (%)	Average annual inflation (%)	Retail sales index (1990=100)	Human Development Index	Average monthly wages	Percentage of Population not	Unemployment rate (estimate).
Year	1980-93	1984-94	1993	1994	1995	1995	2003
Azerbaijan	-4.5	122.8	17.1	0.636	14	11.70%	
Armenia	-14.8	136.6	13.5	0.651	15	30.80%	
Georgia	-9.4	228.3	4.7	0.637		29.70%	
Russia	-1.8	124.3	60.6	0.792	117	21.20%	4.00%
South Federal District							5.50%
Adygeya							6.60%
Dagestan				0.682			7.40%
Ingushetia				0.663			14.70%
Kabardino-Balkaria				0.706			8.00%
Kalmykia				0.677			8.00%
Karachayevo-Cherkesia							6.30%
Ossetia				0.702			5.30%
Chechen Rep.							18.20%
Krasnodar kr.				0.721			2.10%
Stavropol kr.				0.737			1.60%

The economic differences were pushing migrants from Transcaucasia and the Asian Republics of the USSR to Russia and the Western Republics. The importance of economic differentials in shaping migration flows has been stressed elsewhere [e.g. Institute for Social-Economic Research. 1995, 1996; Denisenko 1996; Ostrozhny 1997; Rashidkhanova et. al. 1997; Iontsev and Sagradov 2002]. Looking for better economic opportunities, people move both from the Transcaucasia and the North Caucasian republics of Russia. Many of them find their destination in the Russian krais of the Caucasus. The Russian Caucasus also received migrants from Asian Republics of the former USSR, northern Russia, the Siberia, and the Far East. At the same time, as in the period before, it was a net sender to Central Russia and the Byelorussia [Statistical Committee of the CIS 1995; Goskomstat of Russia. 2000, 2003b]. Indeed, migration flows clearly indicate relative economic development of different regions of the former USSR: Transcaucasian states send migrants to all Russian territories including Siberia and the Far East; and the Northern Caucasus is a net receiver of migrants from the Siberia and the Far East and a sender to other regions.

The ethnic dimension of Caucasian migrations is of high importance. Ethnic conflicts, political destabilization, and ethnic intolerance pushed many Soviet peoples from territories dominated by others. The 1990s became a decade of massive return of Russians from national republics. As it was mentioned above, this process originated during Soviet times, yet, the first half of the 1990s witnessed a huge growth of Russian emigration from former Republics [Danilova and Denisenko 1996; Iontsev and Sagradov 2002; Center for Human Demography and Ecology 1997, 2000, 2002; UN 2002]. Between 1989 and 1995 the Russian population of Armenia lost 56% due to migration. Azerbaijan and Georgia lost 42% and 39% of their Russian populations respectively. Many of these Russians as well as those coming from the Kazakhstan and Central Asia were settling in Northern Caucasian krays. Russians were not the only nationality to immigrate from the former republics. Rather, almost all Northern Caucasian nationalities were fleeing to Russia. Even more, many Transcaucasians residing in Central Asian republics and the Kazakhstan had also moved to Russia. Azeris present a good example: their net migration from Russia to Azerbaijan 1989-1995 was compensated by immigration to Russia from beyond the Russia and Azerbaijan. The extreme growth of emigration of not-titular nationalities from national republics was due to both economic devastation and the rise of ethnic consciousness after independence. Similar processes, though at a less strength, took place in Northern Caucasian Republics, pushing Russians to Caucasian krays and elsewhere to Russia.

In many places strong ethnic tensions and conflicts added to other factors pushing 'non-locals' to emigrate. Armenian-Azeri, Ossetian-Georgian, and Abkhazian-Georgian conflicts did not just result in massive refugee and displaced persons movement. They also highly suppressed the economy of the regions involved and all the Transcaucasia, providing the ground for further out migration. In Russia, the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and the long-lasting Chechen campaign were sources of refugees and internally displaced persons [Iontsev 1996; Vasilyeva 1997; Regent 1998; UN 2002].

By the end of the 1990s emigrational escape from the former republics had stabilized at a level lower than that of the beginning of the decade but considerably higher compared to Soviet times. At the same time the levels of in-migration and out migration alone were lowering, which reflected the loosening of ties between the former republics of the Union. Rates of emigration out the former USSR also passed through fast growth at the beginning of 1990s and later stabilized. As everywhere in the former USSR, these flows in the Caucasus region were determined by 'return' to national states of Germans, Jews (and those close to Jews, i.e. Tats, Georgian Jews, Mountain Jews, etc.), and Greeks. Germany, Israel, and the USA were main attractors of those emigrants. Armenians and Russians also have a remarkable impact on emigration to the West. Armenians' emigration is facilitated by strong Armenian Diaspora in the US and by weak economic conditions in Armenia.

Following we will discuss recent migration trends and their prospects by different Caucasian territories.


### **3. Transcaucasia**

#### **3.1. Post soviet trends of economic migration from the Transcaucasia**

It is difficult to separate 'pure' economic migration factors from those of a non-economic nature. A political crisis leads usually to economic deterioration and, hence, stimulates 'economic' out-migration from a region. The problem of separating economic and non-economic migrations is especially difficult for post Soviet Transcaucasia, which was marked by both economic devastation and ethnic-political conflicts. Despite that, it can be stated for sure that economic factors were of major importance in migration development of the region as well as on the post Soviet space as a whole [Iontsev and Sagradov 2002]. Surveys among migrants had also supported this view. While at the beginning of the 1990s migrants from the Transcaucasia claimed the worsening of interethnic relations as the main reason for departing from the region, later economic reasons and reasons indirectly related to economic motives were indicated to be the main factors of emigration (migrations were claimed to be related to "job", to "returning to the previous place of residence", to "private and family matters", etc.) [Statistical Committee of the CIS 1992; Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 2001; Goskomstat of Russia 2000, 2003b].


As was mentioned before, negative net migration of the Transcaucasian republics was established long before the ethnic conflicts occurred. The migration balance was negative both for Russians and natives, which indicates the existence of stable economic-demographic differentials pushing the migrants from the Transcaucasia. After the Soviet dissolution, net emigration soared up – partly due to political instability and partly due to the economic collapse of Transcaucasian states. Political factors were of critical importance as is indicated by migration peaks at times of ethnic conflicts and by increasing numbers of refugees. Yet, economic migrations were also being developed as the region fall into an economic crisis much deeper than in traditional regions of emigration (Russia, Ukraine, and western republics of the former USSR). Real GDP per capita was about \$1,500 in the Transcaucasian states in 1994 while it was \$2,718 in Ukraine, \$4,878 in Russia, and about \$20,000 in developed countries [UNDP 1997]. This is why emigration from the region continued even after the ethnic-political crises were calmed [UN 2002]. Some changes in post Soviet economic migrations occurred however. While all three Transcaucasian nationalities were leaving the region before the Soviet dissolution, only Armenians and Georgians seem to continue leaving their countries in 1990s. Azerbaijan had a positive net migration balance of Azeri population with Russia [Statistical Committee of the CIS 1995; Danilova and Denisenko 1996]. This can

be attributed both to the relative stability of the Azerbaijan economy, and to well-established Armenian Diaspora in Russia, which facilitates Armenian immigration. Nonetheless, Azeri Diaspora in Russia had also grown in 1990s due to migration from Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Armenia [Danilova and Denisenko 1996].



**Fig. 1.** Post soviet migration trends for the Transcaucasian region (estimates based on official migration data of Russia and other migration partners of the region)

Post Soviet economic factors had both positive and negative effect on migration from Transcaucasia. On the one hand, demographic-economic differentials pushed people from the region to Russia. On the other hand, movement through newly established boundaries without granted job and housing opportunities became more and more difficult and costly. That is why migration intensity was slowing down in the late 1990<sup>s</sup>, see figure 1 [Goskomstat of Russia. 2000, 2001, 2003; UN 2002]. Anyway, the 1990s became a decade of spectacular population drain from the region. Having populations of 7,021, 3,305, and 5,401 millions in 1989, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia lost since then about 662, 258, and 521 thousands through migration (according to the available migration statistics only). Perhaps, population losses of these countries were even higher. According to the Census 2002, Georgia lost about a million (!) compared to 1989 figures. Hereinafter we rely on UN and Russian migration data, which seem to be more accurate than the national migration statistics of the Transcaucasian republics. The UN provides estimates up to 1998 of migration flows between the Transcaucasia and the rest of the World [UN 2002], while for later years only Russian statistics are available. As Russia was the main but not the only migration target for the region, Russian migration figures were corrected in order to roughly estimate migrations to/from other regions. Correction coefficients were derived from the data for 1996-1998. After its temporary peak in 1990, the rate of immigration to the region fell quickly to the level below that of the pre-reform time. Outmigration followed the same trend with a lag, which can be attributed to the prolonged wave of economic emigration from the region. Since 1997 Russia is registering only those migrants from the CIS, which change their residence for more than 1.5 months. This could partly explain the accelerated shortening of the registered number of migrants after 1996. In explaining the decrease of out migration rates from the Transcaucasia, the Russian economic crisis of 1998 should also be taken into account.



**Fig. 2.** Post soviet migration trends for the Transcaucasian region (estimates based on official migration data of Russia and other migration partners of the region after corrections for underestimation made for years after 2000)

The notable decrease in the numbers of migrants from the Transcaucasia to Russia at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century can be attributed to the strengthening of migrants' registration procedures by Russia. As a matter of fact, the sharp decrease in official immigration numbers is explained by applying to NIS migrants procedures similar to those applied to 'far foreigners' after October 1, 2000. After appropriate corrections made for under the registration of immigrants [Mkrtchan 2003] it could be argued that there was no actual fall in immigration numbers after 2000. Trends reflecting corrections made by [Mkrtchan 2003] for 2000 and similar corrections applied to 2001 are presented on figure 2.

The general trend presented on figure 2 masks specific profiles of the Transcaucasian states. Migration trends for these states with corrections made for 2000 and 2001 are presented on figures 3-5. Specific country profiles reflect not only the economic and ethnic differences. They also reflect political history of a country.

Figure 3 presents recent migration trends for the Azerbaijan. For years 1989-1996 data from sources outside the Transcaucasia were combined with data from Armenian sources [UN 2002]. The Azerbaijan Republic, which is the most populated country of the region, passed through the violent seven-year war over its region of Nagorny Karabakh (1988-1994). The rise of Armenian-Azeri tensions on the eve of Soviet dissolution, long-lasting war over the Nagorno-Karabakhskaya ASSR of the Azerbaijan, and economic devastation of the whole region led to an enormous increase of emigration from the Azerbaijan. Even inflows of Azeri from Armenia did not compensate for the emigration. Immigration to the republic increased at the beginning of the period, due to the exodus of Azeri from Armenia, and declined afterwards at a fast pace. A remarkable feature of the Azerbaijan post Soviet migration trend is that by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century out migration had fallen to a level much lower than that of the late 1980s and even of earlier Soviet times. Azerbaijan was the only Transcaucasian state, which had positive net migration from Russia of its native ethnic group (Azeri) in 1989-



1995. At the same time, Azerbaijan was under the highest in CIS pressure of refugees and internally displaced persons as it is described below in the section concerned forced migration.






Fig. 3. Post soviet migration trends for the Azerbaijan

The Armenian picture differs remarkably from those of Azerbaijan and Georgia as it is presented on figure 4. Note that for the years 1989-1996 we used both the UN estimate based on migration statistics of Russia and other countries and on Armenian national statistics [UN 2002]. The outbreak of the Karabakh conflict in neighboring Azerbaijan and economic devastation followed the earthquake, Soviet dissolution and economic blockade by the Azerbaijan caused an rise of both emigration and immigration to Armenia during the first post reform years. Later the rate of immigration decreased at a very fast pace, while economic out migration (mostly to Russia) continued. After a temporary decrease caused presumably by Russian immigration regulations and the economic crisis of 1998, official emigration from Armenia was rising to levels much higher than during the Soviet period. Note that it was the year of economic and political crisis marked by the Prime Minister's assassination (1999), when the emigration rate started to rise again. Many Armenian emigrants settled in other Caucasian regions – Krasnodarsky and Stavroplsky krays.

Georgia experienced two military conflicts on its territory, which started at the beginning of 1990s and caused severe political and economic crisis in the country. Worsening economic and political conditions pushed both Russians and Georgians from the republic. While there were Russians who left Georgia at the very beginning of the crisis (in 1989-1995 134,100 out of 274,800 net migrants from the republic were Russians), Georgians dominated out migration afterwards. Russians counted only about 25,000 in 194,000 migrants from Georgia to Russia in 1996-2000. In total, Russians counted about 159 thousands of 469 thousands of migrants from Georgia to Russia in 1989-2000, while the 1989 Census counted 264 thousands of Russians in the Republic (beyond the Abkhazia and South Ossetia). It seems that the migration from the Georgia has been stabilized finally at a level close to that of the Soviet time.



**Fig. 4.** Post soviet migration trends for the Armenia



**Fig. 5.** Post soviet migration trends for the Georgia


Transcaucasian migration flows had a serious effect on the ethnic composition of the Transcaucasian states and their migration partners. Almost all Azeri fled Armenia and Armenians fled from the Azerbaijan. As was mentioned above, many Russians from all the Transcaucasian states left for Russia. As for Azeri and Armenians residing in Georgia, lack of Georgian migration statistics prevents concluding about their possible migration to their own ethnic state. Yet, available Georgian statistics suggest that Azeri and Armenian populations of Georgia were only a little smaller in 1992 than in 1989 [Eurostat 1994]. According to the 2002 census of Georgia, there are about 433 thousand Muslims in the country, which means that most of Georgian Azeri did not leave the republic. As for Armenians, according to the Census 2002, about 232 thousands non-Orthodox Christians reside in Georgia, while the 1989 Census counted 437 thousands Armenians. According to Russian statistics, many Armenians left Georgia for Russia (44 thousands in 1989-1995). Hence, well above 100 thousands Armenians are likely to left Georgia to Armenia.

Flows to Russia are well documented by Russian statistics. These statistics are not comprehensive, however. In 1989-2000, for example, about 159 thousands of 264 thousands of Russians counted by 1989 Census left the Georgia to Russia. But the Georgian Census 2002 counted only about 5 thousands of non-Georgian Orthodox. Similar figures follow from

the results of the Azerbaijan 1999 census. Most likely this means a serious under estimation of Russian immigration from Georgia and from the Transcaucasia as a whole. Yet, Russian statistics enables tracking general trends in ethnic migrations from the Transcaucasia to Russia after 1989 as is presented in tables 11 to 14.

Russians and Ukrainians were leaving all the Transcaucasia after the Soviet crash (see table 11 and figure 6). On a percentage basis Armenia seems to loose Russians at a higher rate. According to the Russian statistics, Russia was left with about 70% of its 1989 population by 2003, while Azerbaijan and Georgia lost about half of their Russian populations.

Region	Census 1989	Net migration to Russia in 1989-1995			1999	2000	2002
		thousands	% of 1989	annual rate			
<b>Transcaucasia</b>	<b>878</b>	349,9	40%	49,986	5,916	5,777	2,996
Azerbaijan	425	172,6	41%	24,657	2,354	1,888	1,287
Armenia	60	30,3	51%	4,329	0,718	0,64	0,343
Georgia	394	147,0	37%	21,000	2,844	3,249	1,366



**Fig. 6.** Emigration of Russians from the Transcaucasian states to RF in 1989-2002 [Center for Human Demography and Ecology 1997, 2000, 2002; Goskomstat of Russia 2000, 2003b].

Azeris, Georgians, and Armenians were also moving to Russia from all the Transcaucasia (tables 12 to 14). Yet, Azeris seem to have a lower level of migration to Russia, and Armenians on the contrary, migrated to Russia at almost the same rate as Russians. Note that figures for 2002 and 2000 could be underestimated due to changes in registration procedures in Russia as was mentioned above.

Region	Census 1989	Net migration to Russia in 1989-1995			1999	2000	2002
		thousands	% of 1989	annual rate			
<b>Transcaucasia</b>	<b>6197</b>	8,9	0%	1,271	7,236	8,066	1,465
Azerbaijan	5805	-1,2	0%	-0,171	6,457	7,057	1,263
Armenia	85	1,3	2%	0,186	0,135	0,128	0,027
Georgia	308	8,8	3%	1,257	0,644	0,881	0,175

Region	Census 1989	Net migration to Russia in 1989-1995			1999	2000	2002
		thousands	% of 1989	annual rate			
<b>Transcaucasia</b>	<b>6197</b>	8,9	0%	1,271	7,236	8,066	1,465
Azerbaijan	5805	-1,2	0%	-0,171	6,457	7,057	1,263
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Region	Census 1989	Net migration to Russia in 1989-1995			1999	2000	2002
		thousands	% of 1989	annual rate			
<b>Transcaucasia</b>	<b>3803</b>	21,6	1%	3,086	2,851	3,589	1,073
Azerbaijan	14	0,4	3%	0,057	0,021	0,024	0,012
Armenia	1	0,3	22%	0,043	0,024	0,029	0,014
Georgia	3787	20,9	1%	2,986	2,806	3,536	1,047

As a result of post Soviet migrations, Transcaucasian states became more uniform, while many people of their native ethnic groups (Armenians, mostly) moved from the region to Russia and other states. Georgians comprised 83.8% of the Georgian 2002 population, while their 1989 share was 73.7% (without autonomies taken into account). The same figures for Azeris in Azerbaijan are 90.6% (1999) and 82.7% (1989).

The main demographic-economic determinants of Transcaucasian migrations still remain in force and seem likely to result in a considerable migration to Russia from the region in the future. The level of economic out-migration will crucially depend on economic conditions and migration policy of Russia on the one hand and on economic development of the region itself on the other.

### **3.2. Economic prospects and their implications to future migration in Transcaucasia**

Prospects of economic migrations in the Transcaucasia are critically dependent on the economic development of the region. Economic development, in its turn, depends on political

circumstances. There is no visible way of solving the territorial problems of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the short term. Most likely, this will suppress economic cooperation and development in the region. There is a great hope for infrastructural projects promoted by the US and EU, however. Azerbaijan and Georgia could considerably benefit from Transcaucasian and Central Asian oil and gas transportation projects supported by the US. The TRASECA – another prominent infrastructural project promoted by the European countries – could also be a source of economic growth for the region. The largest economy of the region – Azerbaijan – seems to benefit from these infrastructural projects and to be closely related to western economies. It means that despite its highest demographic pressure, Azerbaijan, which already has the lowest migration rate to Russia, will send even fewer migrants to Russia. Economic relief in Georgia, which would lower emigration incentives in the country, depends on both the success of these projects and on political stability in Georgia itself. Participation and benefits of Armenia will probably depend on its relations with Azerbaijan. In any case, given the historical and recent trends in Armenian migrations, it seems that Armenian migration to Russia will not lower in near future.

### **3.3. Trends and prospects of emigration to the Developed Countries**

Although, Russia – followed by the Ukraine – was the main target for migrants from the Transcaucasia, post Soviet emigration to ‘old’ foreign countries is also remarkable. As anywhere in the former USSR, ‘far’ emigration was mostly determined by the ‘return’ of Germans, Jews, and Greeks to their ethnic states.

The largest Jewish minority was in the Azerbaijan (about 41 thousands in 1989) and Georgia (25). That is why emigration to Israel was of a notable size in these countries. Between 1990 and 1997 about 30 thousands immigrated from Azerbaijan to Israel and about two thousands left to Russia, i.e. most of the Azerbaijan Jewish population have left the republic. Almost half of this out migration took place in 1990-1991 alone. Georgia, which was in much more severe economic crisis, lost almost all of its Jewish population (about 20 thousands left to Israel in 1990-1998 and about a thousand to Russia).

In 1989 the German minority was of notable size in Georgia only (about 1.5 thousands) after the deportation of Germans during Stalin’s time they did not return to the Transcaucasia (in 1939 there were about 45 thousands Germans in the region, namely in Azerbaijan and Georgia). No doubt, almost all of them have already left for Germany.

About 100 thousands Greeks resided in Georgia in 1989 and about 5 thousands – in Armenia. In 1990-1993 alone 2,627 migrants left Armenia for Greece according to the incomplete Armenian statistics. We have no data for Georgia, but there is a little doubt that most Greeks have left the republic.

Hence, it seems that traditional ethnic migration sources to the West and the Middle East have already been exhausted. After the ethnic emigration waves had gone, the USA became the main migration target for the Transcaucasia as a whole and especially for Armenians. More than 40 thousands left Armenia to the US in 1987-1991 [Statistical Committee of the CIS 1995] and about 23 thousands – in 1992-1998 [UN 2002].

The size of emigration to the Western developed countries from the Transcaucasia will depend on migration regulations of receiving countries only. Even on completing the Transcaucasian and Central Asian infrastructural projects it is unlikely that migration to the west will outnumber migration to Russia. Yet, the role of western migrations will be more and more important for the region.

### **3.4. Transcaucasian ethnic conflicts and tensions as a source of forced migration in both the Transcaucasia and the Russian Caucasus**

Transcaucasia passed through a series of violent ethnic conflicts in the late Soviet period and after the dissolution of the USSR. These conflicts were especially brutal for Azerbaijan and Georgia, which were involved in conflicts on their own territory and suffered from territorial losses and enormous number of refugees and internally displaced persons. The Armenian republic was involved in the conflict over the Nagorny Karabakh in neighboring Azerbaijan and received many refugees from Azerbaijan. Following we will discuss effects of each conflict of the region separately.

#### **3.4.1. Nagorny Karabakh**

Since the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Turk and Iranian Armenians were moved to Transcaucasia, Azeri-Armenian relations were marked by massacres and territorial confrontations. Some anti-Azeri massacres, which were most brutal, happened at the beginning of the Soviet time, although in later years Soviets succeed in appeasing the situation and eliminating the open confrontation. Nonetheless, estimates provided above suggest that almost throughout the entire Soviet time Azeri and Armenians were leaving their respective republics: the Azeri population of Armenia lost about 72% of its size due to migration in 1926-1989, while the Armenian population of Azerbaijan lost about the half of its size. In 1988, after Armenia's demand for uniting with the Karabakh, many Azeris fled from Armenia and conflict broke out over the region of Nagorny Karabakh, which declared its independence of Azerbaijan. According to the 1989 Soviet Census, Armenians made up 77% of the NK population (145 thousands), Azeri – 22% (41 thousands), and Russians – 1% (2 thousands). As a result of the confrontation over the Karabakh and seizure of six more regions of Azerbaijan about 20,000 Azeris and 4,000 Armenians perished and many people were deprived of their homes [Tishkov 1999]. By 1994 about 201,000 refugees fled from

Armenia to Azerbaijan, and about 662,000 were internally displaced by 1996. Armenia received about 300,000 refugees from the Azerbaijan by the end of 1992. About 60,000 Azeris returned to their homes afterwards [Tishkov 1999]. After the ceasefire achieved in May 1994, the situation was frozen without visible solution found. On the eve of the 21<sup>st</sup> century about 280,000 refugees remained in Armenia and about 192,000 refugees and 570,000 displaced persons in Azerbaijan [UN 2002]. Following the conflict and worsened economic conditions many migrants left the region for Russia. In 1989-1995 Russia received 91,200 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 1,300 Azeri from Armenia. Russian refugees were also fleeing the region: by the beginning of 2000, 58,156 forced migrants from Azerbaijan were registered in Russia as well as 3,781 from Armenia. In 1989-1994 164,300 Russians left Azerbaijan for Russia and 28,600 left Armenia.

Peace talks on the Karabakh did not produced a viable solution for the problem and were postponed indefinitely in June 2001. Till now, political interests of the republics involved and of third parties (Russia, US, EC, Turkey, and Iran) have resulted in an increase in military power in the region and in continuing economic and political separation of the region. The deep rooted nature of the conflict and diverging interests of world and regional powers leave little chance for a peaceful reconciliation in the region. At the same time, economic, military and political weakness of both sides and their interest in economic development, with a special emphasis on the Transcaucasian infrastructural and energetic projects, make a military development of the situation less probable too. Hence, it looks likely that the situation will be frozen for an indefinite time, leaving the refugees' and displaced persons' problems unsolved. Therefore, it is unlikely that backward migrations of forced migrants to their homes will occur. At the same time, this means that considerable stocks of future emigration will persist among forced migrants. Given the country migration profiles presented above and the alliance between Russia and Armenia, many Armenian refugees could in time join the Armenian Diaspora of Russia.

#### **3.4.2. South Ossetia and Abkhazia**

The second ethnic conflict in post soviet Transcaucasia – in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast of Georgia – started in 1990. There were about 1,100 casualties of the conflict [Tishkov 1999]. Although the situation was appeased later, there was found no 'ultimate' solution for the problem of S.-Ossetian independence, and the conflict left many refugees from Georgia in Russia and many internally displaced persons in Georgia. By the end of the 1990s about 26,000 refugees from Georgia were still in Russia, most of them – in North Ossetia [UN 2002]. The total number of refugees and forced migrants that came to Russia from Georgia till 2000 was 69,900. 40,846 of these resided in the North Caucasus [Goskomstat of Russia 2000].

Another ethnic conflict, which also had a profound impact on the political and economic devastation in Georgia, broke out in 1992 in the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic. It was more aggressive and lasted longer than the S.-Ossetian conflict (about 12,000 casualties [Tishkov 1999]). Although Georgians outnumbered Abkhazians in 1989, due to the weakness of the Georgia and involvement of Russia in the conflict, they were defeated and many Georgians were displaced from Abkhazia. In 1993 about 300,000 Georgians were expelled from the Abkhazia [UN 2002]. By the end of 2000, 272,100 persons remained displaced in Georgia, which well corresponds to entire Georgian population of S. Ossetia and Abkhazia [UN 2002].

Prospects for the reconciliation of conflicts in Georgia as well as those of Karabakh are affected by the play of interests of external forces (Russia, US, and EU) and by the weakness of the Transcaucasian republic. Both regions seeking for independence from Georgia have borders with Russia and close ties to some of the Northern Caucasian ethnic groups (South Ossetians to North Ossetians and Abkhazians to Abazins, Adygeys, Cherkesses and Kabardins), which helps in maintaining economic independence. Successful implementation of the Transcaucasian infrastructural and energy projects, involvement of the region in closer economic ties with Western Europe, and economic development of Georgia could affect considerably the situation and stimulate the peace process. Yet, there are no signs of such a progress that could reverse the forced migrations in Georgia. Again, under the indefinite prolongation of the crises, Georgian refugees and forced migrants in both Russia and Georgia itself will be an important source of economic migration.

### **3.4.3. The problem of Meskhetian Turks and Kurds**

Unlike many other peoples, the Meskhetian Turks deported by Stalin and Beria in 1944 were never returned back to their homeland in south Georgia. After brutal interethnic clashes and massacres in Uzbekistan in 1989, Meskhetians fled to Russia. At the very beginning Soviet authorities directed them to Krasnodarsky Krai but later the refugees were settled in central Russia. Georgia insisted that Meskhetians should claim themselves Georgians and be ready to be spread all over Georgia in order to get permission for return to Georgia. As many Meskhetians rejected these preconditions they were forced to stay in Russia. Nonetheless, their legal status in Russia was uncertain and their rights have often been violated – especially in the Krasnodarsky Krai [e.g. Osipov and Cherepova 1996]. Under the pressure of ethnic intolerance, in the 1990s the Meskhetian Turks start leaving Russia and many of them were received by Azerbaijan. At the beginning of 1996 there were 29,076 Meskhetian refugees in the Azerbaijan republic [Statistical Committee of the CIS 1996]. At the end of the 1990s out of a total 206,000-280,000 Meskhetians about 70,000 lived in Azerbaijan; 90,000 lived in Kazakhstan; 50,000-70,000 in Russia; 30,000 in Kyrgyzstan; 15,000 in Uzbekistan; and 7,000 in Ukraine [Osipov and Cherepova 1996]. It is very likely



that Meskhetian immigration to Azerbaijan will continue, and most likely Meskhetians will come there from the Central Asia (from Uzbekistan in particular). Central Asian and Transcaucasian infrastructural projects could only facilitate this immigration. As for the possible return to Georgia it depends most of all on the position of Georgia, which is unlikely to be changed.

Kurds were partly deported with Meskhetians and alike them were not returned back to the Caucasus. In 1989 of 153,000 Soviet Kurds, 102,000 resided in the Transcaucasia (12,000, 56,000, and 33,000 in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia respectively). It seems that Azerbaijan is a receiving country for Kurds too. By 1996 there were 9,866 Kurd refugees in Azerbaijan. Given the stock of about 50,000 Kurds outside Transcaucasia and Russia, there is a considerable potential for Kurdish immigration to Azerbaijan in the future.

#### **4. Northern Caucasus migrations in post Soviet period**

##### **4.1. Economic migrations**

The post Soviet economic crisis had a profound effect on migrations in the North Caucasus. While during the Soviet time urbanization was advanced in the entire region, the economic crisis reversed the trend, and the share of urban population in almost all the territories of the North Caucasus was decreasing or stagnating [Goskomstat of Russia 2001, 2003b], see figure 7.

At the same time, at the end of 1990s there were signs of a new urbanization wave – at least in the Eastern Caucasus, which experienced higher demographic pressure from the country (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and neighboring Stavropolsky Krai). It is notable that the capital cities of all the Eastern Caucasian territories had grown remarkably in 1989-2003: people are moving from the country and from small cities to capital cities, where job opportunities are usually more available (Chechnya seems to be the only exception from the rule), see table 15 [Goskomstat of Russia. 1998, 2002]. The industrialized capital of the South Federal District – Rostov-Na-Donu – has also attracted many migrants from the region and beyond. It seems that the capital cities of western Caucasian Autonomies (Maikop and Cherkessk) did not experience outstanding growth due to both a lesser demographic pressure and outflow of Russians.




Fig. 7. Dynamics of Urban population's share in the North Caucasus in 1959-2002

	1897	1926	1939	1959	1970	1979	1989	1997	2002 <sup>*</sup>
Maikop	34	53	56	82	110	128	149	166	162
Makhachkala	10	34	87	119	178	241	304	338	467
Nalchik	5	13	48	88	146	207	234	236	274
Cherkessk	11	19	29	42	67	91	113	120	116
Vladikavkaz	44	78	131	164	236	279	300	314	315
Grozny	16	97	172	250	341	375	400	n. a.	223
Stavropol	42	59	85	141	198	258	318	345	355
Krasnodar	66	153	193	313	460	560	621	650	645
Rostov	119	308	510	600	789	934	1019	1023	1070

\* Preliminary results of the Russian Census 2002

As everywhere in the former USSR, interregional migration flows in the Caucasus region were determined, first of all, by economic factors. As was already mentioned, the following migration patterns characterized the Northern Caucasus before the Soviet dissolution: both Russians and natives were leaving Caucasian Autonomies to Caucasian Krays and from the Caucasus as a whole to central and western parts of the Russia and the USSR; Georgians and – especially – Armenians were moving from the Transcaucasia to the Northern Caucasus (to its Krays in particular). Perhaps, Azeris were also migrating to the region from the Transcaucasia: the question is not clear as their migration pattern resembled that of N. Caucasians due to a large Azeri minority in Dagestan.

At the end of the Soviet time N. Caucasians had large populations outside the region (both due to forced Soviet deportations and economic migrations). In addition to having remarkable stocks outside the Caucasus, several North Caucasian peoples had sizable populations in the Caucasus outside their autonomy. In 1989 about 236,000 Dagestanis resided in the Transcaucasia (232,000 in Azerbaijan and 4,000 in Georgia), most of them were Lezgs (171,000 in Azerbaijan), Avars (44,000 in Azerbaijan and 4,000 in Georgia) and Czakhurs (13,000 in Azerbaijan). Ossetians were split between the North Ossetia (Russia) and the South Ossetia (Georgia). Soviet dissolution and the following rise of national conciseness and intolerance as well as economic devastation in Southern and Asian republics and in Russian North and East added to the picture, fostering the escape of Russians and N. Caucasians from the national republics and devastated territories. During a single year (1993)

Chukotsky AO lost 10% of its population, Magadan Oblast and Koryaksky NO – 6%, Kamchatskaya Oblast and Northern Krasnoyarsky Krai – 4% [Zayonchkovskaya 1994]. The level of Russian and native emigration from the Transcaucasia has already been mentioned. Similar patterns characterized the republics of Central Asia and the Kazakhstan. Recent migration patterns of N. Caucasian territories are presented in table 16 [Goskomstat of Russia, 2003b].

	Net Migration (total)	Net Migration from the rest of Russia	Net Migration from the CIS (except Russia)	Net migration from the 'Far abroad'
Adygeya	1778	1231	661	-114
Dagestan	-4842	-5298	556	-100
Ingushetia	799	784	15	-
Kabardino-Balkaria	-2033	-1980	257	-310
Karachay-Cherkessia	-2099	-2344	255	-10
North Ossetia	-957	-2365	1481	-73
Chechnya	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Krasnodarsky Kr.	11627	8414	5156	-1943
Stavropolsky Kr.	3789	2414	2318	-943

While Russian North and East and Asian Republics were intensively losing their population through migration, Krasnodarsky and Stavropolsky Krays experienced migrational 'explosion'; receiving many economic and forced migrants from both abroad and the Caucasian Autonomies. Until 1998 the natural decrease of the population of Krasnodarsky and Stavropolsky Krays was overcompensated by immigration. Later decreases of the migration rate and growth of the natural decrease rate resulted in net population decrease (since 1998 in Krasnodarsky Krai and since 1999 in Stavropolsky Krai) [Ostrozhny 1997; Goskomstat of Russia 2001; Vitkovskaya 2002]. Although the migration 'explosion' in Caucasian Krays seems to be gone, immigration from national regions and the Russian North and East will continue. Most of the immigrants to the Russian Krays are Russians (70.2% in Stavropolye, 74.7% in Krasnodarye, and 58.9% in Rostovskaya Oblast as of 1997). Yet, a considerable part of migrants are non-Slavs and most of them are Armenians (14.1%, 11.5%, and 14.3% respectively). Non-Slavic immigration was always attracting attention of the public and policymakers in the region. All Russian territories of the North Caucasus have adopted many regulations aimed at preventing this kind of migration arguing that non-Slavs harm the socio-economic and criminal conditions of their regions [Vasilyeva 1997]. Just recently Stavropolsky Krai has adopted a legislation "On measures for preventing illegal immigration", which includes a sentence: "Migration to the Stavropolsky Krai is of a regulated nature and allowed to such an extent that the geopolitical situation, economic and social conditions can permit fulfillment of the rights and liberties of legally residing civilians and of the state and public security". The legislation gives local authorities of the Krai a right

to determine quotas for yearly migration to the Krai and its territories. The legislation was unsuccessfully filed to the Court by the Krays Public Prosecution as contradicting the Federal Constitution. In addition to the legal pressure, immigrants are also affected by hostile actions from nationalistic organizations of different kinds [e.g. Osipov and Cherepova 1996; Vasilyeva 1997]. As a result of ethnic intolerance, many Meskhetians (fled to the region from the Central Asia) left for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. It is also notable that while there was an influx of Russians to the Caucasian Krays (both from the CIS States, Chechnya, and other Caucasian Republics), N. Caucasians avoided settling in Stavropolsky and Krasnodarsky Krays (this applies both to economic migrants and replaced persons) [Ostrozhny 1997; Vitkovskaya 2002] despite common history and close economic ties. Armenians seem to be the only sizable group, which continually migrates to the region despite the legislative and informal barriers that have been adopted. Another notable case of continuing 'national' economic migration is that of Dagestanis to the Eastern districts of Stavropolsky Krai, which is facilitated both by demographic pressure in Dagestan, economic differentials, and a long history of economic migrations in the region. Yet, even in this case the forced reversal migrations of Dagestanis from the Krai were observed [Ilyashenko 2003]. In view of persisting economic and demographic differentials it seems that economic movements to Caucasian Krays will continue despite barriers constructed in those regions.

Northern Caucasian Autonomies, on the one hand, continued losing their population to Caucasian Krays and Central Russia and, on the other hand, were net receivers of migrants from CIS Republics. Russians, feeling less comfortable in 'national' regions and being able to cross migration barriers easier, constituted the bulk of emigrants. Dagestan and former Checheno-Ingushetia seem to have lost most of their Russian populations – both due to high demographic pressure, severe economic conditions and socio-political destabilization. Central and Western Caucasian Autonomies still possess good Slavic stocks in their populations, which continue migrating to the North.

The problem of Russian exodus is often exploited by politicians in order to win the sympathy and – most important – votes of the Russian population. This emigration, however, is of clearly economic nature. Natives are also leaving the autonomies but their emigration rate is checked by both the barriers against the 'Caucasian immigration' to elsewhere and by closer ties to their autonomies (indeed these ties mean ties to close relatives).

The author has conducted a survey among students of the Karachay-Cherkessian State Technological Academy, which is informative on migration attitudes and causes in the region. Students were asked about their willingness to leave the republic on completing their studies and causes of their decision. Additionally, they were asked to rank different regions and places according to their attractiveness as a place of permanent residence and to rank different factors according to their importance in migration decision making.

Survey results point to sharp differences in attitudes of Russians and non-Russians on the one hand and on economic determination of emigration decisions on other. Practically all Russians stated their willingness to leave the republic and pointed to economic causes of their decision. They ranked the places of possible residence by their attractiveness as is presented in table 17. It is notable that the Karachay-Cherkess Republic and even the adjacent Stavropolsky Krai were ranked among least desirable places of residence. As for the reasons underlying migration decisions, they were ranked as is presented in table 18. Economic reasons and the absence of interethnic conflicts were stated as most important by Russians while ethnic ties as of least importance.

Non-Russians' priorities were different. Only about a half of them (56.4%) expressed a wish to leave the Republic and their ranks for places and reasons differed from those of Russians substantially (tables 19 and 20). Karachay-Cherkess Republic and Moscow gained their ranks comparing the Russian figures. Yet, European countries led the list of attractiveness for non-Russians too. The list of migration factors explains the lower willingness of non-Russians to leave the republic: relatives and ethnic concerns are of higher importance for them.

It is interesting that regional ranks assigned by those non-Russians who do wish to leave the Republic are closer to the ranks given by those who preferred to stay at home (table 21). Almost the only difference concerns the Karachay-Cherkessia – it has a much lower rank for those who wish to leave. Ranks of migration factors given by non-Russians wishing to leave the Republic indicate that it is the desire for a better job which drives their decision (table 22).

**Table 17. Average ranks of potential places of residence by their attractiveness to respondents in the survey (Russians, rank 1 – for the most attractive place)**

Region	Average Rank
Australia	3,3
Great Britain	3,3
Other European	4,0
France	4,7
Germany	5,2
USA	6,7
Krasnodarsky Krai	7,5
Rostovskaya Oblast	7,8
Moscow	8,2
Stavropolsky Krai	8,5
Other	9,0
Karachay-Cherkess Republic	9,8

**Table 18. Average ranks of reasons affecting migration decisions by their importance to respondents in the survey (Russians, rank 1 – for the most**

<b>Reason</b>	<b>Average Rank</b>
Earning possibilities	2,0
Absence of interethnic conflicts	3,2
Close to friends	3,5
Living near the close relatives	3,7
Absence of crime	5,0
Other	5,2
Population of his/her ethnicity	5,5
Moscow	8,2
Stavropolsky Krai	8,5
Other	9,0
Karachay-Cherkess Republic	9,8

**Table 19. Average ranks of potential places of residence by their attractiveness to respondents in the survey (non-Russians, rank 1 – for the**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Average Rank</b>
France	4,5
Germany	4,9
Karachay-Cherkess Republic	5,0
Great Britain	5,5
Moscow	5,5
Stavropolsky Krai	5,9
USA	6,6
Australia	7,1
Krasnodarsky Krai	7,2
Other European	7,5
Rostovskaya Oblast	7,7
Other	10,6

**Table 20. Average ranks of reasons affecting migration decisions by their importance to respondents in the survey (non-Russians, rank 1 – for the most**

<b>Reason</b>	<b>Average Rank</b>
Living near the close relatives	2,1
Earning possibilities	2,6
Close to friends	3,6
Absence of interethnic conflicts	4,1
Population of his/her ethnicity	4,3
Absence of crime	4,7
Other	6,7

**Table 21. Average ranks of potential places of residence by their attractiveness to respondents in the survey (non-Russians wishing to leave the**

Region	Average Rank
Germany	4,2
France	4,3
Great Britain	5,0
Moscow	5,9
Stavropolsky Krai	6,0
Karachay-Cherkess Republic	6,5
Australia	6,7
USA	6,8
Other European	7,1
Krasnodarsky Krai	7,4
Rostovskaya Oblast	7,9
Other	10,2

**Table 22. Average ranks of reasons affecting migration decisions by their importance to respondents in the survey (non-Russians wishing to leave the**

Reason	Average Rank
Earning possibilities	2,1
Living near the close relatives	2,5
Close to friends	3,4
Absence of interethnic conflicts	4,1
Absence of crime	4,4
Population of his/her ethnicity	4,8
Other	6,8

Similar results were obtained in an out-migrants survey in Dagestan in 1999 [Ilyashenko 2003]. About 30% of Russians and 20% of Dagestanis expressed a wish to leave the Republic. Most popular cause of out-migration was – again – a desire for higher earnings (table 23). At the same time, Russians were more sensitive about political instability as well as ethnic matters.

**Table 23. Distribution of respondents by out-migration causes chosen, (Dagestan, 1999, percents; a respondent could choose more than one relevant causes)**

Cause	All respondents	Dagestani	Russians
There are few earning possibilities	36	37	33
People of my ethnicity find it hard to live in Dagestan	4	3	19
High level of crime, helpless	15	19	16
Political instability, threat of war	19	19	28
Nothing	25	26	3
Could not or do not want to answer	18	18	24

## 4.2. Ethnic migration: consequences of post soviet ethnic fragmentation

As was described above, even economic migrations exhibited ethnic differentials and affected ethnic patterns. In addition to this, some migrations in the region were of clearly ethnic nature and deserve a special attention. In general, these migrations were caused by fragmentation of the former solid Soviet society. Ethnic intolerance and ethnic conflicts added to growing economic differences producing migrations dominated by particular ethnic groups.

### 4.2.1. The heritage: flows of formerly deported N. Caucasians from Central Asia and the Kazakhstan. Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks in the Northern Caucasus

Five of the ten Soviet peoples totally deported under Stalin's rule (Karachays, Chechens, Ingushs, Balkars, Meskhetians) were from the Caucasus region. Another totally deported people (Kalmyks) resided near the region and still many other partially deported nations (Cossacks, Germans, Greeks, Kurds, Hemshins) either resided or had a large stock in the region before deportation. Many of these peoples were not allowed to return to their homes before the Soviet dissolution and even those who were allowed left significant stocks in the regions of their deportation. In addition to those deported, other ethnic groups also had sufficient stocks outside their 'home' territory and the Caucasus as a whole (see table 24).

%% in the Caucasus	1926	1937	1939	1959	1970	1979	1989
Deported N. Caucasians	98	100	97	64	89	89	85
Karachays	100	100	97	85	92	92	92
Chechens	97	100	97	61	91	89	85
Ingushs	100	100	98	51	84	85	83
Balkars	100	100	95	80	87	91	85
Meskhetian Turks		98		1		8	10
Kurds	94	91	91	74	69	71	68
Greeks	42	54	49	34	37	42	46
Germans	6	7	10	0	2	3	3
Ossetians	99	96	94	90	91	89	88
Dagestanis	99	100	98	96	96	94	88

After the Soviet dissolution many of these peoples moved to their autonomies. Economic conditions were often barriers for returning 'home' rather than pushing factors. Chechens fleeing from the Chechen war and Meskhetian Turks pushed by ethnic intolerance in Krasnodarsky Krai present the only exclusions – considerable populations of them left the N. Caucasus to the Central Asia. At the moment sufficient stocks of deported peoples in regions of deportation still persist providing a source for future migrations (e.g. see data for



Kyrgyz Republic in table 25). Future migrations of these people will highly depend on socio-political stability in the Central Asia and the Kazakhstan.

At the beginning of the Soviet dissolution many Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks, in addition to N. Caucasians, moved to the N. Caucasus due to their inability to return to former places of residence. Later Tatars left to Ukraine, but Meskhetians did not find their way to home. Many of them continue staying in the Krasnodarsky Krai facing hostile attitudes from the authorities and the public. Due to ethnic intolerance, they partly moved to Azerbaijan and back to the Central Asia. Yet, the problem of Meskhetian Turks is still considered as a headache by Krasnodar authorities. According the official data, there are 13,338 Meskhetians in the Krai, and only 721 of them was successful in getting an official registration [Jazkova 2003].

	<b>1989</b>	<b>1999</b>
Chechens	2873	2612
Karachays	2509	2167
Balkars	2131	1512
Crimean Tatars	2924	65
Meskhetian Turks	0	1400
Germans	101309	21471
Koreans	18355	19784
Kalmyks	5050	5824
Ingushs	592	568
Finns	121	39

#### **4.2.2. Forced migrations and refugees**

In addition to the 'heritage' of Soviet ethnic deportations, the Northern Caucasus experienced forced ethnic movements caused by modern conflicts in the area and the Transcaucasia. Forced migrations in the N. Caucasus were caused by the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, Chechen-Dagestanis tensions, and by the Chechen War in the region itself and by the Transcaucasian conflicts. Since the mid-90s the number of registered refugees and forced migrants has decreased gradually. In 1997 there were about 188 thousand forced migrants and refugees in the region (58,600 and 39,800 in Stavropolsky and Krasnodarsky Krays; 49,000 and 24,000 in Ossetia and Ingushetia; 7,800 and 7,700 in Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia; and about a thousand and half a thousand in Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygeya) [Vasilyeva 1998]. Table 26 presents forced migrants and refugees stocks in the region as of the beginning of 2000 and 2003 [Goskomstat of Russia 2000, 2003b].

	Total	Russia	a	Azerbaijan	Armenia	Georgia	Other
<b>As of 1.01.2000</b>							
<b>North Caucasus</b>	<b>173252</b>	<b>100835</b>	<b>42137</b>	<b>5559</b>	<b>598</b>	<b>35980</b>	<b>30280</b>
Adygeya	1393	552	305	65	17	223	536
Dagestan	8907	5398	1213	481		732	2296
Ingushetia	39703	39701					2
Kabardino-Balkaria	1088	691	110	55	4	51	287
Karachay-Cherkessia	4438	2354	787	376	253	158	1297
N. Ossetia	41691	8813	29316	249	34	29033	3562
Chechnya	n.d.						
Krasnodar Kr.	40663	17415	6616	1955	109	4552	16632
Stavropol Kr.	35369	25911	3790	2378	181	1231	5668
<b>As of 1.01.2003</b>							
<b>North Caucasus</b>	<b>109130</b>	<b>59614</b>	<b>31298</b>	<b>2284</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>28703</b>	<b>18218</b>
Adygeya	697	267	71	28		43	359
Dagestan	9542	6181	1123	414		709	2238
Ingushetia	29299	29297					2
Kabardino-Balkaria	779	584	63	33		30	132
Karachay-Cherkessia	3205	1827	522	196	186	140	856
N. Ossetia	31451	2333	26260	208	24	26028	2858
Chechnya	n.d.						
Krasnodar Kr.	15487	4806	1680	478	18	1184	9001
Stavropol Kr.	18670	14319	1579	927	83	569	2772

The Armenian-Azeri conflict over the Karabakh was a source of huge flows of forced migrants in the Transcaucasia as was described above. In addition, many refugees from the region moved to Russia and to the N. Caucasus in particular. Most of them were Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, who preferred to settle in Caucasian Krays with strong Armenian Diasporas.

More important for the N. Caucasian republics were conflicts in Georgia. The S.-Ossetian conflict resulted in massive movements of Ossetians to the Russian North Ossetia. According to the S. Ossetian authorities, there were about 60,000 Ossetian forced migrants from the region, and most of them fled to Russia [Khorev 1996]. Today there are 26,028 registered refugees N. Ossetia, which came from the Georgia. Yet, these figures do not cover all the forced migrants [Tishkov 1999]. Another Georgian conflict – in Abkhazia – resulted in a massive flow of up to 100,000 Georgians, Armenians, and Russians to Russia (Krasnodar Krai in particular), Armenia, Greece, and other countries [Khorev 1996].

Many Dagestanis had also fled from Azerbaijan and Georgia, which possessed significant stocks of Dagestanis before the Soviet dissolution. Yet, the main problems for Dagestan are caused by interethnic tensions in the Novolaksky region of the Republic itself. This territory was inhabited by Chechens before their deportation, and in the 1980-90s Chechens claimed their rights for it. Lacks and Avars residing in the region (about 14,000) argued that since 1944 many of them had been settled and accustomed there. In 1992, however, Lacks expressed a will to voluntarily leave the region resulting in a relief to the situation. Since then the former Aukhovsky region is being gradually restored and Lacks are being resettled in the Caspian shores north to the Makhachkala and along the Federal Highway “Kavkaz” [Ilyashenko 2003].

The Ossetian-Ingush conflict of 1992-1993 in the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia resulted in a massive forced escape of Ingushs. Before the deportation of Ingushs the region was inhabited by them and belonged to the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR. Afterwards the region was left in Ossetia despite restoration of the Checheno-Ingushsetia. Both Ossetians and Ingushs claimed their historical rights for possessing the region [e.g. Tangiev 1991]. Unlike Dagestan, where a similar problem concerned the Novolaksky raion, ethnic tensions in the North Ossetia turned into a conflict and resulted in massive forced migrations. Its casualties counted about 1,000 [Tishkov 1999]. In 1995 5.2% of 49,000 forced migrants and refugees in North Ossetia were displaced persons from the Prigorodny raion [Vasilyeva 1997]. At the moment the conflict is frozen like the conflicts in the Transcaucasia. Given the further stabilization in Russia, it seems that the evolution of the conflict will be very gradual in future.

The most severe ethnic conflict in the Caucasus as well as on the whole post Soviet territory was the Chechen War that resulted in about 35,000 casualties in 1994-1997 alone. In 1991-1994 over 100,000 mainly ethnic Russians and other non-Chechens fled from the republic. About 300,000 city dwellers left settlements damaged during the war. After the war another 100,000 forced migrants (mostly ethnic Chechens) fled from the republic to Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Stavropolsky Krai [Tishkov 1999]. Not all Chechen migrants were able to get a status of forced migrant. In Dagestan, for example, only 1,400 of 153,000 Chechens arrived before 1997 received an official status, 7,900 left for other Russian regions beyond Chechnya, 18,700 continued to stay in Dagestan, and about 125,000 (82%) returned back to Chechnya. Even in Karachay-Cherkessia, which was most liberal in providing forced migrants with official status, about 30% of those applied did not received the status of forced migrant [Vasilyeva 1997]. Recently, in view of the relative stabilization, some Chechens returned to Chechnya [e.g. Ilyashenko 2003] as is seen from the table above. Prospects of final stabilization in Chechnya are of critical importance for future forced migrations in the region and for asylum seeking abroad. Restoration of the stability in the Republic and of its economy could stabilize the situation in the whole of the Northern Caucasus, while new violent developments will keep the situation as it is or even worsen it by sending new forced migration flows outside the Chechnya.

#### **4.2.3. Transcaucasian migrants in the Northern Caucasus. Armenian immigration**

As was mentioned above, both economic factors and the Transcaucasian ethnic conflicts resulted in notable emigration of Transcaucasians to Russia and the North Caucasus in particular. Armenians exhibit the most spectacular immigration rates, who had already had a well established Diaspora in the region. Krasnodarsky Krai was the most attracting place for Armenians and became the place of the worst Armenian-Russian tensions. In 1989 there were

about 160,000 Armenians in the Krai, which constituted about 4% of its population. In 1980s Armenians were migrating to the Krasnodarsky Krai at a rate of above 2% annually. In the 1990s this flow continued and according to the Krays statistical committee, recent trends in registered Armenian populations are as follows:

Year	Armenian population in Krasnodar Kr.
1998	232,397
1999	236,740
2000	241,960

Meanwhile, registration of Armenian migrants is not complete, and some researchers estimate the Armenian population of the Krai as much as 800,000 [Jaz'kova 2003]. No matter, how unrealistic such estimates might be, they reflect the existence of a remarkable Armenian population in the region and of potential conflict, which could break out if the economic and political situation of the region worsens.

#### **4.2.4. Emigration of Germans, Jews, Tats, and Greeks to their “historical homeland”**

As everywhere in the former USSR, ‘alien’ ethnic groups of the northern Caucasus emigrated towards their ‘historical’ homelands after the Soviet dissolution and economic devastation of the region. Following the ethnic composition of the region, Germany, USA, Israel, and Greece received most of the ‘far’ emigrants from the Northern Caucasus. The exodus was at its highest levels in mid-90s and now is close to be exhausted.

### **4.3. Emigration to the Developed Countries**

While ethnic flows dominated migration to the West and the Middle East in 1980-90s, economic migrations to the developed countries became more and more important. No doubt, enlargement of the EU and involvement in migrations of younger generations will facilitate it.

## **5. Migration prospects in the Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus**

Concluding the overview presented in this paper, we can state that the following migrations are likely to continue in future without critical changes:

- Economic out-migrations of Russians from ‘national’ regions of whole the Caucasus
- Economic migrations of N. Caucasians from their republics

- Migration of Transcaucasians (Armenians in particular) to Caucasian Krays and Russia as a whole
- Ethnic emigration to western countries and Israel

Other migrations also seem to continue, but their intensity will depend on political and economic developments:

*Immigration of Russians and N. Caucasians from the CIS countries* will continue for sure, but its rate will depend on the economic-political situation in sending countries and in Russia. The author was an eye-witness, for example, that many Russians and N. Caucasians in the Kyrgyz republic are highly aware of future political developments there. If political stability and policy of tolerance adopted by Akayev's administration will continue, many of them could stay in the republic

*Economic emigration to developed countries* is likely to rise, but its level will be determined by immigration policies of receiving countries and by economic conditions of the Caucasus and the Russia as a whole

*Partial return of Chechens to Chechnya* could also continue depending on political and economic stabilization in the republic

Some other migration flows are also potentially possible. Yet, they do not seem to happen as there are no political and economic developments foreseeable which would enable these migrations:

Return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of residence in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and North Ossetia of Russia

Return of Meskhetians to Georgia

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**Migration trends between Belarus and the EU, by  
Prof. Lyudmila Shakhotko,  
Deputy Director of the Research Institute of Statistics,  
Minsk, Belarus**

Belarus is located in the geographic center of the European continent, on the crossroad of main transportation routes from central regions of Russia to Western Europe and from the Baltic states to the Black Sea countries. Migration of population plays an important role in the Belarus society. Since the second half of the 1980's cardinal changes in the volumes, intensity and trends of migration flows in the Republic of Belarus have taken place. The most considerable impact on the changes in the trends of migration flows had the collapse of the USSR, as well as the reorganization of economic and political life in the republic and the consequences of Chernobyl nuclear power-station catastrophe in April 1986.

**External migration.** The general migration turnover of the Republic of Belarus with other countries in the 1990's was constantly decreasing. While in the peak 1992 the maximum number of arrivals was 117,700 and the number of departures was 60,500, and the balance made up +57,200 persons, then in 2002 only 18,900 persons arrived, 13,400 persons departed, and the balance made up +5,600 persons. International migration movements consisted of two oppositely directed flows: the *first* – with CIS countries and the Baltic states, and the *second* – with other countries of the world. The first flow during the 1990's resulted in a constantly positive balance for Belarus, while in the second flow the balance was constantly negative (Table 1, Figure 1).

Sharp worsening of the socio-economic and ecological situation in the republic and liberalization of life significantly increased the outflow of Belarus population to outside the borders of former USSR. This trend was stimulated by liberal regime for ethnic emigration and facilitation of the procedure of departure/arrival for different reasons. As a result, in the 1989-1990 external migration of Belarus population with non-former Soviet states significantly increased, and then, since the mid-1990's it began to decrease. In the present moment Belarus continues to lose its population in the migration exchange with these countries, i.e. the outflow exceeds the inflow, however, the scale of this migration is small.

According to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Belarus, in 1989 14,700 persons got the permission to leave Belarus for other countries. In 1990, this number increased more than twice and made up 34,100. This was followed by the decrease of this outflow and a relative stabilization on a rather low level 9,000 – 11,000 persons per year (Table 2). This was the result of a number of reasons. *First*, the departure of a significant part of families, who were oriented at leaving the country, straight after the liberalization. *Second*, introduction of more strict requirements for “accepting” citizens of Belarus in other countries. *Third*, “normalization” of emigration process, i.e. larger access to short-term trips to the

relatives, facilitation of short-term departures abroad for personal reasons, etc., all that does not impel to leave the republic for permanent residence to non-former Soviet states for reunification with the relatives. *Fourth*, certain economic stabilization in Belarus.

The major part of persons departing to the non-former Soviet states are young people in labor active ages (20-24 years old) and those in the greatest professional activity ages (30-49 years old). Over 90% of emigrants for permanent residence have higher and special professional education.

In the recent years, a shift in motivations for emigration is taking place. While earlier the reasons were mainly ethnically or politically dominated, then now they change for mainly economic and social reasons. As Belarus citizens prefer to move to the countries with higher living standards, emigration can be regarded as a search for better life and higher incomes.

In 1989-1990, emigrants from Belarus were mainly Jews. The “traditional” countries of emigration are Israel, USA, Canada, Germany, Poland and Australia. However, due to different reasons (political, economic) the list of top emigration countries was changing rapidly. Thus, in 1989-1990, over 95% of the total number of emigrants were heading for Israel, in 1992 – only 32.5%, and in 2002 – 10.3%. In 1989, only 1% of emigrants departed to the USA, while in 1992 the proportion of those who departed to the USA was already 57.5%, and in 2002 it again reduced to 10.3%. The share of emigrants to Germany was growing slowly but constantly. If in 1989 only 0.3% of emigrants left for Germany, then in 2002 they were 10.3%. The increase of the outflow of emigrants to other countries of the world demonstrates diversification of countries of destination (in 1989 – 8%, in 2002 – almost 70%) (Table 2, Figure 2).

Around 20-30% of all persons who departed from Belarus to outside the borders of former USSR, moved to the countries of the European Union. Citizens of Belarus move mainly to Germany (about 80% of all Belarus people who emigrated to the countries of the European Union). Every tenth person departs to Italy. There is a rather active emigration outflow to Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Belgium (Table 3, Figure 3).

Opposite-directed flow also exists. However, the inflow of migrants from the opposite direction does not exceed 5%.

As to migration flows between Belarus and European countries, which are to join the European Union in the near future, the most scale migration exchange is between Belarus and the Baltic states. However, the migration balance is positive: Belarus does not lose its population in the exchange with the Baltic states, but actively gains (Table 4, Figure 4).

Totally, Belarus has a small negative migration balance with East European countries. Among them, Poland is the most active migration partner.

**Unregistered emigration.** We have analyzed above registered migration of the citizens of Belarus with the EU countries. However, besides registered migration there exists unregistered emigration. Unregistered emigrants are mainly those people who legally departed from Belarus to other countries and stayed there. Many of them live on the territory of other countries on legal basis (contract work, education, marriage), but officially they did not register their departure from Belarus and therefore the data on them is not in the official reports on migration. The volume of such migration is rather impressive. Thus, the representatives of scientific and technological elite quite actively depart in order to work abroad. Many of them leave with temporary work contract, but later they prolong the contract and stay in a country of destination for permanent residence. According to experts' estimates the representatives of intellectual elite make up approximately 5% of the total outflow of emigrants with higher education. In the recent years, migration of young people to other countries for working during summer vacation became popular. The increase of labor migration popularity among young population was encouraged by economic factors, as well as by the natural desire to see the world, improve knowledge of foreign language, realize their intellectual and physical abilities. However, yearly 15-20% of those young temporary migrants do not return on time. According to a survey conducted among parents of the students who did not return, the majority of them have prolonged their work contract with the employer. Some of them entered local colleges and got student visa. There were also persons who registered marriage with local citizens. Many relatives say that students are planning to return home, but no earlier than after three – five years. Marriages between Belarus females and males from other countries, including EU countries, have become a wide-spread phenomenon, even though there is no reliable data on this in the country. Belarus sportsmen also migrate with job contract, however, they do not always return after contract termination. On the whole, Belarus is strongly concerned with so-called “elite brain drain and elite muscle drain”. It is clear that receiving countries benefit from this kind of active, healthy and educated migration inflow, whereas Belarus suffers.

**Irregular migration.** There is another kind of unregistered migration in Belarus. Thanks to its geographic location, the country is often used by migrants from Asia and Africa as a transit state to reach the West European countries. Irregular migrants arrive to the country using tourist or transit channels, visa-free entrance for business and personal reasons, as well as with direct violation of entrance regulation. Often irregular migrants arrive to the country under the pretence of refugees. Restriction of the West European countries' migration legislation creates barriers for emigration to the West. As a result, foreign citizens, who fail to emigrate to the West European countries, stay in Belarus, and their number is rapidly increasing. According to rough estimates of law enforcement agencies, in the present time in Belarus there are approximately 150,000 (according to some of estimates up to 300,000) irregular migrants, mainly from Sri-Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Afghanistan,

Vietnam. The major part of irregular migrants from such distant regions as Africa and South-East Asia consider the country as a staging point for subsequent irregular emigration to Western Europe. Many of them, after entering the country as transit migrants, got “stuck” there for a long time. At the same time they have practically no possibility to regulate their stay, nor to move further to a country of destination or to return to their homeland. As their initial destinations were the West-European countries, they do not wish to stay in Belarus for permanent residence, and in quest of higher living standards they continue to look for ways of reaching their goal. According to the survey among the detained persons, the final targets for irregular migrants are mainly Germany (65%), France (9%), Belgium (6%), Holland (5%) and other countries including Italy, Scandinavian countries, as well as USA and Canada (15%).

The growth of non-status persons on the territory of Belarus aggravates the criminal situation. In the 1990's the number of individual, as well as group, attempts of the foreigners to cross illegally the Belarus western borders significantly increased. Irregular migrants are not registered anywhere, their way of living is anti-social and they are a serious threat to the national security of the country. The motives of these flows are not only political instability, or national and ethnic conflicts, but also economic situation of their countries, and poverty among their citizens, who are searching for better life in politically stable and economically developed countries.

In addition to already mentioned, around 1,000 Vietnamese citizens stay in the country; their work contracts, which were signed with Belarus enterprises when USSR still existed, have expired. A part of them does not wish to leave. In order to depart the rest of them financial resources are needed, so this problem remains unsolved.

The major part of irregular migrants is from African and Asian countries. They can be classified as:

The first group – “economic migrants”, who have penetrated to the European CIS countries through the territory of Middle Asia and Trans-Caucasus in order to move to developed Western countries to get job there or to organize their own business.

The second group – “transit refugees”, who are aiming at entering West European countries through the CIS countries in order to get a refugee status there.

The third group – foreigners, who arrived at the CIS countries pretending to be tourists or students and stay in these countries in irregular status, with the purpose to earn money and set up necessary contacts with a view to leave later for Europe or America.

The fourth group – foreign citizens and apatrides, who arrived to the CIS territory as asylum-seekers with the purpose of getting a refugee status.

The fifth group – citizens of Asian and African states, who stayed on the territory of Belarus after getting education in high school institutions and professional schools or who

worked here against a contract and did not wish to return to their homeland after the termination of their education/work. They motivate their refusal to return to their homeland by the change of political regime there and the consequential threat for their lives in case of their return. Regretfully, some of these people actively participate in smuggling of irregular migrants.

Measures to combat irregular migration do not always reach the due result for certain reasons. The main one is the absence of controlled border with the eastern neighbour. Administrative measures like penalties are not an effective way to suppress irregular stay of foreign citizens due to the fact that the majority of them do not have money to pay these penalties. Deportation of such people to the countries of their citizenship is practically impossible due to the lack of financial resources for this purpose in the Ministry of Interior of Belarus. In 1998-2000, 1,609 persons were deported from Belarus. Starting from 2000, the deportation from the country is effectuated only according to a special resolution for every trespasser. Trafficking in women is becoming more and more critical. According to estimates of the Ministry of Interior, in 2000 140 criminal groups, entrained in organizing of trafficking in women were detained (compared to 40 groups in 1990). Over 200 prostitutes were sent back to Belarus in 2000. Over a half of young Belarus women, involved in sexual industry abroad, were entrained in this criminal activity in a deceitful way.

Geographic location of the Republic of Belarus at the turn of West and East turns it into the crossroad of both regular and irregular movements of people and goods, including “alive goods”, weapons and drugs. Therefore, the activity of transnational criminal organizations is becoming more and more distinct here. Unique geopolitical and strategic location of Belarus in Europe affects general migration situation and the related stability and security in the whole region.


In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about how the enlargement of the European Union can influence migration picture in Belarus. I suppose that it will not significantly affect migration for permanent residence. Neither it will influence seriously contract labor migration. However, border migration, especially the one with Poland, will be surely changed. The significant share of the Belarus population was engaged in so-called “chelnok business”, i.e. short-term commercial circular migration to Poland, in particular, for the purpose of buying goods there in order to sell them in Belarus. Such type of business was very wide spread in the mid-1990s, but later is slightly decreased and became more organized. Nonetheless, even nowadays this type of business is a considerable support and sometimes even the only financial source for household budget, especially for close-to-border residents. Introduction of a more strict border control and visa regime will make this business less profitable and will partially reorient it to other countries.

The EU enlargement will also affect large-scale recreation migration of Belarus citizens going to resorts in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, at least at first time. This flow will partially change its vector to the Black Sea resorts of Ukraine and Russia.

**Table 1. International migration in Belarus, thousands**

Year	Arrivals			Departures			Migration balance		
	Total	CIS and Baltic	Other countries	Total	CIS and Baltic	Other countries	Total	CIS and Baltic	Other countries
1994	53,1	50,0	3,1	56,5	47,7	8,7	-3,3	2,3	-5,6
1995	34,9	33,3	1,6	35,1	26,1	9,0	-0,2	7,2	-7,4
1996	31,9	30,1	1,8	22,6	14,1	8,5	9,4	16,0	-6,7
1997	31,4	29,9	1,5	16,7	9,7	7,0	14,7	20,2	-5,5
1998	33,2	31,6	1,6	13,3	7,5	5,8	19,9	24,1	-4,2
1999	30,8	29,1	1,7	13,3	7,0	6,2	17,5	22,1	-4,5
2000	25,9	24,8	1,7	13,8	7,4	6,4	12,1	16,8	-4,7
2001	23,4	21,8	1,5	14,3	8,3	6,0	9,1	13,5	-4,4
2002	18,9	17,5	1,4	13,4	8,6	4,8	5,6	8,9	-3,4

**Figure 1. Net migration in Belarus, by main flows**



**Table 2. Number of persons, who received permissions to leave Belarus for permanent residence, by countries[1]**

Year	Total	Israel	USA	Germany	Australia	Poland	Canada	Other countries
1989	14680	14158	144	46	79	49	82	122
1990	34094	33085	508	95	62	66	157	121
1991	22017	15146	6 191	208	132	116	89	135
1992	9727	3157	5 590	370	213	152	97	148
1993	6901	2431	3 627	464	57	101	29	192
1994	6950	2952	2826	398	94	99	76	505
1995	8780	3705	2169	552	61	147	37	2109
1996	8917	3324	1912	518	68	206	49	2840
1997	8891	2238	1697	641	35	210	85	3985
1998	9214	2182	1587	579	33	173	103	4557
1999	9581	2803	1451	744	8	74	83	4418
2000	10674	2517	1606	811	19	54	87	5580
2001	10647	1696	1396	1196	10	45	141	6163
2002	10561	1023	1138	1107	14	52	117	7110
<b>Total</b> 1989-2002	171634	90417	31842	7729	885	1544	1232	37985

[1] According to the estimates of Ministry of Interior of Belarus

Figure 2. Emigration from Belarus, by main countries of destination





Table 3. Migration between Belarus and EU countries in 2000-2003[1], pers.

	European Union countries	Arrivals to the Belarus			Departures from Belarus			Net migration balance for Belarus		
		2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002
1	Belgium	..	4	3	17	16	22	-17	-12	-19
2	Great Britain	1	8	4	12	10	17	-11	-2	-13
3	Germany	57	47	55	918	1306	1243	-861	-1259	-1188
4	Greece	3	4	..	3	9	4	..	-5	-4
5	Denmark	..	2	3	11	16	22	-11	-14	-19
6	Ireland	..	..	2	4	18	19	-4	-18	-17
7	Spain	2	2	4	3	6	5	-1	-4	-1
8	Italy	11	8	8	192	123	162	-181	-115	-154
9	Luxemburg	..	..	..	2	1	2	-2	-1	-2
10	Netherlands	2	2	3	16	40	22	-14	-38	-19
11	Norway	6	11	9	4	7	13	2	4	-4
12	Portugal									
13	Finland	..	..	1	12	11	18	-12	-11	-17
14	France	8	7	6	17	16	35	-9	-9	-29
15	Sweden	2	8	2	39	56	56	-37	-48	-54
	<b>Total for EU</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1250</b>	<b>1635</b>	<b>1640</b>	<b>-1158</b>	<b>-1532</b>	<b>-1540</b>


[1] According to national statistics (persons who have registered their departure).

Figure 3. Distribution of emigrants from Belarus by EU countries



COUNTRIES	Arrivals			Departures			Migration balance		
	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002
<b>BALTIC STATES</b>									
1 Latvia	291	299	264	50	49	46	241	250	218
2 Lithuania	384	503	407	109	82	82	275	421	325
3 Estonia	62	51	50	10	16	13	52	35	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>737</b>	<b>853</b>	<b>721</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>568</b>	<b>706</b>	<b>580</b>
<b>EASTERN EUROPE</b>									
1 Bulgaria	18	10	9	6	6	6	12	4	3
2 Hungary	6	6	1		4	1	6	2	..
3 Poland	42	51	39	81	83	81	-39	-32	-42
4 Rumania	1	1	1	2	2	3	-1	-1	-2
5 Slovakia	1	..	4	2	7	5	-1	-7	-1
6 Croatia	1	..	..		2		1	-2	..
7 Czech Republic	7	6	6	7	34	29		-28	-23
8 Yugoslavia	7	4	2	5	2	2	2	2	..
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>-20</b>	<b>-62</b>	<b>-65</b>

**Figure 4. Migrations between Belarus and Baltic States**





**Mr Mehmet Emre, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director General at the Ministry of the Republic of Turkey**

Both as a transit and a source country, Turkey is one of the key countries for migratory movements into Europe. Turks constitute almost the single largest migrant community in the European Union as a result of the labour migration of the last 40 years. Today Turkey has become a transit route for illegal migratory movements originating from the East towards the EU territory. However, mainly because of the factors triggered by social forces of migration, like kinship, family reunification, as well as economic forces such as demand for low skill, low pay workforce, Turkey continues to be a source country. However, reflecting the complexity of migration phenomena, Turkey has also become a destination country for some illegal migration originating mainly from its northern neighbours.

Illegal migration has become both a symptom and a consequence of disparity of income among nations. But it is also a part of globalisation. Migration has occurred through the history of mankind and will continue to occur. Migration is a fact of life, a constant event. However, illegal migration is a phenomena that has to be controlled.

Illegal migration occurs individually, also through in groups organized by criminal gangs, terrorist organisations for political and economic exploitation. These organizations may also use their victims for illicit drug trafficking and arms smuggling, or they may force them into servitude to pay what migrants supposedly owe them. Therefore, illegal migration is a threat to security, to stability, law and order as well as a risk to human dignity and decency.

Illegal migration trails the road of ignorance during its very long journey. Ignorance of migrants who are deceived by the false promises of high income work, a heaven-like life. So they have to be informed about the hardship, the abuse, the slavery-like conditions, the segregation and deprivation in the countries where they aim to reach. This presupposes that illegal migration can best be prevented at its source by enlightenment campaigns, by investment, by creating large number of jobs as well as technical and financial assistance.

Illegal migration occurs because, there is a pull factor, demand for labour. A demand for low pay, menial, insurance-free labour. Especially the labour intensive sectors such as textile and agriculture require cheap and unskilled labour which may not be met at a Standard minimum-wage/ compulsory-insurance labour market. Some governments may be hesitant to accept that they should open, regulate and supervise the channels of legal migration. We ought to recognize that illegal migration must also be tackled at its destination by opening up legal channels of migration or altering the structure of the economies of the countries of destination.

Illegal migrants are taught that they can use and abuse asylum procedures: But this is at the expense of victims, real sufferers. So we need to overhaul the asylum system for a swift, just and efficient processing of applications in order that no economic migrant be allowed to use this precious door of protection.

It has to be stressed that extremely liberal asylum policies of some of the European Countries, thoughtless statements of some populist politicians lure the potential illegal migrants to set out a perilous journey at the hands of smugglers to apply for asylum.

Illegal migration uses and passes through several countries. It starts from the source countries to continue with transit countries to end in destination countries. It is a difficult task, even an impossible one, for a single country to overcome the harmful effects of this trend by itself. Therefore we need to have a very strong and effective international cooperation supported by concrete financial, legal and operational network to prevent illegal migration.

Turkey, being geographically situated between the countries of origin in Asia and countries of destination in Europe, being a democratic country in the region, truly implementing well known international conventions guaranteeing basic human rights, having common borders with countries of low income, high unemployment, having high, rugged mountains in the East and Southeast of Turkey which hinder effective control of the borderline is exposed to the major transit migratory pressures. Extremely close proximity of Aegean Islands which is the first stepping stone into the EU territory makes Turkish territory all the more easy for the smugglers. Illegal migrants use several routes to infiltrate Turkey. These include, walking over the mountains on foot by themselves, passing through certain routes on the border by local smuggling guides; Transiting the border by the more professional organized groups, entering via border gates with forged or false passports or visas, entering legally and overstaying, hiding in secret compartments in buses and lorries. The illegal migrants use various means to reach Aegean Islands such as, small inflated boats bought by themselves, fishing boats, swimming the Maritza River.

If we are to manage effectively pan-European migration in the coming years, we will above all have to devote our intergovernmental co-operation efforts to drawing up long-term policies in order to help eliminate the deep-rooted causes of forced and irregular migration, protect the fundamental rights of migrants in irregular situations and prevent them from being exploited.

We must also step up our information and awareness-raising activities in the countries of origin to ensure that potential migrants are fully aware of the conditions governing entry, residence and employment imposed by legislation in the host country. Too often, migrants turn to criminal Networks to deliver them to what they feel will be a more promising future, but which in reality is a dangerous and uncertain future.

Lastly, we must give stronger encouragement to bilateral and multilateral negotiations between countries of origin and countries of destination leading ultimately to the conclusion of readmission agreements.

Genuine border control belongs to a mythical past. If we acknowledge that immigration depends on millions of individual decisions and that it cannot be totally regulated by governments then we have taken an initial step towards realism. A free society is an open society, a society which becomes all the richer because of its many identities.

## **Point of view of the Representatives of non-members countries:**

**Mr Hiyun Gao, Head of the Delegation of China,  
Chargé d'affaires of the Embassy of China**

Migration is a social phenomenon existing since ancient time. For a long time, migrants have made tremendous contribution to global cultural exchanges, economic development and social progress.

Poverty, economic imbalances, demographic changes are among key factors contributing to migration which is accelerated by economic globalization and the unprecedented development of communication technologies across the world.

Given the increase of migrants and its political, economic, social and cultural implication, migration issue is attracting more attention from the governments of all countries.

Due to different geographic locations and development stages, countries in Asia and Europe should take into full account the present international situation as well as their own characteristics, strengthen their studies on the migration phenomenon and take effective measures to facilitate orderly population movement against the background of globalization.

In order to maximize the constructive potential of migration and to reduce its disruptive effects, countries of origin, transit and destination should strengthen dialogue and exchanges to identify common interests and policy goals on the basis of common understanding, state sovereignty, mutual trust and partnership.

Illegal migration is one of the outstanding issues in the field of migration today. Illegal politicization. Political factors, the abuse of asylum policies and etc. have greatly obstructed the international cooperation in fighting against illegal migration. More attention and actions by States are called for to remove such obstacles. Migration has hindered the normal population movement and led to many social problems. The international community has attached great importance to this phenomenon.

The major root cause of illegal migration is the gap between the rich and the poor across the world. Therefore the international community needs to take practical actions to foster common development and narrow the gap between the rich and the poor in order to eliminate the root cause of illegal migration.

Irrational migration policies, transnational organized criminal groups involved in human trafficking and people smuggling for high benefits, the abuse of asylum policies and etc. have resulted in the deterioration of illegal migration.

Illegal migration is a transnational problem. Given the fact that the countries of origin, transit or destination are all disturbed by the problem, the fight against illegal migration is in the interests of all parties. States should refrain from pointing fingers at each other and take the illegal migration problem as shared responsibility.

China and EU have common concerns in combating illegal migration. Dialogue and cooperation between China and EU are in the interest of both sides.

Cooperation in fighting against illegal migration should be carried out on the basis of *mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit*, in line with the *UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* and other relevant international legal instruments.

International cooperation against illegal immigration should be based on the principle of respect for national sovereignty, national legislation on the management of entry and exit as well as relevant domestic practices in this field.

The international cooperation in the fight against illegal migration should be free from politicization. Political factors, the abuse of asylum policies and etc. have greatly obstructed the international cooperation in fighting against illegal migration. More attention and actions by States are called for to remove such obstacles.

The developed countries have the duty to provide technical and financial assistance to the developing countries to enhance their capacity in fighting illegal migration. The international organizations should continue to play an active role in encouraging and assisting states to utilize the latest technologies in ID certificate making to fight against counterfeiting and carry out efficient and reliable information exchanges.

Legal channels should be opened and illegal channels blocked to ensure orderly regular migration flows. The developed countries need migrants because of labor shortage, whereas the surplus labor in the developing countries need job opportunities. A win-win situation of countries of origin and of destination can be achieved through proper adjustments of migration policies of States to ensure regular migration flow and labor exportation and reduce illegal migration effectively.

Refugees and illegal migrants fall into different categories by nature. One should be distinguished from the other according to the *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and its *Protocols*. The abuse of refugee asylum policy will only indulge and encourage illegal migration.

China supports the fight against whatever form of terrorism. We believe that the scope should not be arbitrarily enlarged and the regular migration should not be impeded consequently.

The transnational organized criminal groups involved in human trafficking and people smuggling grossly violate human rights. It is of crucial importance to carry out effective international cooperation to fight against organized crimes for the reduction of illegal migration and the protection of the fundamental rights for the illegal migrants.

Illegal migrants are as much violators of law as victims. They should be accorded with basic humanitarian treatments instead of discrimination or other unfair treatments.

We hold that repatriation of illegal migrants should be dealt with through friendly cooperation between States and be carried out in a decent manner, in line with such principles as *verification before repatriation, return of the whole group taking the same ship/aircraft*.

China-Europe recent cooperation on migration includes, to name but a few:

- Since the year 2000, three rounds of high level consultations on fighting illegal migration and trafficking in human beings between China and the EU have been held. The fourth round will be held in Beijing in October this year.
- China-EU seminar on cooperation on combating illegal migration and trafficking in human beings was held in Beijing on 14 and 15 November 2002.
- Spain, China and Germany co-initiated ASEM ministerial conference on cooperation for the management of migratory flows between Europe and Asia, which was held in Spain on 4 and 5 April 2002.
- The second ASEM Director-General level conference on cooperation for the management of migratory flows between Europe and Asia will be held on 12 and 14 November this year.

**Mr Truong Xuan Thanh, Deputy General-Director of the Consular Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Council of Europe and the host country Ukraine for giving me the opportunity to attend and address this Conference.

Yesterday, Dr. Truong Xuan Thanh from our Delegation already remarked on the migrant movements across the Eastern borders of Europe and the reasons of the situation. My speech today will focus on the Vietnamese solutions for effective migration management.

The permanent stand of Vietnamese government on migration is that international cooperation should be strengthened in order to facilitate free legal migration for economic, travel, investment and tourism promotion purposes; and at the same time to fight against illegal migration and organized crimes. Therefore, beside other structure and forums within APC, APEC, ASEAN framework, Vietnam would like to participate in this annual seminars in order to exchange views, experiences and strengthen cooperation in the migration issues with East European countries.

For a soon and decisive step on settling the illegal migration, I would like to suppose some solutions as follows:

Firstly, every related country should focus on sustainable economic development with appropriate attention paid to the poverty reduction programs in order to clear away the main cause of the illegal migration. At the same time, domestic laws should be improved and completed to facilitate the citizens' travel and tourism as well as to prevent the crimes related to migration.

Secondly, together with their internal efforts, the developing countries should cooperate in appealing for external assistance and cooperation from the developed countries to diminish the gap between the rich and the poor. Meanwhile, the developed countries should have to reconsider their standards on immigration regulations and labor recipient in order to promote legal migration.

Thirdly, the international cooperation should be strengthened in the field of policy propaganda and information exchange. This will enhance the citizens' acknowledgement and understandings, especially in sensitive regions where crimes on illegal migration exist.

Finally, let me once more emphasize that beside multilateral efforts by the world society, the bilateral cooperation is among the most effective solutions or illegal migration issue. The special attention should be paid to the cooperation in reaching the bilateral

agreement. The cooperation between the host country Ukraine and Vietnam can be chosen as one example. For last some years, the two countries have done a lot to solve the question of Vietnamese migrants. The solutions to end the illegal migration issue have been done together with the efforts to support and stabilize the legal migrants in the Ukraine. Due to the two side's mutual understandings and efforts, the number of Vietnamese illegal migrants has surprisingly decreased. In short, Vietnam always stands ready to cooperate in this issue and hope to receive assistances from other countries. With this, I want to end my speech and wish the Conference success.

Thank you for your attention.



**SESSION 2 :**  
**THE EU ENLARGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM**  
**AND WITHIN THE REGION**

**Enlargement of the EU and situation of migration in the member States of the  
Community of Independent States : co-operation to combat irregular migration,**  
**by Mr Oleg Putintsev,**  
**Director of Department of Security and Co-operation in combating criminality,**  
**Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of the Independent States**

Dear Mr. Chairman!

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Migration processes are among the most topical dimensions of socio-political and economic development of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Migration is a phenomenon of such a complicated, multi-facet and contradictory character, that management of migration deeply concerns both interests of the State and individual's rights and freedoms, sometimes bringing them in conflict to each other.

In the recent years, irregular migration has become of a global scale; it appears to be a serious threat to stability and security for the CIS and EU countries.

Intensification of migration flows at the territory of the CIS region is one of the consequences of large-scale geo-political shifts resulting from the appearance at the post-Soviet space after 1991 of new sovereign states as international law independent subjects.

At the CIS territory, migrations both between member-countries and with the third countries are numerous. The latter are mainly countries of the Asian-Pacific region, Middle East and Africa.

According to different estimates, the stock of irregular migrants at the CIS territory varies from 4 to 10 million.

The presence of such an amount of foreign citizens and apatrides with uncertain legal status at the territories of CIS countries significantly influences criminal situation, including drugs trafficking.

The main factors of international migration are constant and well known: economic, political, ethnic, ecological.

Experts argue that intensive migrations within the CIS territory will continue, at least, for the nearest decade.

This will mean additional burden for economic and social infrastructure of the CIS member-states as well as conflicts between indigenous populations and aliens.

In many cases, irregular migrants use the territory of CIS countries as a transit station on their way to the European Union; they buy forged documents there and seek for illegal channels for onward migration to the third countries; they apply for asylum and refugee status; or use the CIS countries for business (often criminal or semi-criminal) under the siege of education, tourism, fictitious marriages, etc.

The main route of irregular migrants is through Tadjikistan, Kyrghyzstan to Kazakhstan, Russia and further – through Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the north-western regions of Russia, Baltic states – to Scandinavian countries. The certain part of migrants enter Russia by sea: Trobzon – Novorossiisk route.

For migrants who arrive by air, the main arrival point is Moscow's international airport.

The major part of irregular migrants enter CIS countries on a legal basis, with visa issued on the basis of invitation from a travel agency or a state organization. Irregular entry is realized either by crossing the border outside border control posts or by going through control posts with high quality forged documents or with legal passports of the former USSR stolen by criminal groups.

While irregular migration is becoming more scaled, the activity of organized criminal groups specializing in smuggling of migrants from the third countries and involving residents of border regions is growing.

Transit irregular migration in the CIS region is resulting from its geographical location between the Western Europe and Asia and its intermediate position between developed and developing countries; this fact makes them a natural channel for irregular migrants.

The entrance and staying of irregular migrants in the CIS countries is inspired by relatively liberal entry and visa regime, the absence of well-organised systematic control on transit of foreign citizens, imperfectness of immigration regulation, insufficient legal and financial facilities of migration and border guard institutions.

Migration situation is implicated by the fact that in some countries in the CIS region there exists visa-free regime for the citizens of the third countries, who after entering these countries can move more or less free over the CIS territory.

For sure, the effectiveness of combating irregular migration strongly depends on governmental activities in the CIS countries.

In the major part of CIS states, along with improvement of legislative basement for combating irregular migration, the laws and decrees on entrance, staying, transit and

departure of foreign citizens and apatrides have been approved, as well as administrative and criminal punishment for infringers.

One of the most significant conditions for effective management of migration processes is multilateral co-operation of the CIS states. For this reason, on March 6, 1998 the government leaders of nine CIS countries (except Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) signed the Agreement on Co-operation of CIS Member-states in Combating Illegal Migration. In January 2000 the member-states of this Agreement approved the Statute on the common database on irregular migrants and other individuals prohibited to enter the territory of the Agreement member-states in accordance with their legislation, as well as the exchange of data on irregular migration.

These documents are in fact the basement for legal co-operation between the CIS countries in the field of migration control, revelation of foreign citizens who stay in their territories irregularly, elaboration of deportation mechanisms, harmonization of national legislation and irregular migration data exchange.

However, the lack of reliable mechanism for realization of the Agreement and the Statute both in the CIS separate countries and in the Commonwealth in a whole, hampers effective collaboration in counteracting irregular migration.

In this context, the Russian Federation has proposed to create within the CIS frames the coordinating institutional structure – Joined Commission of the Agreement on combating irregular migration member-states. Provisions of this inter-governmental Joined Commission was approved by the Council of CIS Ministers of Foreign Affairs and will be brought for the Council of CIS Government Leaders' ratification on April 2004.

The principal functions of the Joined Commission are *elaboration of suggestions and recommendations on*:

- harmonization of national legislation of the Agreement member-countries in counteracting irregular migration;
- improvement of migration control;
- promotion of training of administrative personnel engaged in counteraction of irregular migration in the CIS countries;
- promotion of governmental database in the field of irregular migration and inter-governmental data exchange for the sake of identification and analytical purposes;
- *and exchange of information on migration situation, changes in national legislation in the sphere of migration and ratified international agreements.*

Ukraine has brought to the Executive Committee of the CIS the Model Agreement between the CIS governments on admission and readmission of individuals who illegally stay on their territories. This Model Agreement has been modified, coordinated and addressed to the governments of the CIS states for practical use.

On the CIS summit in Yalta on September 18, 2003 the Council of the CIS government leaders has supported the proposal of the Council of CIS Ministers of Interior on working out the draft of the Concept of the CIS countries in counteracting irregular migration.

The provisional draft of the Concept has been elaborated, and the first meeting of authorized representatives and experts of the CIS states was held by the Executive Council of the CIS on October 28-31, 2003.

Practical joined actions counteracting irregular migration are realized within the frames of the 2003-2004 Intergovernmental Programme of common actions against crimes approved by the CIS Government Leaders. This Programme presupposes coordinated activities of competent law enforcement institutions in special operations to combat irregular migration.

Therefore, it can be concluded that in the CIS countries the appropriate legislative basement for counteracting irregular migration has been created, and national and international efforts in this field are rather effective. These efforts could be even more successful when coordinated with the European Union and other regional organizations and supported by them.

Thank you for your kind attention.

**Effective migration policy – what kind of technical assistance?**  
**by Mrs Olga Shumylo,**  
**Programme Manager of “Ukraine's European Choice”,**  
**International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev**

**Consequences of the EU Expansion for Ukraine’s Migration Policy**

The fifth expansion of the EU’s unprecedented both in terms of the number of new members and the depth of reforms creates a principally new situation for Ukraine.

As a result of western neighbors joining the European Union, the external border of the EU will go along the borders of our country. Its length (along Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland) will be 1.400 km.

Being direct neighbors with the European Union’s – whose importance in the global employment market, system of international trade, and political sphere will undoubtedly increase after expanding to include Central European countries will impact both relations between Ukraine and the EU as well as other countries and the domestic political and socio/economic development of Ukraine.

This impact will, of course, be varied, since the process of expansion itself is quite contradictory. In the context of transforming western Ukrainian borders to external EU borders, a conflict of interests emerges with regard to ensuring the internal security of the union and its fundamental foreign policy principle of openness; in other words, between the declared transparency of borders, promoting regional trans-border cooperation and realistic limitations on movement across them.

EU expansion brings with it hope for positive changes in conjunction with our country approaching the European zone of stability and security. The movement of the EU eastward will objectively increase its impact on Ukraine in the area of introducing European standards of democracy, business, trade, human rights, etc.

Expansion of the EU, which will mean:

- modernization of cooperation with new Union members in different areas;
- creation of new possibilities for EU-Ukraine cooperation for the implementation of joint European transport infrastructure development projects.
- Alignment of migration policy and migration legislation of Ukraine with European standards

A necessary condition for deepening cooperation with the EU is the successful reform of Ukraine itself, aligning its legislation and administrative practice to European standards.

Institutional alignment with the EU in the area of regulating migration processes, purposeful movement in introducing European norms and standards, will open the way to further closeness, including acquiring visa privileges.

The state policy of integrating Ukraine to the European Union, which has been carried out since 1991, was performed at the first stage exclusively in the area of foreign policy activity, but later more and more transformed into an element of domestic policy.

### **Legislation on Ukraine's European integration process**

With Decree No. 615/98 dated 11 June 1998, the President of Ukraine approved the Strategy for the Integration of Ukraine with the European Union, which determines the main objectives for the work of executive government bodies for the period to 2007, during which conditions are to be created necessary for Ukraine to acquire full-fledged membership in the EU and joining the European political, economic, and legal space.

Among other things, the Strategy anticipated the preparation of a detailed Programme for Ukraine's integration with the EU. This Programme, a rather bulky and complicated structure document comprising 140 chapters, was approved by Decree No. 1072/2000 of the President of Ukraine dated 14 September 2000.

The concrete action plans for the implementation of priority provisions of the Programme that have been developed since 2001 are an inalienable part of it. In its turn, an element of the Action Plan is a work plan on adapting Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU.

The content of the Programme was determined taking into consideration the content of the PCA, EU documents on the common strategy regarding Ukraine, and also the experience of preparing and implementing similar programmes for candidate countries for joining the European Union.

It encompasses various aspects of public life, the economy, and culture, and anticipates purposeful steps for approaching the criteria defined by the EU Council in June 1993 in Copenhagen as being necessary for membership in this organization.

Since in signing the Amsterdam Treaty (in effect as of 1 May 1999) the EU countries, among other things, agreed on a single policy for all of Europe in the field of immigration and refugees, which, of course is mandatory also for candidate countries, the Integration Programme includes special chapters devoted to the issue of managing migration.

Above all, the objective is stipulated of ensuring human rights and freedoms in the process of migrational movement in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and international obligations, particularly the right to freedom of movement and selection of place of residence.

Among the priorities set forth in the Programme are the following:

- improving Ukrainian legislation on citizenship in compliance with the European Convention on Citizenship;
- initiating a state register of physical persons, to replace the propyska (residency permit system);
- creating conditions for Ukraine to join the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol on refugee status;
- joining the European Social Charter insofar as the part applying to migrant workers, etc.

It is planned to continue work in the direction of simplifying the visa regime between Ukraine and the EU, and also preserving a maximally simplified regime of trips between Ukraine and EU candidate countries. Along with that, increased attention will be paid to strengthening border and immigration control, and measures aimed at preventing illegal migration.

### **Legislation on migration and refugees**

In the time since the adoption of the Programme, Ukraine has taken serious steps in the direction of fulfilling it, with the aim of achieving European criteria in the field of legislation on migration and refugees:

- new redaction was adopted of the Law of Ukraine “On citizenship of Ukraine” (January 2001), which resolved many issues connected with citizenship for such categories of persons as repatriates, especially those who were previously deported, who have returned to Ukraine, refugees, migrants on the basis of family reunification, etc.
- in June 2001, laws for the regulation of the migration sphere were adopted – 1) new redaction of the Law of Ukraine “On refugees”, which ensured compliance of national Ukrainian legislation with the 1951 UN Convention on refugee status, and 2) Law of Ukraine “On immigration”, which regulates the procedure for foreigners and persons without citizenship to enter or leave on the territory of Ukraine for permanent residence.

Convincing confirmation of Ukraine’s efforts to create a system of asylum that complies with European standards is the fact that presently about 3,000 foreigners have the status of refugees in Ukraine, which is significantly greater than the number of refugees with official status in neighboring EU candidate countries.

The Law of Ukraine “On immigration” legislatively ensures a clear and transparent procedure for issuing permits for foreigners and persons without citizenship to immigrate to Ukraine; earlier this was absent (performed according to agency instructions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

In establishing a mechanism for legal immigration, the law is also aimed at illegal immigration. At the same time, taking into consideration the realities of the transition period and the existence in the country of foreigners with undetermined status, the concluding provisions of the law establish that all the residence permits granted prior to its coming into effect remain valid.

At the same time, significant efforts are being put into strengthening control measures with the aim of combating illegal migration:

- Presidential decree dated 18 January 2001 approved another programme to combat illegal migration for 2001-2004. In January 2001,
- the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine “On amending certain legislative acts of Ukraine on combating illegal migration”, which significantly increased fines for foreigners violating the rules for staying, and also the responsibility was increased for organizers of illegal transfer of people across borders, and of citizens of Ukraine and Ukrainian legal entities for facilitating such violations and providing services to illegal migrants;
- with the adoption of this law, changes were made to Article 32 of the Law of Ukraine “On the legal status of foreigners”, which regulates the procedure for expelling foreigners and persons without citizenship from Ukraine.

A whole series of documents which have been adopted recently or which are being developed in Ukraine are devoted to guarantees of freedom of movement:

- Decree of the President of Ukraine dated 15 June 2001 “On additional measures regarding the realisation of the human right of freedom of movement and free choice of residency”.

As of 1 July 2001 foreigners from countries with a visa-free regime should apply to MIA agencies only if their stay in the country extends beyond 90 days, while citizens of countries for whom entry in Ukraine necessitates a visa need to apply after the visa deadline expires. Thus, the registration of foreigners who are temporarily staying on the territory of Ukraine should take place only when they are crossing the state border.

Significant harmonization of Ukrainian legislation in the area of migration to generally recognized international norms and standards have allowed the state to join the



1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol on Refugee Status. The corresponding Law of Ukraine was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 10 January 2002.

Yet another confirmation of Ukraine's achievements in establishing and improving legislation in the field of migration in accordance with international requirements can be considered to be the adoption of our country as a full-fledged member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which occurred at the last IOM session in the fall of 2001 (Ukraine had observer status at the IOM since 1993).

### **EU technical assistance for Ukraine**

International donor community, through its technical assistance programs, plays a significant role in the process of democracy development and market reform implementation. During the last 10 years Ukrainian government institutions received different policy advice and recommendations regarding policy in the framework of technical assistance projects. Implementation of such recommendations was aimed at building and strengthening democracy and market economy in Ukraine.

However, the objectives of the above-mentioned projects/programs were not adjusted with the declared priority objectives of the Ukrainian government. Furthermore the Government was not prepared for receiving such type of assistance; there were no civil society organizations that could ensure its effective use. As a result, the assistance appeared in an unprepared, non-dialogic environment, which had a negative impact on project outputs and outcomes. The form of TA for Ukraine, which was policy advice and recommendations, also had negative consequences.

### **Technical assistance for effective migration policy**

Assistance to third countries directly related to migration management in accordance with the Communication of the European Commission, November 2002)

The integration of the concerns related to migration in the external policy in general and in the Community external policies and programmes in particular is a recent trend. Actually, migration is a new field of action for the Community cooperation and development programmes. Since Tampere, the European Commission has begun to integrate several issues directly related to legal and illegal migration in its long-term co-operation policy and programmes. Substantial direct and indirect Community assistance has been programmed to provide support to third countries in their efforts to address legal and illegal migration issues.

Some of these programmes – those specifically dedicated to border management, fight against illegal migration, migration management – will contribute directly to strengthen third countries capacity to manage migration flows.

In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the current TACIS Regional Justice and Home Affairs Programme is focusing on three key areas:

- 1) development of a comprehensive border management, migration and asylum system in order to combat smuggling in illegal migrants and to reduce illegal migration flows (concrete actions include provision of border control equipment and training of border guards as well as strengthening the capacity of partner countries to administer legal migration and asylum matters);
- 2) combating drug trafficking through the creation of a “filter system” between Afghanistan and the geographical areas along the “silk route”;
- 3) establishment of effective anti-corruption measures in the partner states aiming at adopting efficient legislation and developing suitable practices in the public service and in civil society for a sustained fight against corruption.

The EU is the largest donor to Ukraine; over the last 10 years, total assistance amounted to €1.072 billion from the EC while the Member States disbursed around €157 million in the period 1996 – 1999. This consists of technical assistance through TACIS, macro-financial assistance, and humanitarian assistance.

The overall amount allocated directly to Ukraine in 2002 is €47 and in 2003 €48 million. In addition, Ukraine benefited from a number of specific and regional Tacis programmes, totalling some €126 million that year.

On the surface, it can be assessed that Ukraine received almost the same amount of technical assistance as any of candidates. But we would like to focus on the quality of this assistance.

### **What lessons could be learnt from Candidate Countries?**

Studying and practically applying the experience of neighboring countries, which have managed to achieve concrete results in their European integration efforts, could be an important accomplishment for Ukraine.

Additional prospects are emerging for Ukraine in the area of regional and trans-border cooperation with new EU members; to this end, viable mechanisms have already been created including Euroregions” (Carpathian, Upper Prut, and Buh [Bug]).

Since the EU is interested in ensuring peace and stability on its borders, there is reason to hope for the expansion of concrete assistance, which it provides for reforms in Ukraine.

The experience of Poland with technical assistance programmes provides an example of good practice for Ukraine and other WNIS. ICPS has undertaken a comparative analysis of technical assistance programmes for Ukraine and Poland.

The results show that TA programs in Poland - unlike in Ukraine - have been effective in promoting reform policies (in migration sphere as well) because they were embedded in a jointly prepared and jointly “owned”, unified strategic framework for supporting the Country accession goal to the EU (Accession Partnership document).

The technical assistance in Poland is:

- timetabled,
- channeled at developing “institutions”, and
- supplemented with adequate levels of donor funding to develop infrastructures and promote investment.

Meanwhile, there is no strategic framework in the form of joint political agreement between Ukraine and the EU. Technical Assistance has not been brought into alignment with the PCA and the role of TA projects has been reduced to providing recommendations on reform policy.

One important lesson learnt from the process of EU enlargement to Poland is that ‘benchmarks’ should incorporate elements reflecting the level of compliance in the actual implementation - not only adoption - of legislation (to which the attention in Ukraine was mainly attracted).

There are two main elements to future cross-border cooperation of an enlarged EU:

- border management - i.e. continued cooperation to fight against illegal and fraudulent trafficking of human and goods; and
- support to economic development and infrastructure of the new border regions (both within and without the new EU borders).

With regard to the latter, a relevant and successful example of cross-border cooperation between regions is provided by the cross-border cooperation programmes between Germany and Poland, involving the German regions of Saxony, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and the Polish ‘voivodships’ of Lower Silesia, Lubuskie, and Zachodniopomorskie.

### **Coordination of technical assistance to Ukraine and Poland**

Past and present experience show that there is a little coordination between Phare and Tacis CBC programmes. Phare applications on the Polish side are usually not matched by corresponding Tacis applications for funding on the Ukrainian side. There is no proper and adequate communication between institutions across the borders.

However, there also have been examples of successful co-ordination between Phare and Tacis instruments, as in the case of the research project jointly funded to study the

“interconnectivity of electricity networks”. In general, however, there is a case for improving bilateral contacts also using existing mechanisms and institutions such as the Polish-Ukrainian Committee.

For Polish authorities INTERREG is only a minor part of the Structural Funds support they will benefit from as a result of EU accession. It is safe to assume that as Poland braces itself to enhance its local governments’ capacity to absorb the whole range of Structural Funds, the “curve” of interest of Polish authorities in cross-border cooperation with Eastern neighbours will decline in the future. A pro-active approach by Poland’s Eastern neighbours will therefore be crucial to the development of future cross-border programmes.

Of course, the abovementioned cooperation priorities, particularly in the migration area, primarily reflect EU interests, since they are focused on restricting immigration to the EU. However, they equally take into consideration Ukraine’s interests concerning problem of free movement of citizens across borders, labour migration, and employment on the territory of European Union member countries.

#### **Instruments of technical assistance to be introduced in Ukraine**

There are instruments of technical assistance used in Candidate Countries can be introduced in Ukraine:

- Connecting budgeting process with strategic planning at all levels (central, regional, local, sectoral) and public consultations;
- Introduction of PHARE concept of “Institution” as structure, procedure, standards and skills;
- Introduction of change management system as practiced in candidate countries;
- Introduction of EU training and networking for civil servants.
- There are two approaches to TA that can be introduced in Ukraine:
  - institution building in order to enable Ukrainian institutions to implement their objectives effectively;
  - infrastructure development in order to ensure investment promotion.

## Annex 1. EU assistance to Ukraine

**Table 1. Overall EC assistance to Ukraine from 1998-2002, (in € million)**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	Total
Tacis National Programme *	44	46	48	48	47	233
Tacis Nuclear Safety	7,7	8.4	5,5	29.4	21,9	72.9
Tacis Cross-border Co-operation**	10.3	5.2	1	5.5	0.5	22.5
Tacis Regional Programme**	4.8	3.7	6	9.1	10,5	34,1
Fuel gap	-	-	25	20	20	65
ECHO (humanitarian assistance)	1.6	6.3	1.3	0.9	0	10.1
Macro-financial assistance (loan)	-	58 ***	-	-	110***	168
<b>Total</b>	<b>118.4</b>	<b>168.1</b>	<b>86.8</b>	<b>152.9</b>	<b>229,9</b>	<b>756,1</b>

**Table 2. Funds allocated through Ukraine National Action Programmes from 1998-2002, (in € million)**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	Total
Institutional, legal and administrative reform	8	12	18.5	15.5	21	75
Private sector support and economic development	10,7	14	14	10	8	56.7
Development of infrastructure networks	1.8	0	0	0	0	1.8
Energy	7.1	4,2	0			11.3
Environmental protection, natural resources management	3	2	0	0	0	5
Rural economic development	1.5	2	0	0	0	3.5
Policy advice, Small Project Programmes	7.9	6,8	4.5	9	7	35.2
Tempus	4	4	5	5	5	24
<b>Total Ukraine AP</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>233</b>

**Table 3. EU financial resources programmed for Ukraine and linked to migration issue[1]**

Country	Amount	Budget line	Years	Theme	Action	Description
Ukraine	33.500.000	B7-520	2001-2003	Migration management	Border management	Improvement of the overall border management system in Ukraine with a view to facilitate movement of goods and people, while enhancing the local capacities to combat illegal activities. Construction and refurbishment of key border
Ukraine [and Moldova]	3.900.000	B7-520	2000	Migration management	Border management	Training and equipment

[1] Annex 2 bis, Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament "Integrating migration issues

# **PANEL DISCUSSION ON THE IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM AND WITHIN THE REGION**

## **Gender Issues on Migration Policies,**

**by Gloria Moreno-Fontes Chammartin,  
Migration Specialist, International Migration Programme,  
International Labour Organisation (ILO)**

Thank you Chairperson, ladies and gentlemen,

The International Labour Office would like to thank the Council of Europe for its kind invitation to participate in these significant discussions and is pleased to contribute to the anticipated successful outcome of this conference.

The presence here of so many senior officials of the governments of all of Europe, and of representatives of European and international institutions as well as countries from other regions, demonstrates that the universal human phenomena of migration is getting the attention and response it deserves.

The ILO has, ever since its establishment in 1919, been involved in developing an international consensus on how to protect workers employed in countries other than their own. By setting norms or standards, by assisting member states in formulating their policies, by enhancing our understanding of the impact of migration policies through research and training, the ILO has sought to minimize individual and social costs resulting from migration. Of particular importance are our Conventions Nos. 97 and 143 on migration for employment, one or both ratified by 17 European countries. More recently, the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work called on ILO and all member States to give special attention to migrant workers.

World-wide, ILO is giving new attention to assisting countries to better conduct labour market assessments, recruitment, supervision and monitoring of employment, safeguarding decent work conditions, combating discrimination and xenophobia, and other essential elements required to effectively manage labour migration.

In Europe, we continue our active cooperation with the Council of Europe. ILO has initiated a joint effort with the CDMG Secretariat to collect profiles of "good practices" in integration and anti-discrimination efforts by government and social partners in all European countries. We are enhancing cooperation with governments, with regional trade union and employer organizations, and with the European Union to strengthen capacities and effectiveness in managing labour migration across this vast and diverse continent.

The ILO Governing Body decided last March that migrant workers —labour migration— will be the main topic for General Discussion at the International Labour

Conference in June 2004. The discussion will focus on three general themes: international labour migration in the era of globalization; **policies and structures for more orderly migration for employment**; and improving migrant workers' protection. Over the next year, ILO anticipates devoting particular attention to addressing the multiple risks faced by women migrant workers, and to combating trafficking and forced labour of migrants. This process plans to elaborate more coherent approaches to managing gender-balanced labour migration policies among the tri-partite constituents of the 176 ILO member countries.

### **Essential Gender issues to be considered**

As the European Committee on Migration makes explicit, a comprehensive approach is indispensable to achieve a Migration Management Strategy based on careful international consultation and cooperation among all States and social actors concerned. The strategy wisely considers the development of a set of measures to manage migration in an orderly manner to maximise opportunities and benefits to individual migrants and the host societies and to minimise trafficking and irregular movement. The ILO considers of extreme importance to always study the effective implementation of this strategy for migration management from a gender perspective with a view to making recommendations designed to empower and protect women migrants.

Since the early 1980s growing proportions of women, single as well as married, and often with higher educational levels than men are moving on their own to take up jobs in other countries. According to the United Nations Population Division data obtained mostly from population censuses and covering documented as well as undocumented migrants, the stock of female migrants grew faster than the stock of male migrants in most of the world between 1965 and 1990. Percentages saw female migrants outnumber male migrants in the most important receiving countries, industrialised as well as developing.

However, when we look at totals of yearly **legal inflows** of migrants into most of the above-mentioned countries, the percentage of women is under-represented. Since legal recruitment efforts continue often targeting skilled and unskilled workers for male-dominated occupations (construction, agriculture), **women's opportunities to migrate legally continue being more limited than men in most receiving countries**<sup>64</sup>. When legal, official recruitment efforts take place for skilled and unskilled labour, they frequently continue aiming at opening the doors only to construction workers and farm labourers.

For example, while in 1999, 32,372 agricultural workers (H2A type of visas) were admitted as temporary workers to the U.S., only 534 registered nurses were admitted. In addition, a sharp increase was registered from 1995 when agricultural workers represented

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<sup>64</sup> An exception to this rule are Gulf States where domestic work has been recognised to be necessary, plus Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

only 11,394, while the opposite trend was recorded in the number of registered nurses who represented up to 6,512 that same year<sup>65</sup>. The same trend is noticed in most Western European countries where migration policies are not explicitly sex-selective. However, restrictions on the admission for work have been imposed to female-dominated occupations, e.g. domestic work. As a result, when undocumented flows are considered, both the number and proportion of women are likely to be much higher than flows of male migrant workers.

A very good and striking example of these male-selective policies is Germany where all four legal means of skilled and unskilled migration for work are dominated by men: firstly, *project-linked employment* mainly in the construction industry; secondly, *guestworker contracts* that encourage the exchange of young skilled labour between Germany and former Eastern Europe countries (80 per cent are male); thirdly, *seasonal workers* for agriculture, forestry, construction and vineyards (again 80 per cent are composed of male workers); and *commuters* living up to fifty kilometres from the German border and who are also concentrated on the above-mentioned economic sectors<sup>66</sup>. On the other hand, the case of Switzerland is also notorious since no immigration quotas exist for domestic workers, while a large number of undocumented women from different developing countries are found working as domestic workers in middle and upper-middle class households with professional working mothers.

For a large percentage of women workers, migration represents a positive experience since the fact of becoming the principal breadwinner of the family gives them a prominent role in their family and decision-making empowerment. However, undocumented migrant women are relatively more exposed to discrimination, exploitation, abuse and violence in the countries of destination. In the context of relatively less legal means to migrate than men, the feminisation of migration flows has become almost synonymous to a growing precarisation of women migrant workers' status and gives space to abuses from "intermediaries" who turn them into virtual slaves in debt-bondage.

As a response to these recognized trends, the following issues are being explored in different ILO projects as contributing to the reduction in the number of abused women migrant workers and in particular in the reduction of trafficked victims: 1) the promotion of the establishment of labour migration agreements between countries of origin and destination with a 50-50 quota for men and women; 2) the creation of a single and effective system of labour market information on existing jobs abroad, making sure that an equal number of jobs for women migrants are included; 3) the strengthening of the monitoring of job recruitment agencies and other agencies providing information on jobs abroad; 4) the strengthening of

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<sup>65</sup> U.S.: 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

<sup>66</sup> Anderson, Bridget: *Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour* (London and New York, Zed Books, 2000), p. 181.



labour inspection 5) the improvement of job opportunities for adults and of educational and vocational training opportunities for children.

Throughout history, migration has been an essential component of economic and cultural development of societies. However, unless it takes place under regimes that respect human rights it can, as the modern slave trade reminds us, entail a high cost for the individual migrants and their origin societies. Many countries in Europe as elsewhere around the world are reviewing, revising or establishing new coherent and comprehensive foreign employment policies, and it is probably the moment to remind them not to forget the importance of gender-balanced policies.

We are pleased that this conference takes place amid important signs of progress towards a more coherent, humanitarian and productive way of addressing the migration phenomenon. Migration can today be one of the most important ingredients of regional economic and social integration. In addressing the vast challenges presented by migration, we underline the need for effective international consultation and cooperation. Consultative fora such as the Council of Europe's CDMG, and indeed our ILO General Discussion are important steps.

I wish to conclude by emphasizing the commitment of the ILO to enhance cooperation with governments, social partners and regional organizations throughout Europe. I firmly believe that the outcome of this Conference will help in building up the understanding, capacity and action needed to administer labour migration in a manner which protects migrant workers and benefits both home and host countries, all workers and all actors concerned.

**Mr Jean-Christophe Dumont, Division des économies non membres et des migrations internationales (OECD)**

Through its Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA) and, more particularly, its Division on Non-Member Economies and International Migration (NEIM), the OECD has carried out numerous activities on the links between international migration, regional integration and economic development. Among these have been a series of regional conferences, the main results of which are summarised in a publication entitled “Migration, Development and Globalisation” (OECD, 2002). In the more specific context of EU enlargement, a seminar on recent labour market trends in the CEECs was held in Bratislava with the support of the Slovakian authorities in March 2000. The main conclusions of this seminar were published in “Migration Policies and EU Enlargement” (OECD, 2001).

From these activities, two main lessons can be drawn and are now broadly accepted:

- EU enlargement will have less of an effect in terms of migration flows towards the 15 old member States than anticipated.
- More adjustments may have to be made to migration policies in the accession countries.

With regard to the first point, the experience when Greece and the countries of the Iberian Peninsula joined (in 1981 and 1986 respectively) was that migration flows dried up before the introduction of freedom of movement (which systematically followed the opening up of trade). In the case of Spain for example, incentives to emigrate were seriously reduced because of the political changes that occurred with the advent of post-Franco Spain, but also because economic recovery and the influx of foreign investment made it possible to stimulate job creation and bridge the pay gap with other European countries.

In line with this historical experience, recent studies (see Trends in International Migration, OECD, 2002) show that the total migration from the 10 future EU members should not exceed 300,000 people a year. Currently, some 830,000 nationals of the CEECs live in EU countries. Forecasts show that this figure could reach 3 million by 2010 and 4 million by 2030. This is a small number compared to the 254 million people of working age which the 15 old member States will have in 2010.

Some uncertainty remains, however, firstly as to historical comparability, and secondly, as to the accuracy of demographic and economic forecasts. The situation of the accession countries differs substantially from that of the southern European countries when they joined the European Community. The GDP of Spain, Portugal and Greece averaged about 60% of Europe’s GDP at the time of their accession whereas that of the 10 new member States averages about 40% of the GDP of the fifteen old member States. Geopolitical aspects also have a much stronger role to play in the current enlargement process, as half of the 10

accession countries have a common border with Germany, Austria or Italy (only Spain had a border, with France). Forecasts should also be treated with some circumspection in so far as they are very sensitive to certain parameters (eg the growth differential or unemployment rates), but also because they are based on past behaviour and there is nothing to say that a historic event on the scale of the enlargement of the EU to 25 countries will not change individual behaviour.

Whatever the case, it is reasonable to suppose that there will be no major consequences in terms of migration flows, and several countries have decided not to apply the transition period in respect of the free movement of labour after 1 May 2004. This decision must, however, also be interpreted in the light of the continuing need for skilled and unskilled labour in these countries.

As far as migration policies in the central and eastern European countries are concerned, spectacular progress has been made in a very short time (through the Phare programme), although in some cases, it is taking longer than expected for the relevant legislation to be applied. For some countries which are likely to become immigration countries very quickly (as Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece did), the main problem is to set up institutions and policies for the reception and integration of immigrants as quickly as possible. Another challenge that will have to be taken up is the question of border controls in historically closely linked geographical areas (on the easternmost borders).

Lastly, another issue which is still rarely mentioned is the potential movement of highly trained workers from central and eastern Europe to the West. In view of the continuing lack of skilled workers in some of the 15 old member States, there is a considerable risk of a brain drain, particularly in certain sectors (health, education). The movement of highly skilled workers is not a new thing but it could accelerate if convergence processes are so slow that the hopes of new EU nationals are frustrated. In this area, the OECD's work on regional integration has shown the key role that structural funds and foreign direct investment played during previous enlargement processes.

### **SESSION 3 : THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGY – IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

**The Migration Management Strategy: A tool for promoting human rights and co-operation on migrant issues in Eastern Europe ,  
by Mrs Maria Ochoa-Llidó, Head of the Migration and Roma Department, Council of Europe**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have to confess that I have been more than surprised by the wealth of information that has come up from the discussions yesterday. I am sure that we could go on through next week and still not have exhausted the subject.

This of course is thanks to you, and I feel that we have achieved one of our objectives, namely to share information.

However, we all know that behind the facts and figures that we have had presented and discussed, and there has been such a quantity, lie the hard realities of human suffering. Migration is not an easy thing to embark on – to leave one's home, friends and family in the uncertain hope of finding a better future, the Eldorado, in some unknown land and then hopefully bring the family to join you. It is not easy, particularly if the host society is hostile. Imagine the plight of those forced into a clandestine world of smugglers and traffickers...

You know better than anyone that the life of a migrant forced into irregularity and bound by debts to those who have helped his passage is not an easy one.

Migration, be it regular or irregular, continues to entail problems of human rights and dignity. We heard of many of them yesterday. However, these are not problems without solutions. As I said yesterday, there are solutions provided there is a common willingness to find them and we are here in Kiev to discuss that.

I strongly believe that our strategy for the orderly management of migration is an important step towards a concerted solution.

What is this strategy?

*The Migration Management Strategy*

The basis of the Council of Europe's migration management strategy is to develop and implement policies on migration *and* integration that are founded on the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, thereby ensuring orderly migration, social cohesion and respect for the individual. It also means taking into account the development needs of countries of origin and transit and taking measures to facilitate voluntary return to the home country.

The key elements of this strategy are:

- Reaffirming the principle that mobility is a human right
- Developing improved legal channels for labour migration (particularly as a tool to combat irregular migration and all the risk of human rights abuses that this entails)
- Promoting family reunification (because the CoE strongly believes that the right to family life is a human right)
- Developing comprehensive integration policies, that bring together rather than divide host societies and migrants
- Developing improved information systems on migrant flows
- And, above all, as the means of achieving all this, promoting dialogue between countries of origin, transit and destination. This is what this conference is all about, as has been said many times, but it is worth repeating: Promoting dialogue to obtain consensual responses to the challenges we face.

So, we have a strategy, adopted by all the 45 member States of the CoE in 2000, but we have realized that it is not really implemented at the national level. Why is that so difficult? Maybe quite simply because of lack of coordination at the national level, not to say at the international level.

The key words here are coordination and cooperation, and again, this conference is supposed to strengthen the links between the countries in this room, be they EU member, candidate countries, countries on the new EU borders or Asian countries.

What can we then do to strengthen cooperation with a view to effectively implementing the strategy for an orderly migration management?

*Towards new structures to deal with migration*

Let me quote from the opening Speech of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe at the Ministerial Conference in Helsinki.

*“To my mind, time is ripe to create a **structure** in close relation with the Committee of Ministers and with the Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, which would facilitate or, where needed, provoke the dialogue between sending, transit and receiving countries. It would actively promote co-ordination with ministries and non-governmental organisations of the countries concerned and establish co-operation to fight the economic, political and sociological causes of migration. It would launch analyses on issues of interest to member States in the preparation of their political decision-making and would propose innovative*

*policies and law. This structure would help implement the strategy at the national level and would subsequently monitor the progress made.”*

As a first step, the European Committee on Migration (CEMG) decided in March 2003 to institutionalise the contacts with non member countries such as the ones we have already experienced in the regional conferences like ours today, through a regular dialogue with origin and transit countries. This crystallized in the proposal to create a political platform with non-European countries.

The Committee of Ministers agreed in June 2003 to allow this new political platform to meet for the first time at the next CEMG meeting taking place from 8-10 December 2003 in Rotterdam at the invitation of the Dutch authorities.

The added value of such a political platform is its unique geographic dimension and its regularity of contacts. For the very first time, the 45 member States of the Council of Europe (among which origin, transit and receiving countries are to be found) will meet twice a year with six non-European countries of origin and transit of migrants.

These meetings will allow for close co-operation not only on a multilateral basis but also bilaterally. The selection of the countries is based on the migration routes most frequently used by migrants coming to Europe. The CEMG has chosen an African and an Asian route to start the dialogue and partnership.

*What would be the value of such a platform?*

Hosted by the Council of Europe, the platform would benefit from the high-level participation of government experts and policy makers of the 45 European member States and of selected countries of origin. It would therefore provide a unique forum to develop a common policy and set standards on migration for all countries, based on the values of human rights. The participation of the European Union will ensure that the common asylum and migration policy of the Union is fully integrated, and that we avoid new dividing lines. To my eyes, this is particularly important for the countries in the new borders of the EU, such as yours, Mr Chair.

Collaboration with OECD, ILO, UNHCR and IOM would also continue in this political platform, the forum providing the opportunities for all relevant international actors to co-ordinate their actions, ensuring that they are complementary and mutually reinforcing. And for the first time, the Central American Regional Conference on Migration which groups countries of central America plus the United States and Canada will be invited as an observer organization.

However, the political platform would not just be limited to government representatives and international organizations, it would also include parliamentary representatives, local and regional authorities and civil society, and of course the financial

donors, without whom the strategy cannot succeed, and the Council of Europe Development Bank which, as you know, has among its priorities, to help finance projects for refugees and migrants will be closely involved in the platform.

One of the roles of this platform will be to devise a programme of activities decided by all of the members of the platform (i.e. not only by Council of Europe member States, but in consultation with the non-member countries) to effectively implement the Council of Europe strategy for the orderly management of migration.

The European Committee on Migration of the Council of Europe, having taken the decision to set up the political platform, discussed how its activities would then be implemented. It tried to imagine an operational tool for the platform and agreed that, what was first called an observatory of migration, could take the form of an agency or centre, to be established with the pan-European mission to work with countries of destination, transit and origin (including non-European countries of origin and transit) to develop initiatives to implement our Migration management strategy.

*What would the agency do?*

The agency would implement the strategy on orderly management of migration flows, in particular with countries of origin, laying emphasis on actions and project development that would deal with problems of integration in countries of destination.

It would influence the way development aid in countries of origin and transit is supplied and would support, in particular, the role of migrants as vectors of sustainable development.

It would study and propose solutions to issues such as those dealt with during this conference:

- the consequences of the EU enlargement for neighbouring countries,
- how to curb irregular migration,
- how to adapt integration policies to the real needs of both the migrants and the receiving society for the benefit of all,
- Brain drain would also be an issue covered by the agency.
- And above all, the agency would facilitate a joint management of migratory flows between countries of origin and destination by promoting channels of regular migration.

On the standard setting field, consideration will be given to extending the key migration treaties of the Council of Europe (particularly the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, but also the European Convention on Social Security) to

non-member states through the elaboration of protocols to these conventions. The agency could then have another important role in providing technical assistance to third countries to help them sign and ratify such protocols through training and compatibility studies. In this way we would be able to extend the human rights principles embodied in these texts, and contribute to the fight against illegal migration.

Turning words into deeds and concrete action often can be difficult; particularly when working with governments who must, by force, be attentive to their national interests, and with donors who cannot be expected to invest in projects that have not been well thought or do not enjoy the support of the relevant partners.

We are well aware that we are at the very beginning of a long process and that we are far from having reached the end of the road.

But I am pleased to say that we have begun to make real progress, and rather quickly too, after the important decisions taken in Helsinki, and this conference today is an important further step forward. I would not call it a rehearsal of the political platform because the objectives and working methods are quite different, but the success of yesterday's discussions and the fruitful ones I am sure we will have today are, to me, a clear signal that we are in the right direction.

Thank you for your attention.



**Make the integration of immigrants successful:  
challenges for migrants, hosting societies and countries of origin,  
by Dr. Eva Orsos Hegyesi,  
Former Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Health, Social and Family Affairs, Hungary**

## **1. New challenges**

Economic, political and cultural globalisation is posing new challenges to governments and societies at large. In this presentation, these challenges are described in terms of solidarity, good governance and multiple affiliations. In responding these challenges, societies must also learn to use and appreciate the contributions of immigrants and minorities.

Solidarity within societies includes immigrant groups and minorities. Solidarity between countries includes tackling root causes of forced migration and offering (international) protection to minorities. Good governance entails empowering immigrants and minorities to address their specific problems and valuing their contributions in responding to society's overall challenges. Belonging to an immigrant or minority group merely adds another affiliation to the multiple affiliations these persons hold.

Immigrants and minorities do not often share a similar background. Historic minorities usually do not have a recent migratory history, but form long-established communities within states. They are thus able to claim recognition of their language, specific political representation and, in cases of indigenous populations, land rights. For those immigrants groups, who still feel a part of the culture of their country of origin, cultural and language matters are considered policy issues rather than granted rights. Immigrants seek participation in mainstream institutions and do not require specific political representation as exists for national minorities, nor do they have claims on land of the 'host country' as indigenous peoples may have.

Immigrants and minorities do have many things in common, however, and policies relating to them often concern similar issues. Minorities may have a migratory background, on one hand, while the violation of minority rights, on the other, may lead to migratory movements. They often share a distinction from other groups in society in terms of ethnic and national origins, cultures, religions and skin colour. When addressing these issues, societies will have to respond to two challenges.

The first corresponds to immigration and the need to acknowledge that Europe has become a region of immigration. This involves an honest re-evaluation of Europe's history. Europe must consider itself historically as not only a region from which people migrated, but also as the final destination of many who have migrate. This would do justice to immigrants groups throughout Europe, since the denial that Europe is an area of immigration essentially denies the existence of immigrants and the role they played and continue to play in Europe's history.

The second relates to minorities and the development of civil society. In a context of a developed civil society based on the principles of equality before law, there needs to be more openness for accommodating groups of individuals who define themselves as members of minority groups. In a context of multi-national and multi-ethnic states, application of the principles of civil society could contribute to easing ethnic tensions and conflict.

## **2. Policy developments**

The socio-economic, political and cultural changes result in highly complicated processes of societal disintegration and re-integration, affecting the lives of all persons, irrespective of national or ethnic origin. New political and personal attitudes are needed in order to establish “re-integrated“ and cohesive societies that engage all of their inhabitants. Immigrants and minorities play an important part in this process, and may be better or lesser equipped than nationals to do so depending on circumstances. Moreover, the incorporation of immigrants and minorities into changing societies may be easier than their incorporation into societies that are more or less static.

The Council of Europe and many of its member states have adopted a basic philosophy for the integration of the immigrants and the promotion of positive community relation. First, it is recognised that governments – by adopting legislative and other policy measures in all areas of society – have a vital and active part to play in this process. Second, integration and community relations are not only matters for immigrants and minorities, but for society as a whole. Community relations refer to the whole range of challenges and opportunities resulting from the interaction between nationals and newcomers and between majority and minority groups. Integration involves not only adaptation by immigrants and minorities, but also the responses and adjustments of the society at large.

Nowadays, migration ranks high on the political agenda of almost every European state, whether they are older or newer countries of immigration. Usually, a distinction is made between policies that aim to control or manage migratory movements and those that promote the integration of immigrants and refugees.

Governments of newer countries of immigration are recognising that many so-called “transit migrants” and other migrant and refugee groups will, in fact, remain in their countries. They have thus (in varying degrees over the last few years) begun to develop policy and other responses on integration and community relations alongside policies regulating the admission of returning nationals, immigrants and refugees. The development of integration policies is a part of, or profits from, changes in the countries' overall legal framework, including constitutional changes. Provisions outlawing discrimination on the basis of race and skin colour, national or ethnic origin, religion and belief are being inserted into national laws in many of these countries. Specific integration programmes are, if at all, primarily designed for returning nationals, deportees or refugees. Several countries are reviewing their existing

legislation on nationality and citizenship, not only to respond to the immigration situation, but also to address the issue of national minorities and stateless persons. In some newly created states, the process of developing an independent citizenship policy is still underway and has not yet been finalised.

With few exceptions, older countries of immigration have never considered themselves to be countries of immigration, although they have, in fact, become *de facto* countries of immigration. Consequently, it has taken some time before governments began to address the issue of integrating immigrants into their receiving societies. In most of these countries, integration policies have been implemented and considerable experience gained as to how these policies work out in practice. In all of these countries, similar mechanisms have been adopted, including the securing of legal residence rights; measures to facilitate equal access to employment, housing, education and political decision-making; naturalisation and citizenship policies; and efforts to combat discrimination, racism and xenophobia<sup>67</sup>.

Integration policies are often based on varying political philosophies and traditions in older immigration countries, with regular adaptations to respond to changing situations within their receiving societies. In spite of these differences, most of these countries are characterised by significant state intervention in establishing equal rights for long-term and legally resident non-citizens. Equal access to the institutions of the welfare state is viewed as key in integrating foreign-born populations. These policies are based on the notion of the equality of all individuals before law. Non-nationals should gradually acquire socio-economic and civil rights, while some rights would be exclusively reserved for citizens or nationals of the host society.

Some states went further and considered citizenship and naturalisation as central to the integration of immigrants and their families. Many adapted their laws on citizenship or nationality in order to facilitate naturalisation. Once they had acquired the citizenship or nationality of the host society, immigrants would automatically be granted the rights and obligations that come with that status.

Other countries went still further, believing that specific measures targeting (visible) minorities were needed in order to ensure these individuals' equal access to the major institutions of society. Such measures were intended to compensate for the fact that such persons usually come from disadvantaged positions (in terms of language ability, education, and job skills) and/or face social and structural impediments to their full participation in society in the form of racist or xenophobic discrimination.

In express policy terms, these variant approaches translate into the application of 'specific' or 'general' measures. Based on the desire to 'level the playing field', specific

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<sup>67</sup> Based on the document: Diversity and cohesion: new challenges for the integration of immigrants and minorities. Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2000.

measures target persons of immigrant or ethnic background in an effort to provide them with the skills and instruments needed to facilitate their integration into the host society. General measures, on the other hand, are directed towards society at large and involve an extension of those measures designed for national populations to immigrant and minority residents. Additionally, rather than targeting specific individuals, general measures seek to address problems affecting the entire society (i.e., housing, health care, etc.). In this way, it is intended that all social and economically disadvantaged persons be assisted, regardless of their ethnic or national background.

Thus, the challenge for policy-makers continues to be how to balance interests and aims, general and specific measures, in the development of inclusion strategies. One answer may be found in what is referred to in some policy circles as 'mainstreaming' or, the desire to address the situations experienced largely by immigrant and minority groups across a broad policy spectrum.

Policy debates often focus on the problematic aspects of integration and on devising mechanisms to remove barriers to it. A new debate is emerging, however, that highlights the contribution of immigrants and minorities to society, and which values the fact that people are of different backgrounds and have multiple and diverse identities.

**Mr Mehmet Emre, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director General at the Ministry of the Republic of Turkey**

In today's world, values such as "democracy", "the supremacy of law", "human rights" and "tolerance" have become the main criteria for evaluating the advancement of nations individually and collectively. It is therefore incumbent upon every state and every nation to do its utmost to advance human rights and the culture of tolerance.

Intolerance is a rejection of diversity and one of the most crucial issues of our time. It is one of the root causes of many conflicts in the world.

Its extreme forms have led to human suffering, ethnic cleansing and atrocities. Our primary tools in an effective long term strategy towards this end are education and media.

Targeted education and awareness raising is also required. The first step should be overcoming existing prejudices towards one another.

Eventually tolerance, acceptance, respect for the other and inclusiveness will become part of our daily life and political practice.

Intolerance is not a spontaneous fact in the life of an individual or in society. It is a behavioural pattern acquired in time. So is tolerance. Addressing, in a systematic and rational manner, cultural, social, economic and political root causes of intolerance is therefore a necessity. A culture of tolerance, on the other hand, can be attained notably through education, which could make a decisive contribution to the promotion of human rights values and particularly of attitudes and behaviours.

Unfortunately, segregation in schooling and racist as well as discriminatory contents in some study programs, in school texts and in information media are still a fact of life in many of our countries.

Equal access to quality education for children from every background is crucial. Particular attention should be paid to eliminating all direct and indirect discrimination in education systems against individuals from vulnerable sectors of the society, including girls and women. Specific measures should be taken to ensure that they achieve their full potential.

Equally important is the application of education policies designed to promote understanding, solidarity and tolerance among individuals, as well as among ethnic, social, cultural and religious groups and nations. These policies should duly be reflected in school curricula, textbooks and other educational material including the use of new technologies, as well as in the regular training programs for teachers and other educational staff.

Human rights education should not be confined to children, but should also address adult members of the society. Targeted education programs should be regularly undertaken for politicians, teachers, media and civil society representatives, law enforcement officers,

judges, prosecutors, prison staff, customs and immigration officers, health and social welfare services personnel and other officials.

Exchanges of educational practices and research, direct contacts between students, teachers and researchers, school twinning arrangements and visits at national and international levels are useful experiences in increasing knowledge of, and tolerance and respect for, foreign cultures, peoples and countries.

Finally, ethical education of human rights will be a most effective way to combat racism and discrimination, especially in preventing younger generation from acquiring racist tendencies.

Despite the upsurge in racism, xenophobia and related intolerance, the problems experienced by the targeted groups remain invisible to the general public. Despite improved efforts, media is often indifferent to their plight and racist incidents go rather unnoticed.

Sometimes even the media itself, by selectively listing or misrepresenting facts and spreading false information, further promote racist prejudices against certain groups, foreign communities or their countries of origin. The false images that tend to associate people belonging to certain ethnic, religious, national groups with crime and criminality, women from certain parts of the world with prostitution, Africans with poverty, Muslims with terrorism are widespread. Such examples, unfortunately, do not exclude serious newspapers with high circulation.

Moreover, advocates of racist, extremist, discriminatory, intolerant views and ideologies misuse the media to promote hatred, racism, xenophobia and discrimination. They increasingly resort to the Internet to disseminate information and propaganda, to gain followers, to contact similar organizations in other parts of the world and to encourage racist actions.

Although in several countries the dissemination of racist discourses is prohibited and punished by criminal laws, they can avoid legal obstacles by resorting to Internet providers located in countries where this type of web sites is legal. Video tapes, books and CDs containing racist motives are also made available through online shopping.

Media bears a heavy responsibility for the way in which different sectors of society view each other, since it is an extremely powerful means that has an impact on public. It can play a role also in promoting a culture of tolerance and in countering prejudices and hatred. More responsible journalism practices are therefore much needed.

First of all the media itself should realize the dire need for a change of prevalent attitudes. Strategies should be developed to change the tone and methods of media reporting starting from headlines. Mainstream journalists and editors might lead the way by signing up to editorial policies that seek to promote a culture of tolerance. Self-regulatory codes of

conduct would be helpful as a first step. Specialized training introducing non-racist reporting techniques is also needed for journalists. In partnership with civil society, projects for public awareness on race issues and tolerance from a positive angle can be initiated by the media. Experiences and expertise of journalists from different ethnic, religious, national backgrounds can be utilized to reflect the problems of those at the receiving end of intolerance and discrimination.

We have to admit that today there are political and cultural fault lines. Like in an earthquake, if the fault lines move suddenly the devastating effects would be impossible to contain. Therefore, we must try to reconcile these fault lines. If we wish present conflicts be resolved and potential problems be prevented, we must aim to reach at a concept of "us" instead of "the other".

Tolerance and non-discrimination is a matter of mentality. The very root cause of intolerance is ignorance and intolerance is the source for racism, xenophobia and discrimination. Combat against these phenomena and related intolerance is a continuous long term process, in which the International community, Governments, civil society and the media share responsibility. This process requires systematic efforts based on human values and knowledge of and respect for one another.

My conclusion is that, what we need is a positive consciousness on the necessity of a new relationship among cultures to attain solidarity through respect for cultural diversity. We must collectively have the wisdom, and not only wisdom but also courage, for working and living together; there by eliminate any clash among cultures or civilizations.

## **Point of view of non-members countries:**

### **Migration management from the perspective of a developing country, by Mr Tarik Ahsan, Director for Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh**

Mr. Chairman,

#### *DEVELOPMENT ASPECT OF MIGRATION*

Migration has been a natural phenomenon. In the olden days, migration happened basically in the direction of favourable climate and better agricultural prospect. That is perhaps one of the reasons why we see huge concentration of population in the countries of the South which now constitute the developing world. The push-pull factors may have apparently transformed but they are unchanged in basic nature. It is just that, instead of better physical climate and agriculture, the migrants of today would perhaps move for better governance and higher incomes. Migration is, therefore, basically a function of disparity of the level of development between different countries or regions.

#### *PATTERN OF MIGRATION TO EUROPE*

The major recipients of migration in Europe are predominantly developed Western European countries. East European countries are not major recipients of non-European migrants. However, during the Cold War, developing countries had some ideological proximity to these Socialist countries of East Europe. Because of relative gradient of development difference, a good number of students from the developing countries like Bangladesh came to study in the former USSR and the East European countries under government scholarships, and many of them were naturalized in these countries through matrimonial ties. After the end of Cold War, this trend of flow of limited legal immigration into East Europe came to an end.

Mr. Chairman,

#### *MIGRATION MANAGEMENT EFFORTS IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY LIKE BANGLADESH*

Like most other developing countries, Bangladesh is a populous country. Human capital is one of her major resources. Since investment has not been at the desired level to harness the full potentials of the human capital, it is only natural for the government of such a developing country to encourage emigration for overseas jobs. The migration under government patronage started in Bangladesh in 1976 with the sending of workers to the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. By now, such migration has expanded to 20 countries. At present, an estimated 2.8 million migrant workers from Bangladesh are working abroad. The yearly remittance amounts to about US\$ 3 billion. It is about 6% of the GDP. The remittance



is helping the balance of payment of the country. On the other hand, the returnees are contributing to the economic development of their country of origin not only through their investment but also through application of their expertise.

Bangladesh inherited the Emigration Act of British India and the Emigration Rules of 1923. However, migration management in Bangladesh had to be made up-to-date with enactment of the Emigration Ordinance 1982. The Ordinance encourages development of institutions for promoting overseas employment and, at the same time, it authorizes the government to restrict emigration if it deems it necessary in consideration of the possibility of brain drain or otherwise. It also provides for punishment for involvement in illegal emigration. With a view to better management of migration of labour, the present government in Bangladesh created a whole separate Ministry for Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment in the year 2001 as part of its election pledge.

However, migration management in Bangladesh has traditionally been oriented toward the Middle East and East Asia. In absence of any official programme of migration from Bangladesh to Europe, it received only secondary attention from the policy makers and policy thinkers.

#### *EUROPEAN POLICY*

The enlargement of EU is going to essentially have the trickle effect of extending its basic migration management policies further towards the East. As a result, the border countries will assume an enhanced responsibility to control migration through their territories. Like the Western European countries, they have embarked on accentuated measures against illegal immigration, including proposals for readmission agreements with non-European countries. However, readmission agreements are often difficult for any country for its legal and socio-economic ramifications. The readmission agreements can succeed if they are part of a broader co-operation agenda, which takes duly into account the problems encountered by partner countries in effectively addressing the migration issues.

It may be pertinent to comment that prevailing migration management strategy of European countries appears to be overly focused on fighting illegal immigration. The other positive aspect of migration is often underestimated. This aspect has duly been acknowledged by the Commission of the European Community in its Communication of 03 December 2002 entitled "Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union's Relations with Third Countries". I would like to quote a portion from that Communication which says "migration is not to be seen only as a problem, but also as an essentially positive phenomenon ... which produces both opportunities and challenges. It is a fact that industrialised countries, including the European Union, benefit considerably from migration and will continue to need inward migration in the future, both in high-skilled and low-skilled sectors."

It may not be totally out of place to mention that the temporary movement of natural persons TMNP was recognised as one of the four modes of delivering services abroad by the General Agreement on Trade in Services GATS of 1995, where it became known as 'Mode 4' liberalisation. The LDC members of the WTO in the Cancun Ministerial Meeting of WTO in September 2003 demanded preferential treatment facilitating movement of semi-skilled labour to the developed countries under 'Mode 4'. The issue duly found its place in the draft Ministerial Declaration of the Cancun Meeting, which, however, collapsed at the last moment for differences on other issues. The European Parliament in its resolution of 12 March 2003 welcomed the offer by the Commission of EC, under the GATS process, to grant developing countries better opportunities to supply services to the EU market through temporary cross-border movement of qualified personnel.

Mr. Chairman,

### *CONCLUSIONS*

Europe's partnership with countries of origin should pave the way for developing a proper balance between combating undocumented migrations, facilitating legal migration and providing development assistance. It may, however, not be productive in the long run to link development aid to countries' willingness to cooperate on readmission matters. It is redundant to say that investing in the programmes of sustainable development in the countries of origin will certainly address one of the root causes of illegal immigration.

The EU's current presidency, Italy, in July 2003, suggested an 8-point plan which proposed that EU draw up quotas for legal immigrants from outside EU and indicated that the most effective tool for fighting illegal immigration is careful management of legal immigration. Italy, for its part, has recently enacted the Flow Decree 2003 which provided for quotas for migrant workers from a number of developing countries including Bangladesh. It is hoped that other countries will follow suit.

It is also hoped that Europe which is an epitome of good governance and social responsibility will tackle the issue of migration management with an open, pragmatic and unprejudiced mind so that it is not perceived to be blemished with any xenophobic inclinations. It is also hoped that Europe, through any excessively restrictive migration policy, will not become the "Fortress Europe" but remain an inclusive society very much in tune with the hopes and aspirations of the developing world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Mrs Tran Thi Tam, Acting Head of Immigration Division,  
Consular Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the Conference Organizers and the host country - Ukraine for giving me an opportunity to attend and address this important Conference on Migration Policies.

Taking place in one of the most famous and beautiful cities in the Europe, this Conference is a great effort of the European countries to strengthen their mutual understanding and cooperation in a somewhat controversy issue of illegal migrants on the eve of the E.U. enlargement. The theme of the Conference itself reflects a deep and common concern of the World community about the sensitive issue. As we are all aware, there have been many conferences and workshops on illegal migration, refugees etc... ; At the discussions, many causes and solutions have been so far mentioned, analyzed and considered. I myself had opportunity to attend some of the discussions and did share with my colleagues the principles, solutions and desires for a comprehensive cooperation among the related countries in settling the question. The presence of Vietnam's delegation at this Conference one more time reconfirmed the Vietnamese Governments deep concern and attitude towards international cooperation to tackle the common issue of migrants. Today, I will not repeat what have been said, but focus on analyzing the causes of migration flows from Vietnam to Eastern Europe and possible solutions.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before going into the point, let me first remind that migration has been a natural and historical trend alongside the development of human society. Migration brings both positive and negative effects to the origin, transit and host countries. Since the World economic integration has been strongly developed nowadays, the world migration situation is ever-increasingly complicated. Therefore, the international cooperation is of a ever necessity for us to bring into play all positive aspects of legal migrations as well as to put it into control and diminish illegal migrations' negative effects.

You may know well that Vietnam have been seen as one country of origin of migrants to Eastern Europe. Major causes can be named as follows:

- First, Vietnam had a traditional and close tie to almost East European countries, not only politically but also culturally and economically. For many years. East European countries have been the main places where many Vietnamese workers and intellectuals can come to work and study. Due to this historical condition, Vietnamese community in East Europe has increased in number; many found East Europe as their second home and easily harmonized.

- Second, Vietnam has long been a least - developed country with an average income per capita as only \$400. Therefore, for a long time. East Europe has been a promising land in the eyes of many Vietnamese people. In recent years when the world economy become more integrated. East- West relations become more open, many Vietnamese find East European countries as an ideal place for them to stay and to transit to other West European countries. For example, the host country Ukraine has long been used as a stop -over for hundreds of Vietnamese illegal migrants trending to other European countries.

The flows of Vietnamese migrants to the East Europe nowadays are more complicated due to the involvement by national and international crimes, especially in organizing illegal migrants, women and children smuggling and using the modern migration issue for political purpose.

Thank you for your attention.

## **CLOSING SESSION**

**Presentation of the General Rapporteur's conclusions,  
by Prof. Vira Nanivska,  
Director of the International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev**

The Rapporteur General presented her conclusions at the close of the conference as set out below.

### **Conference goals**

The Rapporteur General reminded the participants of the goals of the conference, namely:

- To discuss current and emerging problems.
- To discuss possible actions which might be taken with a view to addressing these problems.

### **Changes that require the development of a strategy**

The Rapporteur General identified the changes that require the development of a strategy; firstly those changes that have been brought about by the enlargement of the European Union and secondly changes in the structure of migration.

#### *Changes brought by EU enlargement.*

EU enlargement was referred to as the key factor that has brought about a number of important changes. The key points put forward by speakers were:

- Though most of the documents on migration management adopted earlier have not been enforced yet; EU enlargement and the Greater Europe concept require the revision of both the conceptual frameworks and organisational principles of migration policies.
- In order to address the problems that have emerged after the enlargement, the European Union has adopted the concept of “Europe without borders”. However, the EU should also take an active part in developing policies within the Greater Europe and neighbouring regions.

- The EU policies should be capable of both ensuring the principle of the freedom of movement and human rights within the EU for the countries that become EU neighbours, and preserving the cultural environment and social equilibrium within European countries (the need to avoid new dividing lines).

### *Changes in the structure of migration*

The key points put forward by speakers were:

- It is essential to distinguish clearly between the approaches and instruments of migration management for refugees, relatives and labour migrants.
- Illegal immigration is an organised phenomenon that constitutes a part of the flow of goods and services managed by criminal structures.
- Human trafficking accounts for a sizeable part of illegal immigration.
- In the course of the last decade, the structure of migration in Eastern Europe has shifted from ethnic migration to economic migration.
- Many countries, especially developed Eastern European countries, have been transformed from countries of origin into countries of destination. They have also become transit countries.

### **Symptoms of problems in migration management**

The speakers emphasized the following problems and contradictions in migration management:

- Migration in the EU countries is not accompanied by proper integration. Infrastructure for integration is expensive and is only now being created. This negatively affects the cultural environment and causes social tension and xenophobia;
- Countries that are located on the border of the Schengen zone are turning into reservoir areas for illegal migrants.
- Migration processes are becoming increasingly criminalised.

- There is the perception of a growing discrepancy between the declarations of Europe's openness and the actual policy of building barriers to legal migration to the EU.
- “Accommodating” policy in the admission countries has failed. Some immigrant groups that have maintained their own national identity find themselves in “social exclusion”.

### **The essence of the new challenge**

The main points under this theme were:

- Old concepts and mechanisms no longer work under new conditions.
- The most complicated issue of linkage between poverty and migration must be considered.
- Illegal migration is hard to control.
- No country can cope with migration problems on its own.
- Migration management should cover a wider region, with the simultaneous creation of management instruments that would be standard and at the same time specific in the way they are used.

To achieve these results, countries from different regions, cultures and traditions should establish partnerships. Consequently, migration management requires a high level of inter-governmental dialogue and joint effort. The inter-governmental dialogue should be institutionalised. This truth is lost amidst a background of persisting contradictions of all kinds between countries.

New challenges were also identified (such as, for example solidarity within societies, solidarity between countries, good governance and multiple affiliation).

### **Key issues in designing common migration management policies**

The main points under this theme were:

- Transforming illegal migration into legal migration.
- Harmonising the legal aspects in the management of migration in different countries.
- Agreeing on conceptual frameworks of migration management.
- Streamlining migration infrastructure in separate countries, on issues like re-admission of illegal migrants, and refugee support.
- Channelling technical assistance to build institutions and integral infrastructures in migration regulation, and not only fortifying the borders between the EU and post-Soviet countries.
- Creating a common information source on migration terms and conditions, covering as wide region as possible.
- Defining migrants' integration criteria, instead of "accommodation".
- Building migrants' integration infrastructure.
- Increasing the level of technological equipment of the border control.
- Promoting tolerance and balanced journalistic coverage of migration issues.
- Undertaking active co-development in the countries of origin instead of just fortifying the future Schengen Border especially in issues of readmission.

### **Unmanaged migration threatens peace and security in the region**

The following factors were mentioned:

- The dearth of coordinated policies between countries participating in the conference.
- The inadequate policies at the national level.
- The intensification of the activity of criminal groups.
- The increasing inconsistency between the rights and obligations of legal migrants, especially in the second and third generations; the emergence of non-integrated groups, which become a grave burden for the social security system and the labour market.



- Short-sighted policy, whereby EU countries are reluctant to invest effort and money in the countries of origin to reduce illegal migration into the EU.

### **Proposals for action**

#### *At the conceptual level*

1. Moving from ad-hoc improvements in separate countries to a coherent migration management policy covering “migration systems”.
2. Developing a new map of migration flows - neighbourhood and interaction of European and Eurasian migration systems, Eurasian migration corridor, etc.
3. Two different approaches to understanding migration:
  - a. The “oriental” approach, as expressed by a Chinese representative, views migration as a natural historic phenomenon that should be taken for granted as such with its obvious costs and benefits;
  - b. The “correct approach” that perceives migration as a consequence of the modern situation that requires new management instruments.
4. Define where the focus should be in the management of migration (e.g. eliminating the need for and encouraging migration, management of migrant movement, migrant integration).
5. How to make integration processes the subject of bilateral agreements.
6. Cooperation on migration management, burden sharing, building general partnership on activities, encouraging joint efforts to resolving problems.

#### *At the legislative level*

1. Harmonisation of legislation.
2. Standardisation of notions and definitions employed in regulatory documents.

3. Every legislative and regulatory document must be accompanied by an explanatory policy paper.

*At the organisational level*

1. EU countries should share their experience in migration management with the post-Soviet countries.
2. Technical assistance should be channelled towards the institutionalisation of migration policies under EU standards.
3. Coordination of the implementation of migration management strategy.
4. To link AID with the adoption of the re-admission mechanisms.

**The concept of a new strategy of migration management**

The strategy is intended to replace the current model which has focused on two major lines of action: the closing of borders to new influxes of labour migrants and measures to promote the social integration of the immigrant population in the host countries.

The management of migration flows is the essence of the new strategy. It includes both management of migration itself and management of public perceptions of migration.

The strategy implies political flexibility, based on balancing the costs and benefits from migration with basic values of democratic communities.

Such an approach requires:

- The capacity of all the participating countries to develop and implement their own strategies;
- Mechanisms of cooperation (such as information exchange, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of migration policy).

The strategy proposes to establish a new Agency with the Pan European mission to work with the countries of destination, transit and origin. The Agency will be charged with developing initiatives to implement the Migration Management Strategy.

The Agency would study and propose how to:

- Address the consequences of the EU enlargement for neighboring countries;
- Curb irregular migration;
- Adopt integration policies to the real needs of both the migrants and the receiving societies;
- Address the problems related to brain drain; and above all
- Facilitate a joint management of migratory flows by promoting channels of regular migration.

### **Risks to the implementation of the strategy**

- Post-Soviet countries do not possess either the experience or the institutions to design migration policy as public policy.
- Short-term interests prevail over a long-term partnership policies.

### **Key issues in the strategy implementation**

- How to establish a bilateral integration process.
- The role of technical assistance in this process.
- How to organise discussion and implementation of the strategy among countries participating in the conference. The role of the dialogue institutionalisation in this process.
- What criteria should be used for monitoring and assessing migration processes: human rights, integrity of cultural ambience, safety, availability of resources?

**Proposals for dialogue extension**

- Extend the scope of discussed and coordinated policies.
- Third countries must be involved to the dialogue.
- The New Agency should become a Pan European FORUM for the dialogue and cooperation coordination between all the interested parties.
- To create a working group for amending the Strategy with a view to taking account of the positions of third countries, and translating them into the working documents.

**Closing remarks**  
**by Mr Viktor Zubchuk, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine**

Evolution of migration policies and emergence of a legal framework to regulate migration in Ukraine developed alongside with the strengthening of the Ukrainian statehood. First, the key elements of the Ukrainian migration policy were defined in the Declaration on State Sovereignty in 1991. It declared migration policy a subject of state regulation and focused upon the introduction of the Ukrainian citizenship.

The development of the Ukrainian migration legislation can be roughly divided into two periods, with the moment the Ukrainian Constitution was adopted serving as a dividing line.

In the period until June 1996, the key aspects of the national migration policy were only partially regulated. This was achieved by adopting 'The Law on State Border of Ukraine', 'The Law on Refugees', 'The Law on the Order of Entrance and Exit of Ukraine by Ukrainian citizens', 'On the Legal Status of Foreigners'.

Simultaneously, a number of other legal acts were adopted. They were aimed at creating mechanisms of the implementation of the aforementioned laws.

Having laid the foundation of the migration regulation, the Constitution of Ukraine outlined the direction of further work on migration legislation as well as of the search for concrete solutions of the problems with guaranteeing the human rights in the field of migration.

With regard to law-making, the main objectives were, on the one hand, to harmonise existing legislation with the Constitution of Ukraine and international legal documents on human rights to which Ukraine is a party while, on the other hand, to complete the creation of the migration legislation. In practical terms, in the absence of the clearly formulated concept of a state migration policy, it was important to determine the main aims and directions of such a policy. They were formulated in the 'Foundations of the State Policy on Human Rights' (17 June 1999), 'Main Directions of Social Policy for 1997-2000 and for the period until 2004', 'Strategy of the Integration into the European Union', 'Programme of the Fight against Illegal Migration for 2001-2004' and other documents that were enacted by the decrees of the President of Ukraine.

Altogether, the main tasks of the migration policy consist in the management of the migration processes on the basis of the national interest of the country as well as in the improvement of the legal mechanism of the regulation of migration.

The most important among the directions of the state migration policy are:

- Facilitating the return of repatriates and their descendants into Ukraine;
- Creating legal and socio-economic foundations for the regulation of the external labour migration of the Ukrainian citizens;
- Guaranteeing the protection of refugees;
- Promoting preventive measures against irregular migration;
- Regulating processes of voluntary resettlement through international agreements;
- Developing international co-operation with a view to solving existing problems in the area of external migration;
- Incorporating norms and principles of the international law in the national legislation.

In recent years, Ukraine has witnessed the increase of migration flows, caused by the differences in social and political condition of countries, their labour markets, as well as by the civil, religious and military conflicts. Therefore, in order to ensure national security and public order, it appears particularly important to adopt a complex approach to the issues of the organisation of the control of migration flows, registration of people and other relevant issues.

International experience demonstrates that every country has its own unique system of state management of the migration processes, a system developed over long time. In many European countries and the USA, the law-enforcement component of the migration policy gains prominence with the aim to subject foreigners who violate the law to strict sanctions and to empower law-enforcement agencies to apply tough measures to such foreigners. Coordination of this work should be ensured by the agencies charged with national security and public order in a state. It is expected that, with the enlargement of the European Union, the EU approach to the migration policy will become even more uniform and strict.

Taking into account international trends, objective factors related to the functioning of the state institutions in Ukraine, issues of national security and the need to improve the effectiveness of the state regulation of the migration processes, it can be stated that Ukraine has now reached the point when a State Migration Service can be created.

**REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON “MIGRATION POLICIES ON THE EVE OF THE  
EU ENLARGEMENT: WHAT CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE CO-OPERATION  
WITHIN THE EAST EUROPEAN REGION”**

Ukrainian House (Ukrainskij Dim),  
Kyiv (Ukraine) 9 and 10 October 2003

**PROGRAMME**

**Eve of Day one**

Arrival of participants

8.30 pm Reception given by **Mr Mykola Bilokon**, Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Hotel Ukraina

**Day One**

8.00 –9.00 Registration of participants

**9.00 – 10.30** *Opening Session*

9.00 – 10.00 Opening of the Conference by :

**Mrs Maria Ochoa-Llidó**, Head of the Migration and Roma Department, on behalf of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

**Mr Mykola Bilokon**, Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine,

**Ambassador Johannes Landman**, Vice-Chairman of the Ministers' Deputies of the Council of Europe,

**Mr Tadeusz Iwinski**, Chair of the PACE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, and

**Mr Oleksandr Motsyk**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

10.00 – 10.30 Coffee break

10.30 – 12.45 *Session 1: Migratory movements across the Eastern borders of Europe*

**Topics for discussion:**

- i. *Regional overview of migration movements;*
- ii. *Current and future trends;*
- iii. *Identification of issues: :*
  - a. *Economic, social, demographic and political basis of modern migration;*
  - b. *integration of migrants by strengthening legal status of regular migrants;*
  - c. *preventing irregular migration*
  - d. *involvement of organised crime*
  - e. *co-operation and solidarity between all countries from the region*

10.30 – 10.50 *Introduction: Eastern Europe: Current and Future Migration Trends*, by Dr Irina Ivakhniouk, Deputy Director of Department of Population, Faculty of Economics, Moscow State "Lomonosov" University, Russia

10.50 – 11.40 **Point of view of the different actors:**  
*Migration in the Caucasus Region: Trends, Determinants and Perspectives*, by Mr Dalkhat M. Ediev, Prof. of Karachay-Cherkessian State Technological Academy

*Migration trends between Belarus and the EU*, by Prof. Liudmila Shakhotska, Deputy Director on Science, Head of Department of Demography, Research Institute of Statistics, Belarus

*Representatives of non-members countries :*

Mr Tarik Ahsan, Director for Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh,

Mrs Xiaolan Hu, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of and Mrs Jixiu Han, Desk Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China

Mr Syed Nayyar Hassnain Haider, Ministry of Interior of Pakistan

Mr Truong Xuan Thanh, Deputy General Director of Consular Department and Mrs Tran Thi Tam, Acting Head of Immigration Division, Consular Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Vietnam

11.40– 12.45 Debate

12.45 – 14.15 Lunch break



14.15 – 18.00	<i>Session 2 : The EU enlargement and international migration from and within the region</i>
	<b><u>Topics for discussion:</u></b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. <i>impact of geopolitical changes on sending and receiving countries;</i></li> <li>ii. <i>freedom of movement and migration restrictions;</i></li> <li>iii. <i>social and economic consequences on “border” countries;</i></li> <li>iv. <i>managing migration through regional co-operation;</i></li> <li>v. <i>implications of the rise of international terrorism and the measures taken to combat it;</i></li> </ul>
14.15 – 14.30	<b>Introduction: <i>The EU policies toward to third countries nationals</i></b> , by Mrs France Mochel, European Commission, DG JAI Unity A2 Immigration and Asylum
14.30 – 15.10	<p><b>The point of view of the different actors:</b></p> <p><i>Characteristics of migration in the Republic of Belarus</i>, by Mr S. Charnysh, Chief Expert, Migration Department Ministry of Labour and Social Defense, Belarus</p> <p><i>Enlargement of the EU and situation of migration in the member States of the Community of Independent States : co-operation to combat irregular migration</i>, by Mr Oleg Putintsev, Director of Department of Security and Co-operation in combating criminality, Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of the Independent States</p> <p><i>Effective migration policy – what kind of technical assistance?</i>, by Mrs Olga Shumylo, Programme Manager of ‘Ukraine’s European Choice’, International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev</p>
15.10 – 16.30	<p><b><i>Panel discussion on the impact of EU enlargement on international migration from and within the region :</i></b></p> <p>Mrs Gloria Moreno-Fontes Chammartin, International Labour Migration Branch (ILO)</p> <p>Mr Guy Ouellet, UNHCR Representative in Kiev</p> <p>M. Jean-Christophe Dumont, Division des économies non membres et des migrations internationales (OECD)</p> <p>Mr Andreas Halbach, Regional Coordinator for Follow-up to the 1996 Geneva Conference (IOM)</p> <p>Mr Oleg Putintsev, Director of Department of Security and Co-operation in combating criminality (CIS)</p>
16.30 – 16.45	Coffee break
16.45 – 18.00	Debate
19.30	Reception given by the Council of Europe in Hotel Ukraina

## Day Two

9.00 – 12.30

*Session 3 : The Council of Europe migration management strategy – implementation issues*

**Topics for discussion:**

- i. *Migration Management Strategy – safe basis to meet political, humanitarian, economic and social requirements*
- ii. *Enhancing co-operation within the region and between countries of origin and countries of destination based on principle of “sharing responsibility”*
- iii. *Managing migration and co-operation at the local/regional authorities level*
- iv. *Economic issues : Aid and sustainable development*

9.00 – 10.00

Introduction, *by Mrs Maria Ochoa-Llidó, Head of the Migration and Roma Department, Council of Europe*

**Preventing irregular migration as one of the important aspects of national regulation of migratory processes**, by Mr Oleksandr Perov, Director of Department for citizenship, immigration and registration of persons, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine

**Make the integration of immigrants successful: challenges for migrants, hosting societies and countries of origin**, introduced by Dr. Eva Orsos Hegyesi, Former Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Health, Social and Family Affairs, Hungary

**Gender issues in migration policies**, by Mrs Gloria Moreno-Fontes Chammartin, International Labour Migration Branch (ILO)

**Migration management from the perspective of a developing country**, by Mr Tarik Ahsan, Director for Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh

10.00 – 10.45

**Point of view of the different actors:**

Mr Andreas Halbach, Regional Coordinator for Follow-up to the 1996 Geneva Conference (IOM)

Mr Oleksandr Perov, Director of Department for citizenship, immigration and registration of persons, Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ukraine)

Ms Nassia Ioannou, Chair of the Committee of Experts on the Implementation of the Migration Management Strategy (MG-FL)

Mr Mehmet Emre, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director General at the Ministry of the Republic of Turkey

Mr Marek Szonert, Head of European Integration and International co-operation Dept, Office for Repatriation and Aliens, Poland

**Point of view of non-members countries:**

Mr Tarik Ahsan, Director for Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh,

Mrs Xiaolan Hu, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China,

Mr Syed Nayyar Hassnain Haider, Ministry of Interior of Pakistan

Mr Truong Xuan Thanh, Deputy General- Director of the Consular Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam

Mr Alexey Bichurin, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belarus

10.45 – 11.00 Coffee break

11.00 – 12.30 Debate

*12.30– 13.30 Closing session*

12.30– 13.00 **Presentation of the General Rapporteur's conclusions**, Prof. Vira Naniwska, Director of the International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev

**Closing remarks** by **Mr Viktor Zubchuk**, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine

13.00– 13.30 **Press Conference**

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